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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen an increase in the number and severity of Information
Operations (10) attacks upon DoD resources. At a higher level, the US as a whole has
come under cyber attack by individuals and groups seeking thrills, monetary gain,
publicity for their causes, and myriad other goals. This effort develops a first cut model
of individual hacker mentality that can be utilized to improve threat assessment, mitigate
Information Assurance (IA) vulnerabilities, and improve risk assessment. Further, it is a
first step toward automated characterization of Information Warfare (IW) attacks based
upon hacker types.
All hackers are not the same. In order to best deal with their actions and the intent
behind their actions, one must understand who they are. Many hackers are not malicious,
in that they hack for the thrill of learning and to "look around". However, others are
intent upon gathering information for gain (profit or intelligence aspects), corrupting data
or denying access to the system, or to see what harm they can cause. Research for this
effort specifically focused on malicious hackers working for nation states, although the
basic framework presented applies in part to any type of hacker. This results in advances
in the way that hackers are classified and profiled, with a better understanding of their
values, skills, and approaches to hacking. Responses can then be tailored to specifics of a
given class of hackers. The model developed is illustrated by a case study.
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MALICIOUS HACKERS:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY
1. Introduction

1.1. Background
Recent years have shown an increase in the number and severity of computer
network incidents on Department of Defense (DoD) resources. The threat that
individuals and groups will launch a successful computer based, asymmetric attack
against DoD resources is real. At a higher level, the United States (US) as a whole has
come under cyber attack by individuals and groups seeking thrills, monetary gain,
publicity for their causes, and a myriad of other goals. Figure 1-1 shows the growing
trend in computer security incidents being reported to the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT). This research effort develops a model of individual hacker
mentality, focusing on average members of foreign government 10 groups, that can be
utilized to improve threat assessment, mitigate Information Assurance (IA)
vulnerabilities, and improve risk assessment for the DoD, other US government agencies,
and US-based corporations. Further, it is a first step toward automated characterization
of Information Operations (10) and Information Warfare (IW) attacks based upon hacker
types.
The Air Force defines Information Operations (10) as those operations that are
conducted to defend one's own, or attack an enemy's, information or information systems
(AFDD 2-5, 1998: i). This concept for 10 applies to all military operations from peace
up to and including war and the return to peace (AFDD 2-5, 1998: vii). AFDD 2-5
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further defines information warfare (IW) as information operations conducted to pursue
one's specific objectives against a specific opponent during times of crises or conflict
(APDD 2-5, 1998: 42). Finally, Information Assurance (IA) efforts are activities that
defend information and information systems from attack. These activities seek to ensure
the availability of the information and information systems, the integrity of the
information, authentication of the data and of system users, confidentiality of the data,
and provide for non-repudiation (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 41).
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Figure 1-1 US Security Incident Trends (CERT, 2001)

Potential threats to Department of Defense (DoD) systems include foreign and
domestic, overt and covert attempts to exploit DoD information and information systems
(JP 3-13, 1998: III-6). Domestic threats, those launched from within the United State's
borders, present a counter-intelligence situation, but are handled as a law enforcement
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issue in accordance with intelligence oversight regulations (JP 3-13, 1998: III-6). The
types of attacks experienced in the US to date include both unstructured and structured
attacks (Lemon, 2000).
Unstructured attacks include hackers acting alone or in small groups for
individual goals (financial gain, thrills, or both) in traditional categories of novice and
expert, malicious and non-malicious (Lemon, 2000). The novice attacks often just copy
code easily obtained on the World Wide Web - members of this category are often
referred to as "script kiddies". Structured attacks have clear objectives, have financial
backing, are organized, and have means in place to support collection of information
about the target information or information systems (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 6).
At a more serious level than script kiddies are the structured attacks by
transnational and national groups. Some authors describe these groups as Political and
Governmental, with Governmental being a higher level of the Political (Vanesevich,
2000) category. Lemon, in a Computer Systems and Networks threat briefing, describes
transnational groups as semi-structured, using the phrase "hactivism" (Lemon, 2000).
This category includes such activities as efforts by a Muslim interest group, a Tamil
Tigers group, the Russian hackers union, and Chinese citizens' efforts following the
accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo conflict. These
groups often launch a cyberprotest using Denial of Service and website hacks with some
limited warnings prior to action.
The third, and perhaps most serious, group are the nation states. These are
considered "enterprise", or very structured / doctrinal, attacks. Russia has the oldest IO
program among nation states (Lemon, 2000). The Russians equate fW on the same level
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of seriousness as nuclear attacks. The Chinese have even conducted 10 efforts as part of
their military exercises (Borland, 2000). According to Newsweek, as many as 13
countries, including France and Israel, have 10 activities directed at the US (Vistica,
2000). Finally, there is the potential for surrogates to be used as a means of IW attack.
This could either be groups (transnational or national) hiring "outside" expertise in IO, or
groups developing their own attacks and releasing these "tools" on the web for use by
script kiddies. It can be very hard to trace these surrogate attacks to the underlying
group.
In October 1996, then CIA Director John Deutch called cyberspace attack the
third most important threat to national security (Scott, 1996: 60). USAF Lt. Gen. Lincoln
D. Faurer expanded this view, saying that the results of a cyberspace attack could equal
that of a conventional war. Leadership at all levels of the Department of Defense (DoD)
has long recognized the importance of IO and IW. Former USAF Chief of Staff Gen.
Ronald Fogleman highlighted the importance of IO concepts in a 1995 speech
"Fundamentals of Information Warfare - An Airman's View". Gen. Fogleman stressed
that enemies see our computer networks and weapon systems in the same way that we see
their computer infrastructure - as key targets in future conflicts (Fogleman, 1995). The
widespread and growing integration of information technologies into day-to-day Air
Force operations only makes these targets more valuable. The interdependent nature of
the military and national information infrastructures could be the weak spot that allows a
conventionally inferior enemy to win in a conflict with the United States (AFDD 2-5,
1998: 6). China views this asymmetric impact of IW attack as a key benefit of IW
(Farris, 2000: 4).
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The Army and Air Force have already begun to raise concerns over the growing
DoD dependence upon Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) and Government-off-the-Shelf
(GOTS) software in new weapon systems. These software packages are readily available
to potential enemies who can then identify the system's inherent security weaknesses
(Stevens, 1996: 46). This threat has grown with globalization of software companies.
Parts of software code are written in countries throughout the world, with the software
companies themselves unsure of the exact nature of all of the lines of code (Lemon,
2000). The rapid growth of the worldwide computer network has exposed parts of our
capabilities and weaknesses to the world at large as never before.
News articles reporting incidents of computer break-ins and computer crime are
on the rise. The Pentagon itself is currently hacked over 250,000 times a year, with over
500 attacks seen as serious efforts to gain classified information (Vistica, 2000). This
number does not include attacks upon the individual services, or worse, those attacks that
go unnoticed. Michelle Van Cleave, general counsel to the US Senate Judiciary
subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information believes that
countries of concern that have a level of computer skill could develop weapons that
would wreck havoc on the US if properly used by an adversary (Borland, 2000). At the
terrorist level, the Irish Republican Army and Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers have begun
developing a background in IW. 1998 saw the Tamil Tigers using weapons such as email bombs in their attacks against Sri Lanka's government (Borland, 2000).
The cost of these attacks, both in direct economic losses and in costs associated
with tracking down those involved, is growing. Estimated losses have grown from $100
million in 1997 to $123.8 million in 1999 (Computer Security Institute, 2000). These
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amounts are based only on the losses that could be quantified and that were reported;
30% of those companies reporting losses could not determine exact figures for losses of
such things as proprietary information or from denial of service.
In order to secure systems against attacks, information system security must focus
on several areas. These include confidentiality, protection from computer viruses and
other efforts to deny service, protection from alteration or destruction of data, and
providing a high level of confidence that data exchanges are only between approved and
authorized users (Minihan, 1996: 17). Data encryption, access controls, data
authentication, digital signatures, and Internet security protocols are all tools to increase
information protection. Another tool is profiling of the potential attackers, which is the
focus of this research effort.
1.2. Problem Statement
All hackers are not the same; they differ in skill level, motivations, and methods
(Lemon, 2000; Vanesevich, 2000). In order to best deal with their actions and the intent
behind their actions, one must understand who they are. A large number of hackers are
not malicious, in that they hack into a system for the thrill of learning and to "see what
they can see". However, other hackers are intent upon gathering information for gain
(profit or intelligence aspects), corrupting data or denying access to the system, or just to
see what harm they can cause. For the purpose of this research, the term "hacker" will be
used to describe an individual who maliciously, or without authorization, breaks in to a
computer system, whether to gain information or exploit the system in some other
fashion. Research for this effort was specifically focused on malicious hackers working
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for nation states, although the basic framework presented would apply in part to any type
of hacker. This thesis reviews existing methods and proposes advances in the way that
hackers are classified and profiled, with the goal of a better understanding of their values,
skills, and approaches to hacking. By understanding the enemy, responses can be tailored
to the specifics of a given class of hackers, leading the way to improved automated
response (both capability restoration and attack response) and attack characterization, as
well as system defense based upon the need to protect specific information from specific
adversaries.
1.3. Problem Approach
This effort develops a scripted profile of the behavior of individual computer
hackers by descriptive modeling of hacker types. A scripted profile uses set details about
hackers, their motivations, and actions as a sort of "checklist" to describe specific
individuals or members of groups. The hacker mentality model developed specifically
describes this "Political and Governmental" group of hackers (Vanesevich, 2000), based
upon behavioral characteristics. It is envisioned that transnational groups and national
groups will be sufficiently different that they will warrant separate detailed models,
although different cases of each group could be described within that group's framework.
Common aspects of the two groups (transnational and national) will be due to the ties of
individual hackers to group goals. However, the way that the two groups approach 10
and IW may differ. For example, Lemon sees attacks by hackers with ties to a national
group to be more doctrinal (Lemon, 2000). This doctrinal approach may translate to
different individual motivations and actions as compared to those of a hacker from a less
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structured group. The end result is a behavioral model for a hacker within a specific type
of social (transnational or national) framework.
Data from past documented cases of hacking can be used to explore
characteristics of hackers that can be obtained from the evidence they leave behind.
Multivariate analysis of substantiated attacks would prove useful in exploring similarities
and differences within the hacker culture. Suggested techniques include cluster analysis,
discriminant analysis, and canonical correlation (Mardia, 1994). The objective is to find
aspects of substantiated attacks that are in common and not in common, with the goal of
separating types of hackers by those aspects. While script kiddies may provide the
majority of data, it is the structured attacks that are of interest.
The primary basis of the model developed in this thesis will be an Ishikawa
(fishbone) diagram from Total Quality Management. This tool provides a clear picture of
the key aspects of the profile, and allows for the hierarchy to be developed at any level
needed or desired. The Ishikawa diagram has the added benefit of allowing for
interrelationships among areas of the model, which can provide additional insight into the
individual being profiled. More details of the Ishikawa diagram, and the process by
which it is built, are provided in 3.1.
1.4. Research Scope
This thesis approaches the problem of malicious hackers from a military
perspective. While the military shares vulnerabilities and concerns with other
governmental and commercial sectors, the proposed model framework focuses on some
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of the aspects of hackers that are unique to the military. For this reason, the proposed
model may not address all aspects relevant to these other sectors of society.
While many classifications of hackers have been proposed (as discussed later),
this effort specifically focuses on malicious hackers that are actors for foreign
governments. The model developed in this research seeks aspects of the behavior and
motivations of these actors that will help IA personnel more readily identify events
attributable to foreign nations. Data on substantiated attacks, where available, will assist
in model validation. A related area, analyzed to a lesser extent, is terrorists and
transnational criminals. Other groups of hackers, such as insiders and those not affiliated
with other than their peers in the world of hacking, are not addressed.
One specific limitation of this effort is the amount and type of data that is
available. According to the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT),
only a small fraction of suspicious connections to the AF networks are attributed to true
"incidents" each year. Statistics for 1999 show 71 incidents found among 368 million
suspicious connections. This means that the number of attacks that could be attributed to
hackers of interest will be limited. In addition, while several efforts have been made to
survey hackers, such as that provided by John Vanesevich's AntiOnline article on hacker
profiling (Vanesevich, 2000: n.pg) and Taylor's Hackers, care must be exercised in
interpreting the results. There is no assurance that the respondents to surveys or
interviews are truly hackers, that they are of the skill level professed, or that they are
responding in accordance with their true feelings or thoughts. That being said, this
research has been conducted within the limits of the available resources.
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1.5. Assumptions
The framework utilized in this thesis relies on some basic, key assumptions:
•

A threat warning and assessment has already been accomplished for the group
of interest;

•

Data is available from previous attacks originating in the country of interest.

1.6. Overview and Format
The remainder of this thesis begins in Chapter 2 with a review of relevant
references, sorted by topics such as Information Operations, hackers, the general concept
of profiling, and proposed models / frameworks. These works supply a scope to the
methodologies and concepts that might prove useful in describing malicious hackers
employed by nation states. Chapter 3 develops a framework for analyzing foreign
governments hackers, developing key aspects such as motivations, intents, skills, and
approach. Insight from the references in Chapter 2 will be used to help "feed" the model
developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 demonstrates and refines the framework developed by
way of a case study of the Chinese and their published views of Information Operations
and the future of warfare. Finally, Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the framework
developed and the case study, and provides recommendations for future efforts.
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2. Review of Relevant References
Since this is a relatively new area of research, there is limited relevant prior direct
research to reference. Much of the supporting data for the effort will be gleaned from
recently published books on Information Security (Anonymous, 1998; Denning, 1999;
McClure, 1999), technical reports, and from news articles. The following review
intended to serve four main purposes:
•

Identify current military views of information operation and information warfare
as they apply to state sponsored hackers;

•

Identify past efforts to quantify individual hackers and types of hackers;

•

Provide appropriate background information in criminal profiling, motivation and
behavioral theory, and multivariate analysis of data; and,

•

Provide appropriate background information required to develop a scripted profile
of state-sponsored hackers.

2.1. Information Operations
There are many available policy documents and studies that address how the
nature of war is changing with the advent of widespread computer technology. Those
with the most bearing on this effort are discussed in this section. A key concept,
expressed in the Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDD), is that doctrine must be "alive",
it must change with the times if it is to be effective (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: v). AFDD 2-1.5
suggests that, as technology changes, "new concepts, systems, and procedures" must be
developed (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 2). With the rapidly evolving nature of IW, those seeking
to define their own doctrine, or to understand a potential adversary's doctrine, must at
least keep pace with the times, if not "move out in front" to set the pace.
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2.1.1. Joint Publications (JP) 3-13
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided overall, authoritative guidance for US
forces with regard to Information Operations. As mentioned previously, 10 "apply across
all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations, and at every level
of war" (JP 3-13, 1998:1-1). It is noted that the boundaries between levels of conflict are
more fluid with 10 than other types of military operations, providing the chance that
effects of 10 may be more widespread than was planned, as is shown in Figure 2-1. IW
acts, then, are those 10 directed during time of war or crisis to achieve specific objectives
over a specific enemy. Joint doctrine defines these enemies broadly. An adversary might
be a group, organization, or decision maker that could affect the success of joint
operations (JP 3-13, 1998:1-1). IW can be used to shape the battlespace and prepare for
future operations (JP 3-13, 1998:1-4). However, intelligence preparation of the
battlespace is vital to successful 10 and IW (JP 3-13,1998:1-18). This includes efforts
such as gathering information on an adversary's information infrastructure and related
activities.
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Peace —!-►
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► Conflict
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Command, Control, Communications, Computers
Intelligence

Figure 2-1IO Relationships Across Time (JP 3-13,1998:1-4)

At the strategic level of war, IO seek to achieve national objectives by impacting
political, military, economic, and informational elements of an adversary's power
structure (JP 3-13, 1998:1-2). It also seeks to protect friendly forces from similar attacks
by enemy forces. Offensive IO at the strategic level attempts to influence enemy
leadership to deter crisis or rapidly end hostilities (JP 3-13,1998:11-10). Additionally,
offensive IO attempts to limit social, economic, and political effects associated with
conventional weapons use, speeding recovery once hostilities end (JP 3-13,1998:11-10).
A warning is in order with respect to this concept, since not all countries may be as
cautious with regard to synergistic effects. For example, interdependencies in the world
financial markets could lead to widespread devastation if an adversary destroyed or
degraded key friendly force economies.
Operational level IO supports operations at the campaign or major operation level
(JP 3-13, 1998:1-2). Targets include enemy lines of communication, logistics, and
command and control. These operations support higher-level goals by degrading the
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adversary's ability to wage war, while protecting friendly forces information superiority
(JP 3-13, 1998:1-3). Offensive 10 at the operational level focuses on adversary forces or
capabilities in the combatant commanders Area of Responsibility (AOR) (JP 3-13, 1998:
11-10). These 10 targets may also have strategic value in demonstrating US resolve. In
peacetime, offensive and defensive 10 at this level may assist in deterrence, assist in
operational assessments and estimates, provide situational awareness, and support
contingency plans and operations (JP 3-13,1998:11-10). In crisis and conflict, offensive,
operational level 10 may help the combatant commander seize and sustain the initiative
(JP 3-13, 1998:11-10).
Tactical level objectives for 10 involve specific objectives to affect enemy
information and information systems that directly relate to the conduct of military
operations while protecting friendly force capabilities (JP 3-13,1998:1-3). At the tactical
level, 10 may be lead at the joint level, by a single service, or by a component
commander. Offensive 10 attempts to deny, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise control the
enemy's use of and access to information and information systems (JP 3-13,1998: II-l 1).
The human element is still the focus of operations at the tactical level. Tactical 10
attempts to affect the will of the enemy's military forces and general popular support (JP
3-13,1998:11-11).
Joint doctrine specifically allows for the employment of offensive 10 when
deemed appropriate (JP 3-13, 1998:1-5). Offensive 10 may be used to neutralize
adversary capabilities prior to their use against friendly forces, or in response to
adversary 10 employment (JP 3-13, 1998: III-7). 10 may be used in three ways: as a
stand-alone operation, a supported operation, or a supporting operation. A stand-alone
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Operation involves 10 as the only strategy against the adversary. If 10 is the main effort
against the adversary, but other capabilities are required, it is a supported operation.
Finally, if 10 is a force multiplier within a conventional campaign, it is a supporting
operation (JP 3-13,1998: VI-2).
US troops and weapons systems are growing more reliant upon information and
information systems. These systems have inherent vulnerabilities as a consequence of
enhanced functionality, ease of use, compatibility, and efficiency. For example, the
move to Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment results in cheaper hardware and
software, but allows potential adversaries the opportunity to exploit known vulnerabilities
in these systems. Additionally, much Department of Defense (DoD) nonclassified
information moves over commercial infrastructure, yet the DoD does not have authority
to protect the commercial infrastructure it depends on (JP 3-13, 1998:1-12). These
commercial systems then become choice targets for potential adversaries. Information
and information systems that are integrated, shared, or synchronized during multinational
operations present additional key targets to adversaries (JP 3-13, 1998: III-3).
Joint doctrine states that 10 is essential to achieving a joint force commander's
(JFC) objectives (JP 3-13, 1998:1-3). Additionally, IO "may have their greatest impact
as a deterrent in peace and during the initial stages of crisis" (JP 3-13, 1998:1-3). This
includes the need for access to information from outside the operational area. The Air
Force's Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) relies upon reachback capabilities to limit
its in theater footprint. All branches of the military need "frequent, instant, and reliable
access to information" to support intelligence efforts and decision making (JP 3-13, 1998:
1-15). Doctrine states that information and information systems will be protected relative
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to the value of information they contain and the risks of compromise or loss of the
information (JP 3-13, 1998:1-5).
Several key definitions relating to 10 are provided in Table 2-1 10 Terminology.

Table 2-1IO Terminology
Definition

Term
Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Information
Information Assurance

Information-based Processes
Information Operations (10)

Offensive 10

Defensive 10
Information Superiority
Information System

Information Warfare (IW)

Operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers
and networks themselves.
Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form.
10 that protects and defends information systems. Ensures
availability and integrity of data, authentication, confidentiality,
and nonrepudiation.
Processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information in
any medium or form.
Actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems, while defending one's own information and
information systems.
10 involving integrated use of capabilities and activities,
supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers and
achieve specific objectives.
10 that integrates policies and procedures, operations, personnel,
and technology to protect information and information systems.
The capability to collect, process, and disseminate information
while exploiting or denying that ability to the enemy.
Infrastructure, organizations, personnel, and components that
collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on
information.
IO conducted during time of crisis or war to achieve specific
objectives over a specific adversary
Source: JP 3-13,1-9-1-11

In order to plan offensive and defensive 10, the nature of a specific threat must be
understood. JP 3-13 states that an 10 threat should be defined in terms of "a specific
adversary's intent, vulnerability, capability, and opportunity to adversely influence the
elements of the friendly information environment critical to achieving objectives" (JP 3-
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13, 1998:1-16,1-18). It defines an adversary as being organized, supported, and
politically sponsored or motivated to affect decision makers (JP 3-13, 1998:1-16). The
effects of targeting enemy information and information systems can focus upon a
widespread or narrow range of enemy systems and capabilities (JP 3-13, 1998:11-10).
JP 3-13 addresses both offensive and defensive operations. Both depend upon
information to plan and conduct operations. However, due to the nature of this research
effort, only the offensive side of 10 and IW will be discussed. US offensive 10 doctrine
will be used to provide insight into that of potential adversaries. The grand target of
offensive 10 is the adversary's human decision making processes (JP 3-13, 1998: II-l).
Potential IO targets are presented in Figure 2-2. Offensive 10 objectives must be clear,
support higher-level objectives, and provide identifiable measures of success (JP 3-13,
1998: II-l). The US limits it employment of offensive 10 in some situations. Actions
must be appropriate for the specific situation and consistent with stated objectives.
Additionally, the actions must be "permissible under the law of armed conflict, consistent
with applicable domestic and international law, and in accordance with applicable rules
of engagement" (JP 3-13, 1998: II-l). Finally, the value of a target as an exploitable
intelligence source must be weighed against the need for its destruction or damage. A
target can be isolated, neutralized, or bypassed in order to keep its intelligence value
intact while supporting other operational needs for offensive maneuver (JP 3-13,1998:
11-14). To ensure efficient 10 attacks, one must:
•
•
•

Understand the adversary's perspective and how 10 may influence
it.
Establish clear 10 objectives
Identify the value, use, and flow of information, and its
vulnerability
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Identify specific targets to meet objectives
Determine target sets
Determine the best set of capabilities to use against the targets
Predict consequences of employing specific capabilities at a
predetermined level of confidence
Obtain approval to employ offensive 10
Identify support necessary to support assessment
Integrate, coordinate, and implement 10
Evaluate outcomes (JP 3-13, 1998: II-1 -II-2).

MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE
Communications
Intelligence
Logistics
Operations

LEADERSHIP
Civilian
Military
Social
Cultural

}
WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Aircraft
11...
Ships
Artillery
Precision-Guided Munitions
Air Defense

CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE
Telecommunications
Transportation
Energy
IV. ^^ Finance
Manufacturing
$£<

Figure 2-2 Examples of Potential IO Targets (JP 3-13,1998:1-17)

Military operations or capabilities such as electronic attack (EW) and physical
attack / destruction may be combined with 10 to produce a synergistic effect (JP 3-13,
1998: II-3). Six of these key capabilities, as they apply to 10, are summarized in
Table 2-2 Key Military Capabilities.
Offensive 10 can be used in peacetime with approval of the National Command
Authority (NCA). In these cases, 10 is used to support peace, as a deterrent or power
projection, and to control escalation of hostilities (JP 3-13, 1998: II-8). Offensive 10
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may also be used during Military Operation Other than War (MOOTW) not involving the
threat or use of force. 10 would seek to affect adversary Courses of Action (CO A) or
degrade the adversary's ability to respond. In this case, 10 supports objectives of
maintaining or returning to peace (JP 3-13, 1998: II-8). 10 could also be used to prepare
the battlespace and set conditions favorable to friendly force goals in case escalation into
violence occurred (JP 3-13, 1998: II-9).

Table 2-2 Key Military Capabilities

Key IO Concepts

Term
Operations Security (OPSEC)

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Military Deception

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Physical Attack / Destruction

Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Seeks to deny the enemy access to critical information about
friendly force capability and intentions in order to slow
enemy decision processes. Requires knowledge of enemy's
intelligence systems and the time required for information to
reach decision makers.
Actions taken to "convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences" in order to influence
emotions, motives, reasoning and behavior.
Affects enemy decision makers' intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination systems in order to cause
specific behavior based upon inaccurate impressions of the
situation. This requires precise knowledge of the enemy
and his decision making process.
Any military action involving directed energy or
electromagnetic weapons to control the electromagnetic
spectrum. EW consists of Electronic Attack (EA),
Electronic Protection (EP), and Electronic Warfare Support
(ES).
Operations involving traditional "hard kill" weapons against
targets as part of an overall 10 effort (i.e. communications
lines connecting information systems).
Actions taken to deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy
information or information systems and / or the computer
systems in which the information resides.
Source: JP 3-13, II-3 - II-6, B-C-l, GL-5
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All levels of 10 require intelligence support. Intelligence collection sources must
be broad-based, including both covert, national-level operations and open sources such as
the media, commercial contacts and publications, academia, the Internet, and resident
foreign nationals (JP 3-13, 1998:11-12). Intelligence processes must be in place to
collect, store, analyze, and retrieve information needed to support 10 in a timely manner
(JP 3-13, 1998: II-l 1). One key area of intelligence support is Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlespace (IPB), a continuous process used to develop detailed knowledge of
adversary information and information systems. This includes

Technical knowledge of a wide number of information systems;
Knowledge of adversary political, economic, social, and cultural
influences;
Template development to portray the battlespace, and refine targets
and methods for offensive 10 COAs;
An understanding of the adversary's decision making processes
(content and timelines);
An in-depth understanding, including motivations and leadership
styles, of key adversary leaders, decision makers, and advisors; and
Knowledge of geography, atmosphere, and littoral influences as
they apply to the AOR (JP 3-13, 1998:11-12 -11-13).
Section 4 of Chapter III in JP 3-13 deals with 10 attack detection. It provides
concepts and ideas that should be included in the hacker mentality model being
developed. For example, not only must potential adversaries and their capabilities be
identified, but their potential ability to affect friendly forces' information and information
systems must be determined (JP 3-13, 1998:111-10). Intelligence activities provide
warnings and assessments of potential adversary actions and cue intelligence collection to
specific activity indicators (JP 3-13, 1998:111-10). This could include technological
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developments, threats to friendly force military, political, or economic interests,
forewarning of actions or intentions of adversaries, or notice of imminent hostilities (JP
3-13,1998:111-11).
Effective and properly focused response to 10 attack requires timely identification
of potential adversaries and their intents, with analytical results linked to decision
makers. Traditional indications and warnings (I&W) must be expanded to better reflect
unique characteristics of 10 (JP 3-13, 1998: III-l 1). Some of the traditional I&W include
adversary, or potential adversary,

Capabilities;
Intentions, preparations, deployments and related activities, and
potential 10 attack methods;
Motivations, goals, and objectives;
Changes in force dispositions, military and nonmilitary activities
that could support 10; and
Required mobilization preparations required to initiate 10 and
mobilization status (JP 3-13, 1998: HI-11 -111-12).

The last sections of JP 3-13 deal with organization of Information Operations
elements and 10 planning. Doctrine stresses that 10 organizational structure should be
flexible, meeting the needs of a wide range of planning and operational situations (JP 313, 1998: rV-1). 10 planning consists of both deliberate and crisis action planning.
Deliberate plans are laid during peacetime in anticipation of subsequent need for 10
during war and MOOTW (JP 3-13, 1998: V-l). They provide a general guide to 10
planning for potential future crises (JP 3-13, 1998: V-6). Crisis action planning deals
with quickly arising, unplanned for contingencies, and hence have a compressed time
schedule (JP 3-13, 1998: V-6).
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10 planning requires clear national strategic guidance to combatant commanders
(JP 3-13, 1998: V-l). Commanders must then provide 10 planners guidance on
constraints, restrictions, and assumptions. This establishes boundaries for 10 plans,
provides policy limits on target identification, and reduces uncertainty in the planning
process (JP 3-13, 1998: V-l-V-2). Planners must analyze the risks of compromise,
adversary reprisal, collateral damage, and hostility escalation associated with 10 (JP 3-13,
1998: V-l). An orderly process and schedule for decision making relating to 10 is also
required. Aspects of 10 can require long-term development of intelligence and EPB,
often beginning in peacetime (JP 3-13,1998: V-2). In some cases, IPB for 10 may
require more lead time and/or have expanded collection requirements than traditional
operations (JP 3-13, 1998: V-3). Figure 2-3 illustrates key steps in 10 planning.
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Figure 2-3 Templating IO Planning and Assessments (JP 3-13,1998: V-4)
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10 planners must identify adversary strengths and vulnerabilities, identify
opportunities and means to exploit vulnerabilities, and devise tasks and subtasks to
accomplish objectives (JP 3-13, 1998: V-3). Identification of adversary strategic and
operational centers of gravity is fundamental to 10 planning. Finally, Two levels of
approval authority are required for 10 tasks. Release authority provides approval for use
of 10 and generally specifies means and capabilities provided to the execution authority.
Execution authority is the actual authority to conduct 10 at a given time and/or place (JP
3-13,1998: V-3).
2.1.2. AFDD 1 - Air Force Basic Doctrine
AFDD 1 is the primary statement of US Air Force basic doctrine. It is meant to
provide a common basis upon which airmen base their decisions (AFDD 1, 1997: 1).
Doctrine consists of fundamental principles that guide the military actions in support of
national objectives (AFDD 1, 1997: 1).
Three levels of air and space doctrine exist. Basic doctrine, such as that in AFDD
1, states the "most fundamental and enduring beliefs that describe and guide the proper
use of air and space forces" (AFDD 1, 1997: 2). As a result, it provides broad guidance
on how the Air Force is organized and employed (AFDD 1,1997: 2). Operational
doctrine provides more detailed guidance on the organization of the AF and applies basic
doctrine to military actions (AFDD 1, 1997: 2). It shapes basic doctrine to a distinct set
of objectives, force capabilities, functional areas, and operational environments (AFDD
1, 1997: 2). Finally, basic and operational doctrines provide a focus for the development
of missions and tasks executed by tactical doctrine. Tactical doctrine "describes how
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weapon systems are employed to accomplish tactical objectives" (AFDD 1, 1997: 3). It
considers specific tactical objectives and conditions.
Political, economic, and social situations may dictate that strategic and
operational plans differ from accepted doctrine for particular contingencies. This
illustrates the difference between doctrine and strategy. "Military doctrine describes how
a job should be done ... strategy defines how it wü! be done." (AFDD 1,1997: 4)
AFDD 1 lists three enduring elements that describe the nature of war (AFDD 1,
1997: 6). First, "war is an instrument of national policy". As clearly seen in Vietnam,
political objectives shape the scope and intensity of war. Second, "war is a complex and
chaotic human endeavor". The nature of war is shaped by human characteristics such as
frailty and irrationality, the "fog of war". Third, "war is a clash of opposing wills". This
aspect of the nature of war captures the unpredictability of a human opponent. The will
of both leadership and the nation as a whole will be tested by war. The will to prosecute
or resist can be a key element of success (AFDD 1,1997: 6).
War can be described in many ways. It does not require a formal declaration of
war for the military to be engaged in combat (AFDD 1, 1997: 7). In many cases,
operations are not conducted as a declared war, or even a preplanned contingency (AFDD
1, 1997: 7).
War is a multidimensional activity that can be categorized in various
ways: by intensity (low to high); by duration (short or protracted); by the
means employed (conventional, unconventional, nuclear); or by the
objectives/resources at stake (general or limited war) (AFDD 1, 1997: 7).
Regardless of the specific form of war being waged, nine "principles of war" have
been seen to hold true. These are unity of command, objective, offensive, mass,
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maneuver, economy of force, security, surprise, and simplicity. The principles of war are
generally accepted "truths" that remain self-evident over time. Table 2-3 Principles of
War summarizes the key elements of these principles of war.

Table 2-3 Principles of War

Concepts

Principle
Unity of Command
Objective

Offensive
Mass
Maneuver
Economy of Force
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

All efforts are focused toward a common objective,
and are directed by a single commander.
Military operations should support clearly defined
and attainable objectives that contribute to strategic,
operational, or tactical goals.
One seeks to dictate the time, place, purpose, scope,
intensity, and pace of operations.
Combat power should be focused at a decisive time
and place to achieve optimum results.
The enemy is placed at a disadvantage by flexible
application of combat power.
Forces should be allocated in the best mix to support
primary objectives.
Forces should be protected from enemy actions that
might provide the enemy an unexpected advantage.
Attacks should come at a time, place, and/or manner
for which the enemy is not prepared.
Military operations should avoid unnecessarily
complex plans, organizations, and guidance.
Source: AFDD 1, 12-21

Many of these principles have special bearing on the conduct of 10. For example,
as with air and space power, 10 does not require the achievement of tactical objectives
before operational and strategic level objectives are pursued (AFDD 1,1997: 13). The
principle of objective seeks to avoid dividing 10 forces to support fragmented objectives.
10 and IW can greatly impact battlespace operations by seizing and maintaining the
initiative. The goal is to force the enemy to react, denying them the offensive, and
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thereby shaping the future of the battlespace (AFDD 1, 1997: 15). This is why 10, as
mentioned in JP 3-13, is a key element at the beginning of a crisis or MOOTW.
Mass in 10 does not require concentration of forces in one location. Rather,
forces can wait to combine at the target site (AFDD 1, 1997: 16). This is what makes
Distributed Denial of Services (DDOS) attacks so "deadly". DDOS is a form of "parallel
attack", which places maximum stress on enemy defenses by presenting multiple crises in
quick succession so that there is no way to respond (AFDD 1, 1997: 24). The effect of
mass for air, space, and 10 forces is through efficiency of attack. "IW can, with
precision, stealth, and the speed of light, affect a variety of functions and capabilities".
(AFDD 1,1997: 16) The principle of maneuver is tied to that of mass by the flexibility,
versatility, and speed of air, space, and 10 forces, allowing simultaneous application of
both (AFDD 1, 1997: 17). Maneuver forces the enemy to react, since they do not know
from what direction an attack might come. With these strengths of IW comes a warning
in the form of economy of force. The contribution of 10 and IW can be greatly
diminished by misuse and misdirection of forces (AFDD 1,1997: 18). Objectives and
priorities should be clearly defined.
The principle of security presents interesting challenges to the DoD.
Traditionally, security was enhanced by remaining out of reach of the enemy whenever
possible. As discussed in StrateRic Information Warfare: A New Face of War, 10 can
allow enemies the opportunity to strike at forces no matter where they are located. 10
has overcome even the traditional sanctuary of the continental US. Additionally, the data
and communications lines, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support that friendly
forces rely on for information and analysis, movement of forces and supplies, and logistic
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support in theater can be attacked at any point in their transmission from supplier to
customer. However, successful security measures conceal friendly force capabilities and
intentions, allowing freedom of movement to gather information on the enemy.
The other side of the coin from security is the element of surprise. 10 and IW
contribute to this principle since they are not inhibited by concepts such as distance or
terrain (AFDD 1, 1997: 20). Force buildups in the realm of cyberspace are not as readily
noticed as traditional forces on the battlefield. As a result, it is harder to notice when an
attack has actually occurred, and from whence it came. Finally, plans, organizations, and
operations should be simple. This allows lower level commanders an element of freedom
in adapting to the battlespace as the situation dictates (AFDD 1, 1997: 21). 10 and IW, to
be successful, must have freedom to react at the speed of the crisis or MOOTW, without
resorting to complex organizational frameworks and guidance.
A final concept for this effort from AFDD 1 is the core competency of
Information Superiority. This concept is similar to the concepts of air and space
superiority - one seeks to gain control over the information realm in order to fully exploit
friendly force information functions while denying those capabilities to the enemy
(AFDD 1, 1997: 31). "Whoever has the best ability to gather, understand, control, and
use information has a substantial advantage." (AFDD 1, 1997: 32) Information
Superiority shapes the adversary's perception of the situation and available courses of
action, and degrades and/or influences their decision making processes (AFDD 1, 1997:
32). AFDD 1 cautions that in seeking Information Superiority we must not expect our
adversaries to react with the same values, preferences, frames of reference, and strategies
that we have developed (AFDD 1, 1997: 40).
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2.1.3. AFDD 2-1.5 Nuclear Operations
While it may seem strange to refer to doctrine on nuclear weapons when
discussing IW, AFDD 2-1.5 addresses how the Air Force views the concept of
deterrence. Similar views could be expressed for a concept of IW deterrence; an idea that
was suggested by Chinese author Shen Weiguang in a February 2, 1999 article in
Jiefangjun Bao (Farris, 2000: 38 - 39). Farris quotes Mr. Weigung as having written,
"Only when we possess the capability to win, and make preparations to win, can we
possibly realize the aim of checking the warfare."
The focus of AFDD 2-1.5 is to "maintain effective forces with sufficient
capability to hold at risk a broad range of targets, while placing great emphasis on safety
and security" (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: v). The goal is a credible posture for deterrence based
on posturing, maintaining, and exercising capable forces, as well as having the intent to
employ those forces if efforts in deterrence fail (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: vi).
Deterrence is defined as
... a state of mind created in an adversary's (or potential adversary's)
leadership. Their leadership must believe the cost of aggression against
the United States, its interests, or its allies will be so high as to outweigh
any possible gain. ... If an enemy believes these tools will not be used,
then their deterrent value is zero (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 2).

As with nuclear weapons, the impact of an IW activity can produce political and
psychological effects far beyond the actual physical effects. Often it may be hard to
determine what these effects might be for nuclear weapons (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 11). The
same could be said for the emerging concept of IW. One example is the effect that these
weapons might have on relations with other nations once they are known to exist or are
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used (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 11). This could justify the US treating IW on the same plane as
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, but does not mean that potential
adversary's will treat IW in the same fashion. Similarly, the potential for severe
collateral effects and unintended consequences has lead to decisions of whether to use, or
threaten to use, nuclear weapons being strictly political (rather than military) (AFDD 21.5, 1998: 1). The US may also decide that, at some levels, IW weapons could also
require the same caution in their use.
Since the key to deterrence is to target those things that an adversary most values,
target selection is based both upon friendly force objectives and enemy objectives
(AFDD 2-1.5,1998: 8). If deterrence fails, targets that could bring a quick end to
hostilities are preferred. Those developing target sets must consider both their own view
of the targets, as well as the perspective of the enemy state (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 8). Two
targeting strategies are countervalue and counterforce. Countervalue targeting "involves
holding enemy cities, industry, and other economic resources at risk" (AFDD 2-1.5,
1998: 8). The goal is large casualties in the short-term, as well as long-term degradation
of the adversary's society (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 8). On the other hand, counterforce
targets are more limited. They constitute targeting of an adversary's immediate ability to
wage war, seeking an "immediate operational effect" (AFDD 2-1.5,1998: 8). This could
consist of actual targeting of enemy troops, weapons stockpiles, planes on the ground, or
similar targets. IW attacks can operate at either the countervalue or counterforce level.
Two final areas of common doctrinal concern between nuclear and IW operations
are the Law of Armed Conflict and war termination. Both will be briefly discussed as IW
doctrine must address them, but they are not a focus of this study. The Law of Armed
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Conflict is based upon a broad group of treaties, customs, and national practices
regarding how war is waged. "This body of international law protects combatants and
noncombatants, safeguards human rights, and facilitates the achievement of peace by
limiting the amount of force and the manner in which it can be applied." (AFDD 2-1.5,
1998: 8). While the idea of counterbalancing military need, proportionality, distinction,
and avoidance of unnecessary suffering has been readily applied to nuclear weapons, the
concept must be explored for IW. A computer virus released by a country in time of war
may have far-reaching and devastating effects upon the world at large.
For the concept of war termination, the goal of nuclear operations is "to achieve
US political objectives and resolve conflict on terms favorable to the United States"
(AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 12). IW, emerging as a new form of war, will have the same goal.
Combat assessment is a tool to determine when to continue or when to terminate a war or
Military Operation Other than War (MOOTW). The three components of combat
assessment are battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessments, and reattack
recommendations. As with nuclear weapons, "intelligence analysts must understand, and
collection assets must be designed to measure, the unique effects" of IW weapons
(AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: 12). The Air Force could use combat assessment tools developed
for friendly force offensive IW actions to gauge the potential effects of enemy IW actions
and to develop defensive measures before these attacks are launched.
2.1.4. AFDD 2-5 Information Operations
AFDD 2-5 specifically addresses the Air Force perspectives on information
warfare and information superiority. It provided the basic definitions of 10 and IW
presented in Chapter 1, and stresses the growing importance of IO in modern warfare.
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Information superiority, domination of the information spectrum, is as critical to military
success as the control of land, air, or space (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 1). Today, the Defense
Information Infrastructure (DII) is partially reliant upon the National Information
Infrastructure (Nil), which is in turn connected to the Global Information Infrastructure
(Gil) (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 4). These interdependences present opportunities for
adversaries to infiltrate and attack any of the interconnected information systems rather
than face the US's strength on the traditional battlefield (AFDD 2-5,1998: 6).
Four threat areas for IW attacks by terrorists, criminals, and hackers are
compromise, deception / corruption, denial / loss, and physical destruction (AFDD 2-5,
1998: 6 - 7). Based upon the work in RAND reports summarized in Section 2.1.5 and
AFDD 2-5, Table 2-4 Information Warfare Threats presents examples of each of the four
threat areas. Examples representing potential hacker attacks, or vulnerabilities that a
hacker might exploit, are marked by an asterisk (*).

Table 2-4 Information Warfare Threats
Compromise
Malicious Code*
System Intrusion*
Psychological
Operations*
Intelligence Collection*
Technology Transfer*
Software Bugs*

Source: AFDD 2-5

Denial / Loss

Destruction

Malicious Code*
System Intrusion*
Lasers
Physical Attack
Nuclear & Non-nuclear
EMP
Virus Insertion*
System Overload*
Radio Frequency
Jamming

Malicious Code*
Bombs
Directed Energy
Weapons
Lasers
Physical Attack
Nuclear & Non-nuclear
EMP
Chemical / Biological
Warfare

Deception /
Corruption
Malicious Code*
System Intrusion*
Military Deception*
Spoofing*
Imitation*

*areas exploitable by hackers
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Defensive counterinformation (DO) focuses on the need to protect information,
information systems, and information operations from enemies (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 10). It
encompasses such concepts as Information Assurance, Operation Security (OPSEC),
Counter-intelligence, Counter PSYOP (psychological operations), Electronic Protection,
and Counterdeception (AFDD 2-5,1998: 3). Defensive counterinformation is the Air
Force's top priority within the rW arena (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 15). Deception operations
attempt to mislead an enemy so that he or she acts according to the deceptor's intent
(AFDD 2-5,1998: 13). Counterdeception, therefore, seeks to help decision makers
identify an enemy's deception attempts. A key factor in successful deception is an
understanding of the cultural, political, and doctrinal framework that the intended target
operates within (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 13). OPSEC focuses on limiting the information
available to adversaries that could be used to derive critical information about DoD
systems (AFDD 2-5,1998: 16). Counterintelligence efforts focus on identifying and
assessing vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adversary (AFDD 2-5,1998: 18).
Social engineering attempts by hackers would represent a vulnerability that
counterintelligence efforts would attempt to mitigate, possibly through personnel
training. Finally, misinformation spread over the Internet would represent an attempt at
psychological operations that Air Force Counterpsychological efforts would attempt to
identify and mitigate.
When perpetrated by a military organization, a hack can be considered an
information attack. "Information attack refers to those activities taken to manipulate or
destroy an adversary's information or information system without necessarily changing
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visibly the physical entity within which it resides." (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 6 - 7) These
attacks can affect decision making by denying access to information, degrading accuracy
of decisions, or denying access to technology. It also reduces the exposure of
conventional forces to harm (AFDD 2-5, 1998: 15). Such attacks could focus on strategic
effects, operational effects, tactical effects, or a combination thereof (AFDD 2-5,1998:
28 - 30).
As a prelude to exploring an adversary's 10 goals during a conflict, it is useful to
explore the strategic, operational, and tactical effects AFDD 2-5 identifies for Air Force
operations during conflicts. Table 2-5 Air Force Information Operation Goals
summarizes these goals.

Table 2-5 Air Force Information Operation Goals
Strategic Effects
(national objectives)
- Influence ally and adversary
behavior toward US national
objectives
- Terminate leadership resistance,
reduce adversary's confidence,
degrade communication capability
- Deter aggression, support
counterterrorism and
counterproliferation

Operational Effects

Tactical Effects

(theater level)
- Negate adversary's ability to
strike
- Reduce adversary's operational
tempo
- Negate adversary's command,
control, communication,
computer, and intelligence
capabilities
- Influence world support in favor
of US objectives
- Disrupt adversary's plans and
focus
- Disrupt adversary's decision
process

Extracted from AFDD 2-5
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- Prevent adversary's effects on
friendly IO
- Reduce size or capability of
adversary forces
- Deny adversary knowledge of
friendly forces

2.1.5. RAND Studies
The RAND Corporation has performed several research efforts for the
Department of Defense (DoD) that deal specifically with the effects of the information
revolution on the nature of war.
Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War
This study develops a framework to characterize strategic information warfare,
and explores how information warfare can affect national security. The authors define
strategic information warfare as an emerging type of conflict "wherein nations utilize
cyberspace to affect strategic military operations and inflict damage on national
information infrastructures" (Molander, Riddile, and Wilson, 1996: 1). In studying the
concept of strategic information warfare and its effects upon future wars, RAND was
tasked to focus on the defensive, rather than offensive, nature of the concept (Molander,
et. al, 1996: 3).
The rapid spread of computer technology has changed the face of war. The
number of potential enemies with the access to tools for waging strategic information
warfare is large (Molander, et. al, 1996: 11). The theaters in which this new war might
be waged are not just those of the traditional theater of operations - strategic information
warfare can target any point in the chain of regions from the continental US, to
deployment and redeployment zones, to anywhere surrounding the traditional theater of
operations (Molander, et. al, 1996: 12). "Strategic IW reduces the significance of
distance with respect to the deployment and use of weapons" (Molander, et. al, 1996: 42).
According to the authors, US strategy in 1996 did not address the possibility that an
adversary make attack all of these theaters (Molander, et. al, 1996: 37). The range of
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targets is also expanded. In addition to military, political, and economic targets,
information warfare can target the social framework of a country itself. It is likely that
enemies may avoid facing the US's technological superiority and strength of numbers in
the field by attacking more vulnerable targets through asymmetric IW (Molander, et. al,
1996: 37). The US will no longer remain a sanctuary from war (Molander, et. al, 1996:
12).
Seven key features of strategic information warfare help define the difference
between this new form of war and more traditional forms of conflict (Molander, et. al,
1996:15-16).
Low Entry Cost
The low entry costs for IW facilitates the development of viable IW programs by
a wide range of players, be they nation states, terrorists, or criminals. Additionally, new
IW weapons can be developed with limited equipment, anywhere in the world, by
technically knowledgeable adversaries (Molander, et. al, 1996: 15). The growing
connectedness of computer systems in all aspects of governmental and commercial
infrastructures provides multiple targets and attack paths. Finally, the ease with which
potential adversaries can acquire the tools and talent necessary to build IW capabilities
makes it difficult to identify and monitor possible sources of future attacks (Molander, et.
al, 1996: 18).
Blurred Traditional Boundaries
The growth of the Internet has changed how people view the world, blurring the
traditional boundaries between nations. This also blurs the distinction between what is a
foreign or domestic source of IW threat (Molander, et. al, 1996: 19). The once fine
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distinction between criminal acts and anti-state activity may no longer exist as it becomes
more difficult to identify "who gave the order" (Molander, et. al, 1996: 20). A final
consequence is that during an attack it may be difficult to tell what is under attack, by
whom, and, therefore, who has the responsibility to respond (Molander, et. al, 1996: 20).
Perception Management
Perception management also becomes more difficult in the realm of IW. The
Internet provides a wonderful opportunity to rapidly spread information and
disinformation worldwide. Militia groups have already capitalized on the Internet to
build, support, and disseminate their views (Molander, et. al, 1996: 22). Political support
in future conflicts will have to be won on the Internet as well as over traditional news
media. The ability to publish disinformation on the Internet has lead to situations where
the US leadership and the American public at large no longer know what is real
(Molander, et. al, 1996: 23).
Strategic Intellisence
The previous areas of concern feed into the problem of obtaining good strategic
intelligence. The traditional approach of focusing on specific nation states with distinct
boundaries is no longer sufficient, as the low cost of IW raises the number of potential
adversaries while their locations become blurred (Molander, et. al, 1996: 24). The list of
potential adversaries has become dynamic, making it difficult to know their identity,
capabilities, and intent (Molander, et. al, 1996: 25). The separation of domestic law
enforcement and the intelligence community is seen as a factor hindering strategic
intelligence collection in many cases (Molander, et. al, 1996: 26).
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Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
Tactical warning and attack assessment also becomes more difficult in IW. The
speed of attacks and the ability to hide in cyberspace increases the difficulty of
identifying and characterizing an attack in a timely manner (Molander, et. al, 1996: 26 27). In some cases, what appears to be a minor incident could be part of an ongoing
intelligence effort in support of future operations. Additionally, the ability to determine
whether an attack is an official act of war or not adds to leadership's problems in crafting
an appropriate response (Molander, et. al, 1996: 27).
Building and Sustainins Coalitions
Building and sustaining coalitions also becomes more difficult in the Information
Age. Conducting operations with other countries on foreign soil was complex enough
before the use of IW adds to the fog of war (Molander, et. al, 1996: 28). In addition,
allies may seek reassurance that the US plans are not subject to disruption from IW
efforts, and the US may be concerned about allies' weaknesses as well (Molander, et. al,
1996: 29). Management and protection of coalition information systems becomes a key
concern.
Vulnerability of the US Homeland
Finally, there is the inescapable fact that the US is no longer a sanctuary
(Molander, et. al, 1996: 30). The growing dependence on interconnected computer
infrastructures provides an adversary many vital targets, both commercial and
governmental. Deterrence is more problematic since attacks at the speed of light can
come from anywhere (Molander, et. al, 1996: 37).
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Countering the New Terrorism
This RAND study focuses on how changes in the nature of warfare, from the
advent of the information revolution to widespread availability of biological and
chemical warfare agents, have also affected terrorism (Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla,
Ronfeldt, and Zanini, 1999: xv). Terrorism is defined as "a crime in the classic sense ...
albeit for political motives" (Lesser, et. al, 1999: v). Terrorism is also partially defined
by the separation of the victims of the act from the intended audience (Lesser, et. al,
1999: v). Over time, terrorist acts have become more violent, in part due to the spreading
ethnic and religious nature of the groups carrying them out (Lesser, et. al, 1999: vii).
During this same period, terrorists organizations have reorganized themselves into more
networked structures that make wider use of amateurs and members of other groups
(Lesser, et. al, 1999: 1).
"In the past, terrorism was practiced by a collection of individuals
belonging to an identifiable organization that had a clear command and
control apparatus and a defined set of political, social, or economic
objectives. .. .their ideology and intentions were at least comprehensible albeit politically radical and personally fanatical."
(Lesser, et. al, 1999: 8).

Traditionally, terrorist groups were selective in their targets, focusing on those
symbolic of the source of their anger, and controlled in their use of violence (Lesser, et.
al, 1999: 8). Connections to foreign governments were vaguely recognizable, if not well
substantiated (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 8). In more recent years, new terrorist groups have
emerged that are much less well defined. Their memberships are less restricted, as are
their aims, while at the same time their membership numbers have grown beyond the size
of older terrorist organizations (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 9 - 10). Sponsorship by nation states
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is still a force multiplier for terrorist groups - "enhancing planning, intelligence,
logistical capabilities, training, finances, and sophistication" (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 15). In
effect, terrorists become "surrogate warriors", adding an asymmetric force to any actions
against the US (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 15). Many of the newer terrorist organizations are
now classified as religious in nature, and the religious ideology is often tied to an increase
in violent acts made justifiable by religious imperatives (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 17 - 20).
The amorphous, transitory nature of the new terrorist organizations, compounded
by the wealth of information available over the Internet or through books, mail-order, or
CD-ROM, increases the difficulty in identifying, tracking, and understanding the various
groups (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 20 - 22). Often no central command authority exists, and in
some cases a group forms for a specific, perhaps even one-time, purpose (Lesser, et. al,
1999: 21 - 22). There is still the chance that these loosely coupled groups are indirectly
influenced or controlled by nation states or nongovernmental entities (Lesser, et. al,
1999: 22). Combined with the low cost of IW tools and the inherently expendable nature
of the terrorist group, this could allow these nations to act against the US without fear of
direct reprisals or diplomatic and economic sanctions (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 23).
The advent of the information age may have changed the way that terrorists view
their world. The past focus on individual acts as a way to coerce results may now be
moving to a view of terrorism as a protracted form of unconventional warfare (Lesser, et.
al, 1999: 39). The idea of unconventional warfare appeals to those viewed traditionally
as weaker than their adversaries, those seeking to gain attention to themselves and their
cause, and as a way of moving to a future world by destroying the present (Lesser, et. al,
1999: 39 - 40). To support these goals, terrorists are changing to a less hierarchical, more
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networked structure, often connected over the Internet (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41).
Systemic disruption, provided by IW tools such as Denial of Service (DoS), is becoming
more of a focus than target destruction (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41). Finally, terrorists are
making use of information technology and the tools it provides to support themselves
both offensively and defensively (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41).
The authors use the term "netwar" to describe the direction in which they see
terrorism moving, with examples provided in the actions of Middle East terrorist groups
(Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41). Netwar is differentiated from "Cyberwar" by the level of
perceived intensity and realm of action- netwar is low-intensity and societal in nature,
while cyberwar is high-intensity and military in nature (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 46).
Additionally, cyberwar is seen as the application of new technology to existing concepts
of warfare, while netwar is seen as the emergence of an entirely new form of warfare
(Berger, 1998: 112). Two tiers of terrorists are emerging - one of professionals and the
other of amateurs (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 43). At times, the professional groups may hide
behind the actions of amateurs. Both groups already see information infrastructures as
key targets (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 44). Information technology allows the potentially
dispersed groups to launch coordinated attacks against these targets from considerable
distances (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 45).
The networked structure of netwar actors takes advantage of the flexibility and
adaptability of networks. Communication is facilitated by the organizational structure,
decentralization is common, and initiative and autonomy are often encouraged (Lesser,
et. al, 1999: 51). Nodes within the structure may be large or small, tightly or loosely
couples, and are often non-state actors (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 48 - 50). To be successful, a
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core set of shared principles, ideas, or goals are required, along with a method of rapidly
spreading information to members as well as, potentially, the world at large (Lesser, et.
al, 1999: 51). The Internet, e-mail, and cell phones provide the required tools. New,
younger members of terrorist organizations have grown up with these technologies, and
can lend their expertise to the group (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 67 - 68).
More in the realm of cyberwar, adversaries may use IW as an asymmetric strategy
against the US and its allies. Terrorism could be seen as a way to gain time to
consolidate land grabs, to directly attack the US or one of its allies, or to wage war in the
battle for the American public (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 94). The authors feel that IW based
terrorist attacks may become the norm rather than the exception in the future (Lesser, et.
al, 1999: 95). These attacks are more of a concern for the developed nations of the
world, who are increasingly relying on information systems to control their infrastructure.
The driving factors for these future IW incidents are seen as to fit the following
categories:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ethnic Separatism and Frustrated Nationalism;
Religious Extremism and "Postmodern" (apocalyptic) Terrorism;
Low-Intensity Product of Regional Rivalries;
New Ideological Clashes (i.e. over class or economic distinctions);
Crime and Drugs;
Losers of Confrontation with the US and its allies; and,
Anarchy and Rage (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 99 -109).

2.1.6. Organizational Innovation and Redesign in the Information Age: The
Drug War, Netwar, and Other Low-End Conflict
Berger's thesis explores the effects of organizational structure on success in the
Information Age. The relationship between an organization's structure, and its ability
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to act and react, will have a bearing on the hacker profiles being developed in Chapter
3 of this study. Berger postulates that organizations that move to a networked
structure will be more flexible, adaptable, and innovative, and will therefore make
quicker decisions and be more successful than organizations that still follow a
hierarchical approach (Berger, 1998: x). On the military front, the traditional,
hierarchically organized threat is evolving into less formally organized, threats
(Berger, 1998: 3). The two hypotheses of interest are 1) "The future security
environment will not be one of peace or war, but different "degrees" of conflict" and
2) "The new security environment will consist of traditional military threats, but will
also include numerous threats that aren't currently dealt with by current defense
structures" (Berger, 1998: 3).
The case study Berger used to explore these hypotheses is the international drug
war. It is seen as an example of the conflict between nations and transnational
organizations not limited by international boundaries or laws (Berger, 1998: 7). In
this case, Berger states that the threat is not to national stability, but to the confidence
and faith of the American public (Berger, 1998: 7).
Organizational theory provides the basis for exploring Berger's hypotheses. One
focus is on the paradigms with which an organization approaches the world. These
paradigms are influenced by biases, past experiences, cultural issues, and other
factors that impact on decision making (Berger, 1998: 7). These concepts will also be
important in exploring the framework of malicious hackers. Organizational theory
provides a "rational-systems model" that finds the best structure for a given
organization based upon goals, roles, and technology (Berger, 1998: 21). Interrelated
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system aspects are strategy, structure, processes, people, and rewards. A change in
one system aspect requires evaluation, and possibly changes, in the other aspects
(Berger, 1998: 21). Environmental pressures may also require system changes
(Berger, 1998: 22).
Berger found that transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups are
incorporating vertical information processing and lateral relations, often supported by
information technology, to improve information flow at all levels (Berger, 1998: 27).
The idea of vertical information processing seeks to provide all levels of command
the same information. This can be seen in the military's focus on developing "system
of systems" to integrate a variety of information sources for use by all levels of
command (Berger, 1998: 26). Development of lateral relations means
decentralization, where decision making authority is passed as far down the chain of
command as possible (Berger, 1998: 25). Decentralization can also encourage
information sharing across lines of authority (Berger, 1998: 25).
While criminal and terrorist groups are evolving into more networked
organizational structures, the military still depends on a traditional hierarchy which
can make it slower to respond to change. Hierarchies are most effective in situations
where little environmental uncertainty exists (Berger, 1998: 29). On the other hand,
organizations that use project team or organic network structures require little formal
coordination, encourage innovation, allow greater informal information flow, and can
more readily deal with large amounts of environmental uncertainty (Berger, 1998: 33
-35).
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Examples of organic network structures used by organizations are all-channel
(everyone can talk to each other) and chain or star structures that allow less
interConnectivity. Organizations might combine an all-channel core command
structure and star or chain structures for lower level functions (Berger, 1998: 36). A
change from a hierarchical structure to a more networked structure requires cultural
as well as structural changes (Berger, 1998: 37).
Berger uses international drug cartels and the governmental agencies that pursue
them as a case study in organizational structure. Over the past few decades, these
cartels, which are loose confederations of different drug trafficking groups, have
moved across the spectrum of organizational structures from independent hierarchies
to interdependent networks (Berger, 1998: 60-61). "Their boundaries are fluid, the
cast of characters change continually, and the links in the chain are bound together by
an intricate system of contracts and subcontracts." (Berger, 1998: 72)
In part, the advent of information technology has aided this evolution; speeding
and expanding the communication network through use of cell phones, fax machines,
pagers, and e-mail (Berger, 1998: 72, 76). Even when the "head" of a cartel is
arrested or killed, the loose network structure survives since pieces of the network, to
include the locations of operations, can be removed or replaced as required (Berger,
1998: 75). This flexibility contributes to law enforcement's difficulties in closing the
drug trade.
Cartels also use high technology to gather intelligence on counternarcotics
operations. Berger asserts that cartels' intelligence efforts are very similar to
national-level intelligence agencies, frequently recruiting insider support through
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threats and bribery (Berger, 1998: 78 - 79). As smaller cartels have grown to replace
the larger ones of the past, one telling difference has emerged. Older cartel leaders
sought recognition as societal figures; new cartels show interest only in financial gain
(Berger, 1998: 86).
One of the main challenges for law enforcement is the international level of drug
operations. It remains difficult to share intelligence across national boundaries
(Berger, 1998: 96). This same difficulty arises in the pursuit of hackers. Limitations
on the amount and types of information that can be shared across agencies at all
levels, and the lack of appropriate infrastructures to support information exchange,
hinder law enforcement (Berger, 1998: 96). Berger also asserts that the US national
security structure stifles innovation by its bureaucratic nature, and that it is
predictable (Berger, 1998: 98). The decentralized nature of the cartels, combined
with their extensive communication structure, allows the cartels to spread information
more quickly than law enforcement (Berger, 1998: 100).
The Cold War, with its relatively stable environment and predictable threats,
contributed to the hierarchical nature of the US national security structure (Berger,
1998: 104). The current state of global affairs is no longer stable, with any number of
state or non-state actors possessing the potential to become adversaries at any time.
The Information Revolution contributed to this change by helping smaller or less
efficient groups increase their ability to communicate and attack with greater security
and ambiguity (Berger, 1998: 107). This change is also seen in the blurring of the
bounds between foreign and domestic threats, challenges to national security and
criminal activity (Berger, 1998: 110).
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Berger also discusses the concept of Netwar. Non-state actors rely on networked
organizations with little centralized command or hierarchy. While they do follow a
central doctrine, they are operationally decentralized and reliant on rapid
communication with all parts of the organization (Berger, 1998: 112 - 113). These
organizations, which exist at levels from sub-national to transnational, depend upon
consensus building for decision making, allowing local initiative and autonomy
(Berger, 1998: 115). Organizational success is the result of a shared sense of purpose
(Berger, 1998: 115). "Offensively, netwar organizations are adaptable, flexible, and
versatile in their response to challenge." (Berger, 1998: 121) Decentralization
encourages innovation, allowing a netwar organization to better exploit an
adversary's weaknesses, learn from its own mistakes, and institutionalize change
more rapidly (Berger, 1998: 121).
Terrorists, which have traditionally used decentralization to operate and maintain
secrecy, are taking advantage of information technologies to increase communication
while decreasing the risk of discovery (Berger, 1998: 116). Strategic alliances, based
upon shared goals or ideologies, are common for both the drug cartels and netwar
organizations. These alliances may even involve state actors, such as state support
for terrorists groups (Berger, 1998: 119). These loose alliances may be based upon a
specific goal or evolve into long-term organizational changes (Berger, 1998: 119).
While US national security organizations are responding to the threat of cyberwar
and netwar, they are doing so with the traditional hierarchical structure (Berger, 1998:
133). The broad and ambiguous nature of world threats makes identification of
potential adversaries and prediction of their future actions more difficult (Berger,
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1998: 138). The intelligence community must not only determine the capability of
future cyberwar and netwar adversaries, they must also attempt to determine intent
and motivation. With limited historical information on the groups of interest, the job
is becoming more difficult (Berger, 1998: 139). An additional problem is the
regional / global nature of non-state threats on the Information Age. These groups
can move freely across international borders that nation seeking to respond to a threat
or an attack must respect (Berger, 1998: 142). Adversaries that know the legal
constraints find innovative ways to use the laws to their advantage. For example, US
national intelligence organizations are prevented from collecting against US citizens
anywhere in the world. A drug cartel that requires all communications involve one
American ensures that intelligence agencies are thwarted; unfortunately, in most
cases law enforcement agencies do not have the equipment necessary to collect the
intelligence (Berger, 1998: 148).
2.2. Legal Issues
There are several legal issues that affect how the military and law enforcement
agencies deal with hackers. One of the first issues is the Posse Comitatus law, which
prohibits use of the military for law enforcement within the US borders. Incidents and
intrusions regarding DoD systems should be reported to military criminal investigators
and counterintelligence agents so that appropriate action is taken. Internal DoD
procedures balance the needs of incident investigation with protection of information
integrity and individual privacy rights (JP 3-13, 1998:111-10). Records from past
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incidents are a vital element in identifying and defining vulnerabilities, which leads to
security improvements (JP 3-13, 1998:111-14).
2.2.1. JP3-13
JP 3-13 acknowledges the complex legal and political nature potentially involved
in 10. Legal limitations may vary depending upon the current level of war, and with the
offensive or defensive nature of a specific 10 (JP 3-13, 1998:1-12). 10 planners are
advised to consider three broad areas of concern. First are the limitations of domestic and
international criminal and civil laws regarding national security, personal privacy, and
issues of information exchange and ownership. Second are concerns with international
treaties and agreements, and customary international law that might affect IO. For
example, restrictions may be placed on tracing a hacker through servers that belong to
private corporations and that reside in a foreign nation. Third are issues of formal and
informal relationships among US intelligence agencies, other US agencies and
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (JP 3-13, 1998:1-1).
Diplomatic actions and economic sanctions may prove useful in cases where
attacks can be tied to nation states. Diplomatic actions, in addition to their deterrent
value, provide low cost, scaleable, and easily adjusted options for attack response (JP 313, 1998: III-14-III-15). While economic sanctions can prove troublesome to enforce,
they may weaken an adversary to the point that they become susceptible to other response
options (JP 3-13,1998:111-15). Finally, military force provides a wide range of lethal
and nonlethal response options that may eliminate a threat directly or interrupt an
adversary's means of conducting IO (JP 3-13, 1998:111-15).
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2.2.2. DoD Office of the General Counsel
The Office of the General Counsel has begun to address the legal issues
surrounding 10 as they apply to the military. When it comes to issues of law, sovereign
nations are of equal status. Therefore, it is only through agreement that they assume legal
obligation to each other (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 1). The General Counsel makes
the assertion that international law develops to handle the situations at hand (DoD
General Counsel, 1999: 1). Efforts to develop strong restrictions on 10 would follow
incidents that cast 10 as a severe, revolutionary threat to national security.
Hacking, termed computer network attack (CNA) when used by a nation state, is
seen as significantly different from traditional weapons. As such, current international
law does not provide existing legal principles that easily apply (DoD General Counsel,
1999: 5). The very nature of the attacks, which can come from anywhere and which may
leave few traces of the intruder, raises questions as to attribution, intent and motive, and
the application of international law dealing with territory invasion and attacks by
traditional troops and weapons systems (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 5).
As mentioned in JP 3-13, the laws of war must also adapt to IO and IW. The
distinction between noncombatants and lawful combatants is much less clear when those
involved may never see each other (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 8). Military necessity
as balanced against attacks on civilian entities is also a more contentious issue (DoD
General Counsel, 1999: 8). Targeting of a nation's economy will most likely shorten a
war, but the interlinked nature of the global economy poses a high chance of collateral,
possibly worldwide, damage. For short duration conflicts, justification of such a target
may be harder to support. The concept of proportionality in 10 attacks poses similar
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problems (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 9). Collateral damage can be a large risk. For
example, computer viruses could be an effective weapon, but their ability to spread
without bounds could result in more harm to civilian systems than is justified by military
advantage. Viruses could represent an indiscriminate weapon (depending on how they
are written), as could attacks on computer systems that result in loss of control of dams,
refineries, or power stations. Indiscriminate weapons are forbidden by the laws of war
(DoD General Counsel, 1999: 9).
Even the issue of neutrality must be considered for communications relay systems
existing in neutral countries (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 10). An extension to the
exception for telegraph and telephone lines could apply. In this case, as long as the
neutral nation provides the same access to both sides of the conflict, neutrality is
maintained (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 10). The same exception, according to the
General Counsel, would not apply to systems that create information.
While the concept of an act of war has fallen out of favor according to the General
Council, IW attacks would most likely be seen as acts of aggression - a "crime against
the peace for which there is a responsibility under international law" (DoD General
Counsel, 1999: 12-13). The General Counsel states that a single incident of CNA may
not be treated as an act of aggression, unless it results in widespread damage (DoD
General Counsel, 1999: 15). They feel that how the incident is viewed would depend in
part on the intent and consequences of the attack (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 18). If a
CNA is determined to represent an act of aggression, the victim nation is entitled to
respond. This raises questions as to the appropriate response, since the exact equipment
and personnel involved may not be easy to identify (DoD General Counsel, 1999: 18).
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2.2.3. News articles
The Council of Europe has begun work on a cyber crime treaty, with all forty-one
nations participating in the effort. The treaty calls for "increased, rapid, and wellfunctioning international cooperation" on the issue (Meiler, 2000). One of the concerns
of the treaty is the use of computer networks and the information they hold to commit
crimes, as well as the evidence relating to the crime that may be stored or transmitted on
these networks (Meiler, 2000). The issue of extradition will also be addressed in the
treaty, easing the prosecution of any criminals who are citizens of those nations
supporting the treaty (Meiler 2000). Finally, the treaty is seen to be most useful in the
lesser developed nations of the Council of Europe, as the more develop nations tend to
have laws against cyber crime already in place (Meiler, 2000). International actions such
as this treaty could provide the basis for extending the laws of war, as well as domestic
and international laws and policies, to IW.
In 1997, The US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia
pledged to coordinate efforts to combat cyber crime (Denning, 1999: 395). The
agreement involves cooperation in the search and prosecution of cyber criminals from
each other's countries. Additionally, it encourages the development of technology to
support the efforts of law enforcement, to include obtaining and sharing witness
testimony (Denning, 1999: 395).
2.2.4. Legal issues in Hackers by Taylor
Taylor asserts that two camps exist with respect to dealing with hackers - the
hawks and the doves. Hawks oppose dealing with hackers other than through legal
prosecution efforts. They do not feel that hackers can or should contribute to improving
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computer security. Doves, on the other hand, feel that the computer security industry can
learn from and work with hackers (Taylor, 1999: 93).
Taylor, and those he interviewed, presents three arguments with respect to laws
and regulations; all stress that those laws that pass must be able to adapt quickly. The
first argument is that laws will be ineffective in eliminating hacking. Next, many hackers
believe that companies providing computer hardware and software will hide behind the
laws and not fix the known security flaws in their products. Third, that prosecuting
hackers may drive them and their skills into the hands of criminal organizations (Taylor,
1999: 124).
Convicted hacker John Draper, who Taylor interviewed via e-mail, supports this
view. Draper states that many hackers who serve prison sentences are approached after
they are released by embezzlers, scam artists, and other related criminal elements that
they met while in prison. They are offered large sums of money to teach automated
hacking techniques (Taylor, 1999: 172-173). Such incidents can spread hacking skills to
broader elements of society - both white collar and hardened criminals, as well as hate
groups, transnational organizations, and terrorist groups. Taylor believes that the
pressure to hack for financial gain may rise as hacking techniques become more desirable
to traditional criminals (Taylor, 1999: 22). Finally, many "older" generation hackers see
the newest hackers as "true computer thugs". Hacking for this group is seen as a way to
control their world, as a way of feeding their desires for power, and a way to "learn and
abuse for their own gain" (Taylor, 1999: 161-162). Governments at all levels and in all
industrialized nations must come to terms with these issues.
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2.3. Malicious Hackers
The term "hacker" has evolved over time. Originally, a "hacker" was someone
who explored the full range of capabilities of both himself and his computer equipment
(Taylor, 1999: xii) -a tinkerer trying to learn about an unfamiliar system or to improve
known ones (McClure, et. al 1999: xxv). The original meaning of hacker is often now
associated with the term "cyberpunk"(Taylor, 1999: xv). Largely due to portrayals in the
media, a "hacker" is now perceived as someone who intrudes upon another's computer
systems to further his or her own, possibly criminal, ends (Taylor, 1999: xi). This
mentality was originally described by the term "cracker", a term generally no longer in
vogue (McClure, et. al 1999: xxv). For the purpose of this research, the term "hacker"
will be used to describe an individual who maliciously, or without authorization, breaks
in to a computer system, whether to gain information or exploit the system in some other
fashion.
One type of attack that is of interest to this effort is Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. DoS attacks can be the result of frustration when efforts to break into a system
have failed, for the sense of power it can bring, or can be used to carry out a grudge
against an organization (McClure, et. al 1999: 340-341). McClure also feels that DOS
attacks will increase due to tools that allow easy launching of DOS attacks, and the
opinion that Windows NT/95/98 is a favorite, and readily available target. This makes
DoS a weapon of choice for terrorists, even if skilled hackers do not care, in general, for
this type of attack (McClure, et. al 1999: 340-341).
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2.3.1. Hackers by Taylor
"Analyzing the computer underground is inherently difficult. It appears as
a 'gossamer framework' mixing real-world relationships and the
immateriality of cyberspace with the result that its social ties are loose,
even by subculture standards" (Taylor, 1999: ix-x)
Taylor sympathetically describes the hacker culture, based in part upon e-mail and
in-person interviews from hackers worldwide (Taylor, 1999: ix-x). Changes in society,
as a result of the computer revolution, rest on two elements - the rate of technological
change, and the fact that the world is increasingly viewed in informational terms (Taylor,
1999: xiv). Taylor sees the dependence upon technology to be the main attribute of
cyberculture, with two key parts - the hack and the hacker ethic (Taylor, 1999: 27).
There are three main characteristics to every hack: simplicity, mastery of an
aspect of technology, and the illicitness of the act (Taylor, 1999: 15). Anonymity allows
the hacker to engage in elaborate role-playing, with limited fear of reprisal (Taylor, 1999:
5). The hacker ethic has evolved over time. Most nonmalicious hackers subscribe to all
or portions of a common code (Taylor, 1999: 25). This code involves concepts such as:
respect for other's property; the view that information should be free; and, inflicting
damage is wrong.
One of the crucial elements is still the curiosity that people have with computer
equipment (both hardware and software). The worldwide computer networks allow
people from diverse locations to cooperate in explorations of the Internet (Taylor, 1999:
27). This exploration comes with anonymity - the normal cultural associations with race,
gender, age, geographic location, or social level do not exist in cyberspace (Taylor, 1999:
30). Common interests, such as technology, transcend geography, culture, and language.
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One of the main problems in describing or quantifying computer culture is the secrecy
and fluid nature with which its society changes - people changing aliases, tools and
techniques, and group associations (Taylor, 1999: 28). The efforts of law enforcement to
stop hacking have contributed to secrecy and unwillingness to talk with those interested
in describing cyberculture (Taylor, 1999: 29). However, one can state that hacker culture
depends upon technology, however technology is defined. Hacker culture exists within
the environment of computers, with no real physicality that is comparable to other
cultures (Taylor, 1999: 26).
As discusses previously, the term hacker did not originally have the same
connotation that it does today. The term was coined in the 1960's to represent the
imaginative and unorthodox use of any technology (Taylor, 1999: xi-xii). Original
hackers, and nonmalicious hackers today, were looking for the most elegant way to solve
a given problem. Hacking was considered a playful, yet highly skilled, academic pursuit
(Taylor, 1999: 14). A hack can also be defined as a "quick bit of work", technique
without knowledge of how or why it works (Taylor, 1999: 88). This is more in line with
today's definition of a "script kiddie". When compared to normal methods of writing
computer code, hacking is seen as a more holistic approach, whereas traditional methods
are seen as reductionist and fragmented (Taylor, 1999: 88).
Today the term "hacker" is highly contested. Any given definition may serve to
establish boundaries between groups. Key elements of most definitions deal with
exploration, obsession, ingenuity, and issues of legality (Taylor, 1999: 13-15). Dutch
hacker Rop Gongrijp provided the following definition in an interview with Taylor
(Taylor, 1999: 17). ".. .hacking is a frame of mind, a sort of intellectual curiosity that
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attaches itself to more than one type of technology or technological artefact...." Hackers
were originally tolerated for their expertise, no matter the manner in which it was gained.
The information revolution and the commercialization of computers now makes hacking
less tolerable (Taylor, 1999: 67).
It becomes an issue of trust - some companies do not believe that hackers have
the discipline to strictly follow the rules and keep their innate curiosity in check (Taylor,
1999: 105). In the case of an 10 "warrior", this may or may not become an issue. If the
hacker can be trusted not to hack systems belonging to friendly nations, and are given
"permission" to explore adversary or potential adversary systems, there may be a limited
set of "rules" that one wishes the hacker to follow. This relates to the issue of doctrine
and its implementation through 10. Should 10 be afforded more flexibility in target
selection, weapons mix, and operational planning in order to take advantage of its
inherent flexibility, speed, and surprise? This issue will be explored more fully in
Chapter 3.
Like many who explore hackers, Taylor has found most hackers to be male.
Three factors are seen as discouraging women. First is the same set of societal factors
that discourage girls from playing with technical toys, math, and science. Second, the
masculine environment in the hacking culture, which could be viewed as similar to
"locker room" culture, might discourage women. Finally, the issue of gender in language
could dissuade some women from participating in hacker culture (Taylor, 1999: 33).
Recent efforts to encourage young women to pursue technology, math, and science could
change the number of women involved in hacking. Additionally, Taylor believes that the
feelings of power conveyed by hacking may appeal to young boys more than to young
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girls. The desires of boys to explore and the machismo projection of hackers as
independent loners may also explain the difference in participation levels. In addition,
Taylor feels that the anonymity involved in hacking may allow males, who feel powerless
in society, to feel empowered in the computer world (Taylor, 1999: 34, 37-38).
Taylor proposes his own views of hacker motivation, after his discussion of
cyberculture. These motivations include compulsive programming (Taylor, 1999: 44), a
thirst for knowledge (Taylor, 1999: 46), boredom (Taylor, 1999: 52), a feeling of power
(Taylor, 1999: 56), desire for peer recognition within the hacking community (Taylor,
1999: 58), political acts (Taylor, 1999: 60), and rebellion against perceived bureaucracy
and authority (Taylor, 1999: 61). The motivations are not mutually exclusive; one or
more could be operating at the same time (Taylor, 1999: 46).
Compulsive programming refers to a feeling of addiction; that a hacker must
"hack" much as a drug addict must continue to use drugs. The rate of technology change,
possibly combined with feelings of addiction, means that hackers must have a high level
of commitment in order to stay abreast of technological advances (Taylor, 1999: 49).
The urge of curiosity is a similar driving force for hackers, and curiosity in general is
what drives technology forward. Taylor, and other authors, sees this as a positive
motivation (Chantler, 1996: 78; Taylor, 1999: 50). Hackers are testing the limits of
current and developing technology (Taylor, 1999: 51).
Balancing hackers' curiosity is the desire to avoid boredom. This is often
associated with younger hackers not challenged by the educational system (Taylor, 1999:
52-53). As a result, they turn to technology to find new puzzles to solve. Knowledge of
computers is often not learned in school, but like hacking skills, is self- or peer group-
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taught (Taylor, 1999: 76). These hackers sometimes stop their illicit pursuits once
adequately stimulated by college curricula (Taylor, 1999: 52-53).
Breaking into system may allow a hacker to feel he is "better" than the system
administrator, providing a sense of power (Taylor, 1999: 57). There can also be a feeling
of "beating the system". This sense of power, combined with a sense of adventure or
exploration, may help explain why hacker magazines and websites carry articles on
potentially destructive information such as bomb making (Taylor, 1999: 58).
Hacking is also a method of obtaining peer recognition or prestige. Social
interaction with other hackers, those who share and understand their interests, can be a
key motivation for many hackers (Taylor, 1999: 59). With recognition of past
accomplishments and abilities comes access to more information, and potentially an
invitation to join a group (Taylor, 1999: 60). Groups pool resources (skills and
information) to accomplish more than one hacker can on his own. Recognition within the
group can add to the competitive, machismo environment (Taylor, 1999: 60). Group size
is often 6 to 7 members, each with specialized skills or areas of expertise (Taylor, 1999:
60).
In addition, hacking can be a form of political protest. For example, the hacker
ethic states that all information should be free. Some hackers claim to hack to gain and
share information that is being denied to the public (Taylor, 1999: 61-63). In some cases,
this can help explain the number of hacking attempts against government organizations.
Hacks may also be an anti-establishment statement. Finally, Taylor believes some hacks
to be a "blow" against the "dehumanization in the techno-bureaucratic world" (Taylor,
1999: 61-63).
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Taylor also explores issues of computing skill and approaches to hacking. Rob
Nuata, a Dutch hacker interviewed by Taylor, believes that finding holes in computer
security takes either luck or expert skill. "Experts generally know how to crack a system
but don't find it challenging, worth the trouble." (Taylor, 1999: 103). Many people fail
to take into account the danger of insiders who are intimately familiar with a particular
system (Taylor, 1999: 70). Ironically, most incidents highlight known security
weaknesses. Hackers have even been criticized for rarely making use of original,
unknown security flaws (Taylor, 1999: 71). Some experts suggest that hackers' often
unstructured approach could benefit from more structure, something more than just
"rattling the doors" (Taylor, 1999: 102). Many hackers, however, have an "instinct for
serendipitous discovery", according to Taylor (Taylor, 1999: 73). They sometimes think
in ways that system designers would not consider logical, and in so doing, the hackers
find ways around roadblocks that would otherwise block their paths.
Hackers often have the time to thoroughly research topics or systems of interest
and specialize in narrowly defined specialty areas (Taylor, 1999: 78). This time is rarely
available to computer security experts. Chris Goggans, a former hacker and co-founder
of computer security firm ComSec Ltd, commented to Taylor via e-mail
".. .1 can monitor data on any network in existence, I can obtain root privileges on
ANY Sun Microsystems UNIX. If I, a 22 year-old, non-degreed, self-taught
individual can do these things, what can a professionally taught, profit motivated
individual do?" (Taylor, 1999: 70)
Even if security experts assume previous barriers in a system have been overcome
when building layered defenses, total security may not be possible for some systems
since "weaknesses cannot always be foreseen" (Taylor, 1999: 73). Statistics on computer
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security incidents are hard to use as a basis for the level of "crime" involved. Incidents
can be under-reported due to companies who do not know that their security has been
compromised and due to those who do not want to advertise their vulnerabilities. On the
other hand, the exaggeration of incidents by the media, computer security experts, and
hackers themselves can lead to over-reporting of incidents (Taylor, 1999: 67-68). Factors
that contribute to continued security holes include commercial pressures to ship code
quickly, the low status of security in software design, constant updates and expanding
networks, exaggerated marketing claims, apathy, and hype (Taylor, 1999: 81-86).
2.3.2. Hacking Exposed by McCIure, Scambray, and Kurtz
McClure, Scambray, and Kurtz explain the tools and techniques that hackers use,
as well as ways system administrators can thwart hackers' efforts. A basic attack
methodology is presented. The skill level of a given hacker determines how faithfully
and well they follow these steps (McClure, Stuart, Scambray, Kurtz, 1999: xxvi). The
steps in a successful hack are: target acquisition and information gathering; initial access;
privilege escalation; covering of tracks; and planting back doors. Since the purpose of
this thesis is to profile hackers, not to explain in detail how they accomplish their tasks,
not all of these steps will be fully discussed.
Target acquisition often begins with network mapping via ping sweeps (McClure,
et. al, 1999: 34). This can greatly reduce the target set to be explored, saves time over the
course of the hack, and allows the hacker to focus efforts only on "live" hosts. Once a
live host has been identified, the hacker tries to identify what system it is on (McClure,
et. al, 1999: 51-52). Banner grabbing or stack fingerprinting can provide valuable
information such as vendor name and version number. Banner grabbing, or banner
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enumeration, consists of simple tasks such as opening a telnet connection (for UNIX or
Windows NT) and pressing enter a few times to see what response the target system
provides (McClure, et. al, 1999: 70). In many cases, the target system will reply with
both an error message and information on the system hardware and software. Stack
fingerprinting, which requires a listening port on the target system, is a technology that
can determine, with a high degree of accuracy, the components of the target system
(McClure, et. al, 1999: 52). These efforts aid in vulnerability assessments.
Tools to aid in target identification and information gathering include netcat, Back
Orifice, and NetBus. Netcat, often referred to as the "TCP/IP Swiss Army knife", can be
extremely successful in hacking NT or UNIX systems (McClure, et. al, 1999: 70). It aids
in banner grabbing, port scanning, establishing remote backdoors, and running remote
shells. Back Orifice is a similar tool that uses UDP ports, and is often not screened out
by firewalls (McClure, et. al, 1999: 98). Finally, NetBus, which uses TCP ports, is more
effective at taking control of remote Windows systems.
Vulnerability mapping is the next step in target acquisition and information
gathering. It is a step that script kiddies often skip. Instead, script kiddies tend to throw
everything they have at a system (McClure, et. al, 1999: 209). This helps explains why
many script kiddies do not know how or why an exploit worked. Key points of
vulnerability mapping include:
•
•
•
•

Network reconnaissance;
Mapping system attributes to known vulnerabilities and exploits;
Target acquisition by identifying and selecting key systems; and,
Enumeration and prioritization of potential points of entry
(McClure, et. al, 1999: 209).
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Once a hacker has taken over a system, they often install a "rootkit" so that they
can return again in the future, or pass the capability on to other hackers. These rootkits
are often so well hidden that, even if part of the hacker's exploits have been detected and
the vulnerabilities corrected, they are never found by system administrators.
Rootkits consist of four tools: trojan programs, back doors, interface sniffers, and
system log cleaners (McClure, et. al, 1999: 252). A trojan program is one that pretends
to perform a useful function, but also performs code in the background without the user's
knowledge (McClure, et. al, 1999: 132). Often the background code is malicious in
nature. A back door is simply a method for the hacker to return undetected in the future,
generally through the use of hidden files (McClure, et. al, 1999: 438). An interface
sniffer captures, interprets, and stores packets traveling in a network for later analysis
(McClure, et. al, 1999: 253). The sniffer can provide information on any system that the
compromised system is connected to, potentially expanding the hacker's power.
One method of gaining information about a system, and also of attacking it, is
wardialing. This consists of dialing a large set of phone numbers believed to belong to a
target. The goals of wardialing include identifying those numbers attached to computer
systems, attempting to break access codes to dial out from the Public Branch Exchange
(PBX), or trying to break into systems attached by modems (McClure, et. al, 1999: 270277). This is one danger of cable modems and other internet connection that are "always
on" - they are always open to wardialing and ping sweeps by hackers. Much of the
general public is unaware of this danger, and the need for home firewalls.
A related attack is the Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack. The goal of a DoS or DDoS attack is to prevent use of a system by
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bandwidth consumption or resource starvation (McClure, et. al, 1999: 344). Many "point
and click" tools exist for DOS attacks, making them easy to launch. DOS attacks may be
used to force a system reboot so that changes planted by the hacker can take effect,
hopefully without the system administrators noticing the changes (McClure, et. al, 1999:
340-341). The authors believe that DoS attacks are the last resort of unskilled hackers
who are frustrated with a system that thwarts their efforts, or are motivated by personal or
political vendettas (McClure, et. al, 1999: 340). The simple nature of these attacks leads
the authors to state that DoS will be the cyberterrorist's weapon of choice (McClure, et.
al, 1999: 341). "Many governments have or are in the process of ramping up offensive
electronic warfare capabilities that use DoD attacks rather than conventional missiles"
(McClure, et. al, 1999: 354)
2.3.3.

Risk: The Profile of the Computer Hacker by Chantler

Nicholas Chantler, a former head of computer security for the Australian Army,
developed a hacker profile based upon his years of work in computer security, as well as
interviews and survey of hackers during the development of his doctoral dissertation.
The goals of Chantler's dissertation were to conduct an ethnographic study of hackers; to
explore how hackers are represented in the press; and to determine the threat or risk
hackers pose to society at large (Chantler, 1996: 3). Objectives of the study included a
description of the hacker environment; identification of hackers characteristics; a model
of how hackers process information; and development of a threat / risk approach that
encompasses hacker generation, limitations, and proposed methods of control (Chantler,
1996: 3). Since many of his conclusions are based upon surveys and interviews of those

2-53

willing to participate in the study, care must be taken in interpreting results since a
random sample was not possible (Chantler, 1996: 169).
Chantler identifies three types of people who hack (Chantler, 1996: 13). First are
students, who represent 49% of hackers according to Chantler's research of 284 reported
events. Next, at 22% are criminals - those subsequently convicted of a crime. Chantler
feels they were mainly hacking for monetary gain (Chantler, 1996: 12). The final group,
representing 29% of the incidents, were "others". This group contained computersecurity specialists, system administrators, law enforcement, journalists and authors.
Chantler participation in underground hacker electronic bulletin-board systems
(BBS) lead him to the following conclusions on those who frequented the BBS. First,
three groups seem to exist: intelligent and well educated; bright but poorly educated and
often on the wrong side of the law; and those that are juvenile and inexperienced
(Chantler, 1996: 62). As a whole, the members of BBS had several common attributes:
•
•
•

•

•

•

A loose hierarchy exists and teams from of between four and seven
members (some members with special skills);
Successful hackers tend to be of above average intelligence,
imaginative, curious, and inventive;
Some members are "loners", many of whom are respected for their
ability to think "laterally" and push technology into things it was
not designed to do;
A group language has evolved, consisting of abbreviations, slang,
and visual representations of feeling, that overcomes the
limitations of communication solely via keyboard;
All claimed an addiction to computing;
They believe they can do anything they want;
Enjoy a sense of power and achievement through the systems they
have hacked; and,
Targets of choice include military, government, and university
systems and web sites (Chantler, 1996: 62).
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Chantier spends some time exploring issues of how and why hackers begin to
hack. The home environment is seen as a key factor (Chantler, 1996: 78). He feels the
high number of juvenile hackers in single-parent homes, often looking after younger
siblings, creates an environment that pushes hackers to "bury themselves in the PC"
(Chantler, 1996: 78). Via the Internet, these hackers find friendship and support from
others in similar situations. The home situation, especially in cases of dislike of step
parents, may lead to attitudes of contempt and arrogance toward "the system", resulting
in little respect for laws regarding illegal hacking (Chantler, 1996: 78).
It is interesting that Chantler places such emphasis on answers to the home life
questions. Only 41% of the respondents replied that their home environment was sad,
boring, frustrating, or dull. Chantler feels this supports his theory that unhappy home life
may lead people to hacking (Chantler, 1996: 95). However, 59% of respondents felt their
home life was happy and rich.
Chantler developed a computer-based survey, to which he received 164 replies he
felt were valid (of 191 total responses). The survey consisted of questions regarding
personal details, when hacking activities began, home life, school / university
experiences, work, computing, and hacking (Chantler, 1996: 83).
Most hackers that responded were male, although 5% were female. Real names
were provided by 67% of the respondents, but all provided their "handles" (the name they
go by in the hacking community). Their ages were between 11 and 46, with the majority
in the 18-24 year range (Chantler, 1996: 83-84).
Most respondents began hacking within months of owning a PC, with an age
range of 11 to 26 years of age (Chantler, 1996: 85). Many listed a sense of power or
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control provided by the computer as a reason for beginning to hack (Chantler, 1996: 86).
Discussions or demonstrations by peers convinced 40% of the respondents to hack
(Chantler, 1996: 86). On average, respondents were familiar with three operating
systems, although nine respondents were only familiar with one system (Chantler, 1996:
91). UNIX and DOS were the best-known systems, and could represent the most likely
targets (Chantler, 1996: 91).
When it comes to targeting of systems, the majority (78%) did not pursue specific
targets (Chantler, 1996: 87). They predominately went to sites that had previously been
exploited. Those that did target particular sites chose their targets based on the level of
challenge, particular interests in technology inherent in the system or contained in it, or
the thrill or "excitement" value of the site (Chantler, 1996: 87).
Chantler asked if threat of detection or prosecution inhibited hackers. Only 73%
of the respondents answered the question. One was afraid of a criminal record, but the
rest did not feel threatened by existing laws (Chantler, 1996: 88). Current legislation was
viewed as ineffective by 91% of the respondents.
The motivations listed by survey respondents corresponded with those previously
discussed: addiction, freedom, knowledge, recognition, self-gratification, pleasure,
challenge, friendship, excitement, profit, sabotage, espionage (obtain access to restricted
information), theft, and vengeance (Chantler, 1996: 89). Chantler found that 49% of the
reasons that the respondents hacked was for challenge, knowledge, and pleasure.
Recognition, excitement, and friendship accounted for 24% of the motivations. These
motivations were seen as "positive" or "harmless" (Chantler, 1996: 89).
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Over 70% of the respondents wish to work in the computing industry when the
finish school. An additional 15% are interesting in investigation, intelligence, security,
and police work (Chantler, 1996: 107). This might mean that a potentially large work
force would be available to nations or other organizations looking for the hacker's unique
skills over the next few years. Of interest to those that might hire hackers, 41% stated
that they do not use computers to hack from work; 15% stated that they did (Chantler,
1996: 108). This second group could pose an insider threat.
Overall, Chantler sees hackers as a very valuable resource at the forefront of
computer technology (Chantler, 1996: 168). Their self-motivation and devotion to
hacking could make them an important asset to governments or corporations that require
high levels of computer skills. The only drawbacks are limiting a hacker's curiosity
about forbidden systems, and the small (according to Chantler) number of hackers
without the ethical background to determine right from wrong (Chantler, 1996: 168).
2.4. Profiling, the Criminal Mentality, and Psychology
Most published profiling to date is of the criminal mentality, more specifically,
that of the violent criminal (Godwin, 2000: iii). This type of mental model may not apply
in totality to the classes of hackers relevant to this research. The national or religious
activist does not have the same goals and motivations as the serial killer; however, some
of the basic drives and compulsions may prove similar.
2.4.1. Hunting Serial Predators
The primary reference on profiling, Godwin's Hunting Serial Predators, was
chosen due to its basis in multivariate data analysis. The author seeks three main goals in
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his classification scheme of profiling: reliability, ease of interpretation and use, and
validity for its intended uses (Godwin, 2000: xvii). As he discusses in his Prologue,
many efforts at profiling behavior are based in deductive reasoning. Godwin defines
deductive reasoning as assuming facts to be self-evident, and then using these facts, and
past experience, to make conclusions that are then, themselves, stated as facts (Godwin,
2000: iii). The assumptions often have a cultural bias based upon the views and
background of the investigator (Godwin, 2000: xviii). The FBI considers their approach
to serial killer profiling to be inductive, meaning it is an empirical framework based upon
formal analysis, since interviews with known serial killers are used as a basis for their
profiles. Godwin considers the FBI's efforts as deductive, since he feels the profiles have
not been empirically analyzed or systematically organized. Godwin used data from past
crime scenes across many databases as a basis for what he considers a truly inductive
approach to profiling (Godwin, 2000: viii). The key questions he seeks to answer in his
research are also applicable to a hacker mentality model, specifically:
1. Does a specific serial killer show common behavior across
his victims;
2. Are their unique types of serial killers;
3. Do a given type have common underlying background
characteristics; and finally,
4. Is there consistency across time in both behaviors and killers
(Godwin, 2000: ix)?

Godwin feels that the FBI's organized and disorganized classifications of serial
killers is faulty for several reasons (Godwin, 2000: 12). First, the original interviews
with jailed serial offenders were unstructured. Second, no analysis of the offenders'
background information has been published. Additionally, there is no literature to
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explain the difference between organized and disorganized offenders, although Godwin
feels it is based upon theories of aggression and personality. Finally, an offender that
does not fit into either type is not addressed.
The underlying methodology of Godwin's approach is the Thematic Facet Model,
where a facet is defined as a categorical framework for a group of data (Godwin, 2000:
29). Facet theory is based upon a geometric representation of complex relationships
within a set of observations. Multivariate hypotheses are combined into an empirical
procedure for their validation. Multivariate statistical procedures are used to determine
underlying relationships within the data. The three types of facet structures (background,
domain, and range or content facets) are used to explore individual differences
(background) on common areas. Range facets are then possible reactions to a specific
stimulus from the domain facet, allowing for different reactions by an individual at
different times (Godwin, 2000: 30).
This appears to be a fruitful method of explaining individual differences of
hackers from a common group. Each facet contains all of the elements that describe
variations in that facet. Similar to decision theory, facets and facet elements should be
mutually exclusive. Mutual exclusivity of variables is another of Godwin's criticisms of
FBI profiling (Godwin, 2000: 30).
Key facets in the model are Behavioral Organization and Attachment (Godwin,
2000: 32 - 42). The behavioral facet of Godwin's model is further divided into two
elements - affect (feelings and emotions) and cognition (beliefs and rational behavior)
(Godwin, 2000: 33). The Attachment facet is divided into victim as object and victim as
vehicle elements (Godwin, 2000: 40). These two elements are a relation of how the
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offender sees his interaction with the victim; a similar construct might be computer
system as end or computer system as means to another (non-computer based) end.
The methodology used by Godwin in his data analysis was Smallest Space
Analysis (SSA), a subset of Nonmetric Multivariate Analysis (Godwin, 2000: 58). The
data was obtained from a variety of sources such as eyewitness accounts, crime scene
evidence, telephone conversations with the killer, and medical reports on the victims
(Godwin, 2000: 53). SSA seeks to determine whether a hypothesized order within a set
of data is organized in such a manner that the structure can be tested. Similar to cluster
analysis, SSA postulates that related variables will be near each other in conceptual
space. An added advantage of SSA is that "empty" space between variable points in the
solution region may point to additional variables that are needed but not currently
included, since they are close to the current variables in conceptual space (Godwin, 2000:
59). SSA can handle data that is qualitative, quantitative, or both. It is considered robust
for categorical, ratio level, discrete or continuous distributions, and numerical data
(Godwin, 2000: 58).
Evaluation of individuals within the multivariate data structure is conducted using
Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA) (Godwin, 2000: 59). POSA postulates that
individuals and attributes may be ordered solely in the dimensions of type and degree.
Godwin's overall goal in data analysis was to explain how serial killers relate to their
victims and other members of the serial killer group. One of the chief advantages of the
facet approach to profiling is the ability to show relationships between variables before,
rather than after, the fact (Godwin, 2000: 60).
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Finally, as in other profiling approaches, Godwin seeks to model crime scene
behavior and background characteristics of serial killers. This is an effort to tie certain
aspects in a killer's history, such as marital status and education level to types of serial
killers (Godwin, 2000: 194); in the case of the FBI's model, this would be either
organized or disorganized. Using the four elements under his two facets, Godwin
examines whether there are any differences between killers' characteristics (Godwin,
2000: 194). Total scores for specific crime scene action were summed across an early,
middle, and later victim for each offender. These scores were combined into a matrix
with scores for each facet element and with scores for background characteristics. POSA
was then used to evaluate the relationship between behavior and background variables
(Godwin, 2000: 195).
The results showed a mixed ability to predict facets of a killer based solely upon
crime scene behavior. In some cases, a single behavior was useful in predicting a
background characteristic, in other cases either more behaviors were required for
prediction, or no set of behaviors adequately predicted background characteristics
(Godwin, 2000: 225). In the case of profiling computer hackers, there may be more
difficulty in determining which incidents belong to the same hacker.
2.4.2. Offender Profiling:
This work by Jackson and Beckerian is a compendium of inputs from the US and
several European countries. They begin with a definition of profile analysis, also known
as offender profiling, psychological profiling, criminal profiling, and criminal personality
profiling (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997:2). TREVI, a European initiative to share police
information, defines profiling as "attempting to produce a description of the
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perpetrator(s) of a criminal offense on the basis of analysis of characteristics of the
incident" (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 2). Tools for profiling include clinical
experience, statistical analysis of offender databases, and experimental research, all to
answer the questions: what happened at the crime scene, what type of person would most
likely have committed the crime, and what are the most likely personality characteristics
ofthat person (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 3). The equivalent questions in dealing
with computer hackers are: what happened during the incident, what type of hacker is
most likely to have committed the incident, and what are the most likely characteristics of
this person or group.
Similarly, according to Jackson and Beckerian, the FBI's process for profiling
serial killers involves four stages: data assimilation from all sources; crime classification
(type of crime); crime reconstruction to generate hypotheses about victim's actions, the
sequence of the crime, and the modus operandi of the offender; and, finally, profile
generation to include demographic and physical elements, behavioral habits, and
personality dynamics of the offender (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 4). The profile tries
to provide an idea of the offender's age range, race, possible job skills, marital status,
socioeconomic status, education level and degree of intellectual abilities, arrest history,
military background, family characteristics, habits and social interests, personality
characteristics, and suggested techniques for interviewing (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997:
5). Of specific note for this research effort, offenses most suitable to profiling are those
where the behavior at the crime scene suggest important details about the offender
(Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 5). Again, the FBI approach is criticized for the small
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data set used in its creation, the dichotomy between the two classes of offenders, and the
lack of published research to support their methods (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 6).
Underlying clinical (mental illness) and developmental (developed in response to
intrinsic personal needs and life experiences) issues are often clearly seen in violent
crimes (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 10). It is conjectured that these issues would not
be as applicable to the profile of a hacker from a structured group. It may be applicable
to script kiddies or other individuals not affiliated with a structured or semi-structured
group.
One of the areas of the profile is an idea of the type of person that committed the
crime - their personality. Personality is defined as those aspects that are relatively
enduring characteristics of the person over both time and space, those characteristics
which taken as a whole are unique to the individual, and finally those characteristics that
suggest the person's thoughts, attitudes, and behavior (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 44).
The authors are not concerned with the competing theories to explain personality,
believing that the different theories are desirable. Different theories can explain a given
situation in different ways, some being more applicable to the given situation (Jackson
and Beckerian, 1997: 44 - 45).
The five different frameworks of personality theory outlined by these authors are
psychoanalytic / dynamic, learning theory, dispositional / trait theory, humanist /
cognitive, and alternative / Eastern (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 45). When using
personality theory on a specific case, one begins with a synthesis of data on the case, then
key issues and points are identified, and then the profiler selects a specific framework or
personality theory that best suits the case. This theory is next applied to the specific data
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gathered, and finally the individual profile is developed (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997:
46).
The framework selected must meet two criteria - it must offer the best chance of
providing insight into the offender's personality, and offer the most benefit to the
investigation (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 46). Three extortion cases are used to
illustrate this idea. Of most interest is case 2, one of extortion against a supermarket
chain in Europe (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 52 - 56). The offenders were coherent in
their plans, seemed to be of high intelligence and not subject to reality distortion. The
plan used was very involved, showing a high degree of knowledge about the area and any
potential police actions. The offenders' actions supported a cognitive - social learning
theory, specifically, that of Bandura.
Bandura's theory of motivation was chosen based upon the clarity of the
offenders' plan, the meticulous way in which it was executed, absence of an affective
tone, strong focus on personal gain without the need to justify the actions, and the
coherent structure and design (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 53). A key aspect of
Bandura's theory is that different individuals can have different reactions to the same
stimuli - both environment and the individual shape personality (Jackson and Beckerian,
1997: 54). In this case, the profile accurately predicted that the offenders were hardened
criminals, that a team was involved, as well as providing clues to whether they would
carry out their threats, to their personal history, and to their familiarity with the area
involved.
Jackson and Beckerian commented on an effort by Aitken to consolidate data
from several sources in the United Kingdom (UK). Databases in the UK were studied to
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see whether a predictive model of an individual offender could be gleaned from details of
the crime (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 102). The study found potential for developing
such a model, but also found the effort was hampered by such problems as inconsistent
coding across source databases, and data sets that were too small. There were also
problems with past efforts where inappropriate statistical analysis was used, and with
methods of testing the model's reliability (Jackson and Beckerian, 1997: 102). Aitken's
study found a trade-off must be made between reliability of the model and the detail of
the predictions. Simultaneously predicting several offender characteristics was not
possible due to the small data set (320 offenders). He did find that combining the
expertise of an experienced detective with the database provided a simple model that
could predict several characteristics with an acceptable level of reliability (Jackson and
Beckerian, 1997: 103). He believes better predictions to be possible as large data sets
specific to the purpose are developed. The results of the study point to the potential
benefit in standardized collection of data into shared databases that could best address the
characterization of hackers and analysis of their actions.
2.4.3. Psychological Bases of MotivationFreud, among other psychologists, suggests that individuals often do not know all
that motivates their behavior (Arkes, 1982: 3). Unlike behavior, these motivations are
not directly observable. Others suggest that environment is the major influence over
behavior. Motivation is defined as "the processes that influence the arousal, strength, or
direction of behavior"(Arkes, 1982: 3), and therefore understanding motivation is a key
beginning to understand and predict behavior. Arkes points out that both learning and
motivation affect behavior, but that learning is the semi-permanent behavioral change
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that is a direct result of experience (Arkes, 1982: 4). Both learning and motivation affect
an individual's current behavior, but in different ways. Motivations are often of shorter
duration of influence than learning, since motivations move a person toward achievement
of a goal. Motivations occur at many levels - physiological (hunger and thirst),
contemporary (social interactions and task characteristics), or past experiences as they
may explain motivations (Arkes, 1982: 5). Many types of theories exist to explain
different aspects of motivation, yet no overarching theory exists.
Two broad approaches to psychological theory are clinical and experimental. The
clinical approach is based upon observations outside of a laboratory, in a natural setting.
In this manner, the environment of the subject is not altered by the observation (Arkes,
1982: 7). Since these observations are not as controlled as those of an experimental
approach, the results are less exact and the overall process is less systematic. On the
other hand, experimental approaches to motivation theories are based upon laboratory
experimentation and concepts that can be directly observed (Arkes, 1982: 6). As such,
care must be exercised in extending laboratory results to real-life situations.
Several key theorists have contributed concepts that might apply to developing a
hacker profile. Specific examples are Maslow's concept of self-actualization, Berlyne's
optimal level of stimulation, Rotter and Bandura's social environment and cognitive
variables, and Lewin's "field theory". A final area of study is achievement motivation.
Maslow:
Maslow's theory of self-actualization, as discussed by Arkes, is a clinical
approach to motivation, and is humanistic in philosophy (Arkes, 1982: 108). It and other
humanistic approaches look at motivation as the effort of an individual to achieve his or
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her full potential, self-actualization. Two key aspects of this approach are that motives
affect behavior in a straightforward way, and that this need for self-actualization is innate
and unlearned. As a clinical approach, Maslow's hierarchy of needs (the primary
humanistic approach to motivation) relies upon observations and their interpretations, not
upon experimental results (Arkes, 1982: 111). The hierarchy of needs is based upon a
system of motives that can influence behavior. Those on lower tiers must be met before
the individual moves on to higher levels (Arkes, 1982: 123).
The levels progress from survival of the person to self-actualization in five stages:
physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs, and
finally self-actualization needs (Arkes, 1982: 125). As lower level needs are satisfied, the
demands of the next level become dominant over behavior. Safety needs such as
security, stability, and a need for order can be seen in views towards religion, philosophy,
and other ideologies an individual may hold (Arkes, 1982: 125). Esteem needs, the need
for status, respect, and recognition, may be a key area of focus for a hacker profile, based
upon the degree of technical proficiency needed.
This may also be true for the highest level of the hierarchy - self-actualization.
This highest level of motivations is where Maslow's theory shows the greatest degree of
individual expression, as different people are drawn toward different activities (Arkes,
1982: 127). All of the levels of the hierarchy are motivated to overcome a deficiency
(such as in safety), except for self-actualization, which is a growth motivation beyond
satisfaction of needs.
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Berlyne:
Berlyne, according to Arkes, is the prominent theorist of an inherent optimal level
of stimulation. His theory is based upon an experimental approach (Arkes, 1982: 177).
Basically, every individual has a certain minimum level of stimulation that they require
from their environment. His theory states that people want to optimize their "arousal
level" based upon stimuli that have properties such as surprise, novelty, or complexity.
Everyone has his or her own individual optimal level of arousal potential (Arkes, 1982:
178). Preferences for a stimulus drop off in a bell-shaped curve from the optimal level
for all but the individuals who prefer the highest and lowest levels of stimulation.
Of practical application, optimal level theories also include the idea that a
stimulus will become less arousing if it is repeated often (Arkes, 1982: 179). It then
follows that a hacker who can readily break into a given system, or into multiple systems
with the same tool, may become bored with that system or tool over time and move on to
something new. An important note is that stimuli that were initially higher than a
person's optimal level actually become more popular upon repeated exposure, as they
move toward the optimal level, and then drop below the optimal level with even more
exposure.
Finally, organizational principles or coding schemes can create a unified picture
of a stimulus, thereby reducing its perceived level of complexity (Arkes, 1982: 181).
Basically, experience with a stimulus reduces its novelty and provides a framework for
experiencing the stimulus. This theory has ties to environmental research - how the
environment itself influences behavior (Arkes, 1982: 188).
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Rotter and Bandera:
Arkes also discusses the theory of social learning and cognitive perspectives.
Developed by Rotter and Bandera, this approach combines aspects of both clinical and
experimental approaches. Its concepts of observational learning and vicarious
reinforcement have been used to explain such things as the potential ties between
children's aggressive behavior and violence on television (Arkes, 1982: 197). For a
social learning theorist, the processing by an individual of information concerning
motivational variables is the critical determining factor for behavior.
Rotter proposes an expectancy-value theory for social learning. This theory
specifically focuses on complex social interactions and behavior. It readily provides a
heuristic framework for personality assessment, and it emphasizes the individual aspects
of motivation and learning (Arkes, 1982: 204). However, its experimental basis limits its
real-world applications.
Bandura's social learning theory also focuses on complex social interactions. His
theory includes the idea of symbolic rewards, that someone need not be specifically
rewarded or punished in order for learning to occur (Arkes, 1982: 212). An individual
can reinforce and motivate his or her own behavior based upon observation of others.
Bandura's theory is largely descriptive rather than explanatory, which is a criticism from
a scientific perspective (Arkes, 1982: 212), but may make it better suited for the purposes
of modeling a hacker. A more substantive criticism is the theory's ability to explain
behavior in great detail after the fact by overuse of cognitive mediating variables (Arkes,
1982: 225). Additional variables, not originally part of the study, are generated until the
observed data is best explained.
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Lewin:
Lewin's field theory states that, according to Arkes, behavior is based both upon
the individual and the environment (Arkes, 1982: 228). Thus, two people exposed to the
same environment can perceive the same situation in two different ways.
Behavior is directed in one of four ways. The basic direction is oriented from the
current "region" (i.e. activity) toward the same activity, toward a nearby (in physical or
psychological space) region, away from the current region but not toward a specific new
region (i.e. just getting away from something seen as unpleasant), or away from a remote
region. Motivational constructs are the forces that cause a person to move in one of these
four directions (Arkes, 1982: 230).
Primary criticisms of Lewin's approach to motivational theory are the lack of
operational definitions and its inability to make predictions. In addition, field theory does
not account well for individual differences, even though it is based upon the idea that
both the individual and the environment affect behavior (Arkes, 1982: 248 - 249).
However, Lewin was one of the first to introduce strong cognitive aspects to a theory of
motivation (Arkes, 1982: 250).
Achievement Motivation:
Lewin's field theory influenced achievement theory, which is solely concerned
with motivation. It is both controversial and practical in nature, and has shown wide
applicability to a diverse range of topics, such as gender and racial differences in
motivation (Arkes, 1982: 252). Its underlying idea is an individual's underlying need to
achieve success and to avoid failure (Arkes, 1982: 256). An interesting notion is that if
the need for achievement can predict the behavior of individuals, perhaps it can also
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predict the behavior of groups of individuals. This general approach has been
successfully applied in hindsight to British economic growth over a 350-year period
(Arkes, 1982: 277).
The assessment of the need to achieve is based upon the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT), where an individual creates a story around an ambiguous picture (Arkes,
1982: 252). In the case of societal trends in achievement, writings about the same
general topics were compared across many years. Some experts question the validity of
the TAT to measure motivation (Arkes, 1982: 286), based upon studies where need for
achievement does not predict well a given measure of performance. Atkinson, one of the
developers of achievement theory, defends the theory with Yerkes/Dodson's law (Arkes,
1982: 287). This states that people with a low need for achievement do better on hard
tasks, while people with a high need for achievement perform better on an easy task.
2.5. Foreign Actors: Governments, Terrorists, Transnational Criminal
Organizations
State sponsorship of terrorist organizations is seen as waning (Lesser, et. al, 1999:
130). This has lead to an increase in the level of violence used by terrorists that are no
longer constrained by conservative state sponsors, but rather are less constrained by
criminal organizations or wealthy nonstate sponsors (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 131). A key
challenge for the US is finding ways to respond to IW attacks by individuals, nonstate
groups, and terrorist organizations when these actions are launched within the borders of
states with which we are not at war (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 131). Deterrence and response
must focus on key nodes in terrorist networks, yet the distributed nature of the terrorist
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organizations and methods of secure communication can make them hard to identify
(Lesser, et. al, 1999: 142).
2.6. Outsourcing and the Rise of IO Mercenaries
On the subject of mercenaries, Machiavelli warns the prince "They have no love
or other motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not enough to
make them ready to die for you" (Machiavelli, 1962: 72). A mercenary's loyalty is not to
those that hired him, but to himself. Ultimately, without stronger ties of loyalty to the
hiring organization, money is not enough to ensure performance during times of war.
Mercenaries, then, may provide outstanding service during the safety of peaceful times,
but leave or demand higher pay during the dangerous times of war or conflict.
In the case of IO, this concept may be altered. The advantage of IO is the ability
to attack any target from the safety of an anonymous location. For this reason, there may
be a growth in the number of IO warriors who are not active duty members of a nation's
military. The advantage to the military is a highly skilled workforce that is "bought"
rather than "trained". A contractor's salary is not limited by standard military wages and
benefits, but only by the budget the military can spend on purchasing offensive IO
capability.
Military contractors have a different motivation from military members. Salary is
a primary motivator for their service. Consequently, they can be loosely defined as
mercenaries. The contractor's salary will be based upon skills, demand, risk, and the
level of competition present in the marketplace (Lavadour, 2001: 59). Terrorist and
criminal organizations may also begin to make use of "hired" hacking talent rather than
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trying to "grow" their own expertise. This can impact profiles of malicious hackers
belonging to nation states.
According to some mercenaries, many who prefer to be called "contract soldiers",
they are businessmen first (African Business, 1997). "We have highly specialized,
intensely trained and thoroughly disciplined teams able to deliver a unique service:
security. ... We go where we are wanted and where people can pay our fees." (African
Business, 1997) Many of these groups are looking for a certain amount of respectability;
for example, they say they will only work for legitimate governments. Some will also
work for multinational corporations. They freely admit that they wish to earn large
profits, which may involve such items as mining concessions (African Business, 1997).
The Geneva Convention bans the use of mercenaries, but "the distinction between
soldiers of fortune and private security firms is blurred" (African Business, 1997). The
many small wars that have grown since the fall of the Soviet Union, especially in Africa,
contributes to the growing acceptance of private security firms. These forces may be
perceived as more "neutral" than a UN peacekeeping force. They may also prove
cheaper and more effective (African Business, 1997).
Their leadership often contains former high-ranking military and national security
advisors from many nations (African Business, 1997). Services provided by these
contract soldier firms have grown more specialized. Many of the firms focus on
protection, security, and training. In some cases they may actually participate in combat
(African Business, 1997). An expansion into IW will probably occur in the near future, if
it has not already happened.
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2.7. Statistical Analysis Techniques
In addition to the data analysis techniques mentioned by Godwin in his approach
to profiling serial killers (Godwin, 2000), other techniques in the areas of multivariate
statistics can provide valuable insight into the specific evidence gained from a
substantiated computer incident. Additionally, basic linear regression could also provide
insight into the relationships within the data. Where data is available, these techniques
will be utilized in building the malicious hacker framework.
2.7.1. Linear Regression
Linear regression utilizes the relationship between variables to better predict a
single dependent variable. The independent variables used to predict the dependent
variable can be quantitative or qualitative (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman,
1996: 455). Predictor variables are sought that explain the dependent variable better than
the grand average (Neter, et. al, 1996: 217). The basic model is of the form:
Yi=ß0 + ßiXn+ß2Xi2+ei
Equation 2-1 Linear Regression Model

The expected value of the error term (£j) is assumed to be zero, and the error
terms are assumed to be independent and to have constant variance (Neter, et. al, 1996:
29, 218). ß0 is the intercept of the regression plane if the range of Xi and X2 both include
zero, ßi represents the change in mean response per unit increase in Xi when X2 is held
constant; a similar interpretation holds for ß2 (Neter, et. al, 1996: 218-219). Interaction
terms may also exist in the model (Neter, et. al, 1996: 308). The Ys are assumed to be
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independent random variables, also with constant variance (Neter, et. al, 1996: 29).
Finally, significance tests exist to determine the how much of the variability in the
dependent variable is explained by each of the independent variables or interaction terms.
This determines which variables should be in the model, in that they add to the prediction
of Y given values for all of the Xj in the model (Neter, et. al, 1996: 228).
2.7.2. Cluster Analysis
When presented with data from unknown populations, cluster analysis seeks to
group the data into mutually exclusive, homogeneous clusters or groups (Mardia, 1994:
360). A group is homogeneous if members of the group are close to each other, but differ
significantly from members of other groups. Cluster analysis can either present a
condensation of the data, where the analysis is for descriptive purposes, or can support a
model of populations (Mardia, 1994: 360-361). The technique can support single- or
multi-sample situations (Mardia, 1994: 360-361). Cluster analysis can also support
hierarchical methods of grouping, an example of which is nearest neighbor grouping
(Mardia, 1994: 369-370).
The "distance" between groups can be defined in many ways. To be an
acceptable distance measure, it must have the properties of symmetry, non-negativity,
and identification mark (this distance between a point and itself is zero); a distance may
also have the desirable properties of definiteness and meeting the triangle inequality
(Mardia, 1994: 376). Examples of acceptable distance measures for quantitative data are
Euclidean, Karl Pearson, and Mahalanobis distances (Mardia, 1994: 376-377). Euclidean
and Mahalanobis distances are also suitable for qualitative data (Mardia, 1994: 377-378).
Data from hacking incidents would contain both quantitative and qualitative data.

2-75

2.7.3. Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant Analysis seeks to allocate an individual, with as few mistakes as
possible, to a specific group based upon data about the individual (Mardia, 1994: 300).
Populations can either be known, with parameters that must be estimated, or unknown
(Mardia, 1994: 301).
In the case of known populations, an individual is assigned to the group based
upon the highest likelihood of membership (Mardia, 1994: 301). If there is prior
information about which population an individual is from, the information can be
incorporated in a Bayesian discriminant rule (Mardia, 1994: 304). A Bayesian approach
can also be useful when dealing with small data sets (Mardia, 1994: 316).
When the populations underlying the data are unknown, Fisher's Linear
Discriminant Function can provide a way to differentiate between them (Mardia, 1994:
318). This is done by finding a linear function that maximizes the ratio of betweengroups sums of squares to within-group sums of squares. It is then easier to differentiate
between groups when the between-groups sums of squares if large compared to that
within-groups (Mardia, 1994: 319).
2.7.4. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis seeks a small number of underlying factors to explain the
underlying correlation of a large set of variables (Mardia, 1994: 255). Since these factors
are not directly observable, factor analysis is well suited to the area of psychology. In
fact, psychologists originally developed the concept (Mardia, 1994: 255). Maximum
likelihood estimation and principal factor analysis (similar to principal component
analysis) are the two primary methods used (Mardia, 1994: 255).
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In factor analysis, a mean and a sample covariance matrix for a data set is
obtained. One then seeks to determine if, for sample covariance greater than zero, a
factor model can explain the data better than the covariance matrix (Mardia, 1994: 258259). In maximum likelihood estimation, the underlying data is assumed normally
distributed, the true mean is estimated by the sample mean, and the likelihood of the
model is maximized (Mardia, 1994: 263).
An advantage of this tool is that it allows a goodness of fit test for the factors that
are chosen (Mardia, 1994: 267). Principal factor analysis assumes all of the factors are
uncorrelated (Mardia, 1994: 256). Without these assumptions, and that of a well-defined
model, principal factor analysis can result in specious answers (Mardia, 1994: 275).
2.7.5. Canonical Correlation
Canonical correlation partitions the variables of interest into two groups, x and y.
The goal is then to find linear combinations of r\ = a'x and 9 = b'y that have the highest
possible correlation (Mardia, Kent, and Bibby, 1994: 281). The result is insight into the
relationships between the two groups of variables. Since canonical correlation places the
fewest restriction on the types of data it uses, some researchers feel the results are of
lower quality and less interpretable than other techniques (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and
Black, 1992: 194-195). Canonical correlation is similar to principle component analysis,
in that it looks at interrelationships. However, canonical correlation focuses on between
group relationships, whereas principal component analysis focuses on within group
relationships.
Canonical correlation can also be seen as an extension of linear or nonlinear
regression, where more than one dependent variable is being predicted (Mardia, et. al,
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1994, 281). The group a'x would be the best predictor of y, and b'y the most predictable
criterion (Mardia, et. al, 1994, 281). However, unlike regression, which assumes causal
asymmetry (x causes y, y does not cause x), canonical correlation treats both x and y
symmetrically (Mardia, et. al, 1994, 281). Additionally, as with regression, canonical
analysis does support the use of qualitative data in addition to quantitative data (Mardia,
et. al, 1994, 290). Finally, canonical correlation does provide significance tests for the
correlation coefficients that are developed (Hair, et. al, 1992: 198).
All of these multivariate techniques show promise in helping to profile hackers.
Unfortunately, they also require a large quantity of data; data that may not currently be
available for the specific group of interest.
2.8. Models and Frameworks
2.8.1. Introduction
During the course of research into characterizing hackers, several different types
of models were explored. The following presents an overview of each of the most
promising model types. More detail on the model selected, Ishikawa diagrams, is
provided in Chapter 3.
The key characteristics desired in a model were:
•
•
•
•
•
•

A descriptive framework;
A framework that can consider many aspects, such as personality and
motivation;
An estimation of underlying preference functions;
Ability to use observed and unobserved data;
Robustness for small sample sizes; and,
No formal experimental process required.
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2.8.2. Value Focused Thinking (VFT)
A few of the past AFIT research efforts that relate to a multi-objective value
model and the area of 10 are Capt. Rob Renfro's study Modeling Individual Behavior,
Capt. Todd HamiU's thesis Modeling Information Assurance: A Value Focused Thinking
Approach (AFiT-GOR-ENS-00M-15), and 1LT Philip M. Kerchner Jr.'s thesis ValueFocused Thinking Approach to Psychological Operations (AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-07).
These two efforts applied Multiobjective Decision Analysis frameworks to complex
problems in computer systems or psychological operations, both of which have a bearing
on this effort. Hamill and Kerchner both used Multiobjective Value Hierarchy theory as
the basis for their decision models (Hamill, 2000; Kerchner, 1999). In the case of
Kerchner's Psychological Operations hierarchy, one could even state that structured IW
attacks would have the same fundamental objective - to modify the attitudes and
behavior of opponents (Kerchner, 1999: 3-3).
Value focused models were developed from the viewpoint that a person's
underlying values are what should guide their decisions, and therefore their actions
(Kirkwood, 1997: 3). Focusing a model on the decision maker's values aids in the
evaluation of complex decisions by determining what is desired and then deciding how
best to achieve it (Kirkwood, 1997: 11). Multiobjective models then take into account
competing objectives that must be traded off to find the best decision
(Kirkwood, 1997: 1).
Unfortunately for this effort, the types of "decision makers" one would interview
are members of the national and transnational groups to be profiled. While some
information about the desires and values of these groups could be gleaned from open
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information sources, it is doubtful that short to moderate length interviews of these
people, if even possible, would truly represent their underlying values. Verification of
the model developed would also then be open to discussion of the correctness of the
"values" derived form the information sources. Air Force Red Team members, or other
comparable groups could be suitable as substitutes for a national, doctrinal group. VFT
has been used previously to explore behavior, such as Renfro's basic profile (Renfro,
2000), however its benefits without interviews of the desired group members is an open
question.
2.8.3. Item Response Theory (IRT) and Latent Trait Theory
These two model classes, though begun as separate psychological modeling
approaches, grew into one common approach with the advent of computing power that
could support the use of the models (Weiss, 1983: xiii, 4). Mathematical models are used
to explore the functional relationships between observable variables and underlying
(latent) trait constructs that are hypothesized to influence the observed variables (Weiss,
1983: 1). The model is then composed of a stimulus, response, and a hypothesized
relationship between the response and the trait of interest (Weiss, 1983: 1). The traits
explored are often a subject's ability, such as strength or mental aptitude.
The Item Response Theory (IRT) model specifies a probabilistic relationship
between an observed response on a test question and the individual's level on that trait
(Weiss, 1983: 9). IRT theories were developed to address specific problems in
psychology, education, and other social sciences (Hulin, Drasgow, and Parsons, 1983:
14).
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In general, the term "item" refers to a specific unit of observation (i.e. test
question), "test' refers to a collection of items, and "trait" refers to the latent
(unobserved) characteristic of a test subject (Hulin, et. al, 1983: 15).
If the characteristics of the stimulus are known (i.e. how well a specific test
question describes a particular skill or aptitude or the question's difficulty level), then the
model can be used to estimate the latent (unobservable) trait level of a subject based upon
his or her responses (Weiss, 1983: 2). This assumes that the mathematical form of the
model describes the true relationship.
Three parameters can be used in the basic IRT model. A one-parameter model
involves the difficulty of the test item and the trait level (ability) of the test subject
(Weiss, 1983: 9). If more than one parameter is needed to describe the test items, than a
second parameter can be added. This parameter seeks to account for how quickly the
probability of a correct response can change as a function of ability, or how well the test
question can discriminate in ability level (Weiss, 1983: 9-10). Finally, a third parameter
can be used to account for effects of random guesses (pseudoguessing), resulting in a
three-parameter model (Weiss, 1983: 10). Equation 2-2 provides the Three-Parameter
Standard IRT Model.
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?rob{U I ability = 3} = flPiW,[l-Pi(&)]l~Ul
1=1

^(^) = c,. + (l-C(.){l + exp[-ai.(^-6,.)]r1
Equation 2-2 Three-Parameter Standard IRT Model

In this model, U represents a vector of scores on test items coded 1 for correct
responses and 0 for incorrect responses, and Pj(0) is the conditional probability that a
randomly selected test subject with ability 0 will correctly answer the z'th question
(Weiss, 1983: 112). The values of a, b, and c represent item discrimination parameters,
item difficulty parameters, and aspects of pseudoguessing respectively (Weiss, 1983:
112). In the standard model, a test subject's ability is held to be constant during the test,
responses are scored as correct or not correct, and 0 is unidimensional (Weiss, 1983:
112).
Implementation of an IRT model requires estimation of values for the variables
(observed and latent) (Weiss, 1983: 10). This progresses in two stages. First, the values
of the parameters are estimated. This stage is often termed item calibration, and is
carried out for each test item (Weiss, 1983: 10). Trait level parameters are obtained as a
result of this effort, but are not the main focus at this stage (Weiss, 1983: 10). The
second stage of implementation is estimation of the trait levels (ability) of test subjects
using the item parameters from the previous stage (Weiss, 1983: 11-12). In this stage
differences between individuals, in terms of ability or responses to test items, can be
estimated (Weiss, 1983: 112). Different test subjects must be used for each stage (Weiss,
1983: 10).
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Sample sizes, the number of items in the test, and other aspects of the data can
affect the results (Weiss, 1983: 10). Aspects of the model's ability can be evaluated
using tests for robustness and goodness of fit for a specific model (Weiss, 1983: 31). The
more general IRT models, such as the three-parameter model, require more time to obtain
parameter estimates, larger sample sizes, and more test items, but this model tends to
provide a better fit of the data (Weiss, 1983: 31). Computer simulation is often used to
explore these concepts, since data can be generated with known trait levels and item
parameters (Weiss, 1983: 10, 33). In actual use, direct access to the test subjects is
required to the extent that the subjects must take the test themselves.
2.8.4. Stochastic Token Theory
Stochastic token theory is based upon experimental psychology's traditional
stimulus-response (S-R) paradigm. A subject is shown a precisely controlled stimulus,
and he or she then responds using one of a specified set of reactions (Falmagne,
1997:129). Quantitative analysis of the data leads to inferences concerning what took
place within the subject (Falmagne, 1997:129). Experimental psychology and related
empirical social sciences theorize about what happens in the "black box" between the
observed stimulus and response. Finite-state learning models assume that the subject can
be in only one of a finite number of states at any time. The states are specified by their
probabilistic ties to the stimulus and to the response (Falmagne, 1997:129). Parameters
estimated from the data provide the connections. Learning is then the process whereby a
subject moves from an initial state to a final state. While the stimulus and response are
well characterized, little is known or postulated about the subject's states (Falmagne,
1997:129).
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The stimulus-response paradigm has limited usefulness in cases where the stimuli
are not under the control of the experimenter (Falmagne, 1997:129). An example is data
for election polls if the polls use the same respondents over a period of time. If the
respondents change their ranking of candidates between surveys, the experimenter does
not know what exactly caused the change in preferences (Falmagne, 1997:129). In this
case, the stimuli are unknown, but the responses (R) provide information about the
respondents' state at the specific time intervals (/,-) (Falmagne, 1997:130).
This suggests use of a new model that uses the stimuli as the model's theoretical
construct rather than the subject's state (Falmagne, 1997:130). A large data set results
from all of the possible rankings of candidates over several time intervals (Falmagne,
1997:130). Statistical analysis of trends in the data can provide meaningful insight into
the states and preferences of the survey population (Falmagne, 1997:130). The set of
Stochastic Token Theory models is particularly suited to survey data, or other situations
amenable to the same framework of unobserved states followed by observed responses
over time (Falmagne, 1997:130).
The two fundamental constructs of Stochastic Token Theory are the states and the
stochastic stream of tokens. At any time t, each member of the population is in one of a
finite set of states in the class S (Falmagne, 1997:130). The states are fully or partly
observable, for example the researcher could ask for a subjects most preferred political
candidate at specific time intervals (Falmagne, 1997:130). If the preferences for all
candidates are not specifically ranked, only features of the states are associated with the
responses (Falmagne, 1997:130). S could also represent a set of semiorders (i.e. partial,
interval, or weak orders) on the set of alternative A (Falmagne, 1997:130). The second
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construct, the stream of tokens, represent a collection of messages that bombard the
subject. The information in each token could potentially move a subject from one state
into another adjacent state (Falmagne, 1997:130). The model does not assume that the
tokens can be reliably observed. Rather, their effect is seen through statistical analysis of
the subjects' responses (Falmagne, 1997:130). In effect, the tokens map S back into S
(Falmagne, 1997:130). The model specifically explores a collection of tokens Tthat
generate a semigroup of transformations on S so that each token has a unique "reverse"
(Falmagne, 1997:130).
A framework for stochastic token theory is that of subjects whose succession of
states is the result of the random occurrence of tokens delivered by the environment
(Falmagne, 1997:140). If tokens occur as if drawn with replacement from an urn, the
result is a real time renewal process (Falmagne, 1997:140). A probabilistic token
medium is specified by the quadruple (S, T, %, 9), where t, is the probability distribution
on the set of states and 0 is the probability distribution for the set of tokens (Falmagne,
1997:140). The distribution £, represents the beginning of the process, and 0 governs the
change of states due to the occurrence of tokens (Falmagne, 1997:140). These two
distributions give rise to a discrete-parameter stochastic process -- a regular Markov
chain on the set of states S (Falmagne, 1997:140). A regular Markov chain is
homogeneous, irreducible, and aperiodic (nonrepeating) (Falmagne, 1997:140).
Several assumptions are required for the evolution of states in real time. Rather
than assuming that tokens occur in discrete trials as if selected from an urn, assume that
the tokens occur as a renewal process (Falmagne, 1997:141). If a token occurs at time t,
then it is equal to x with probability 0T (Falmagne, 1997:141). The times of occurrence of
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tokens is assumed to by a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity A. (Falmagne,
1997:141). The k-step transition probability of the Markov chain is completely defined
by the probability of the tokens (Falmagne, 1997:141). The tokens are not assumed to be
controllable or observable; only their accumulated effects can be observed or quantified
by repeated probing the states over time (Falmagne, 1997:141-142). No assumptions are
made about the internal structures of the states (Falmagne, 1997:142). This approach
provides a general framework for exploring how preferences vary over time (Falmagne,
1997:143). The number of tokens is significantly less than the number of states, which is
critical since one seeks to explain as many observable quantities as possible with a few
number of theoretical constructs (parameters attached to tokens) (Falmagne, 1997:142).
2.8.5. PetriNets
Petri Nets were developed to model systems, and are particularly useful with
those having independent subsystems (Peterson, 1981: 31). The models are used to
observe the occurrence of events and activities, to include the movement of information,
in the system of interest (Peterson, 1981: 31). The Petri net developed can have multiple
levels of detail, such as those commonly developed to represent computer hardware and
software, or project plans (Pagnoni, 1990: 119; Peterson, 1981: 40).
Petri nets are built either to describe a proposed or existing system, or to analyze a
system that can be described as a Petri net (Peterson, 1981: 151). Analysis efforts, which
proceed in a similar fashion to analysis of networks, attempt to determine the properties
of the Petri net and the system it represents (Peterson, 1981: 151). The set of all
transitions (actions) that can occur characterize the system of interest, and is one of the
most important properties of the system (Peterson, 1981: 151). Analysis techniques can
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explore the boundedness of the Petri net, the conservation of tokens in the system,
reachability of places (events), set covering, and the matrix equations that correspond to
the Petri net (Peterson, 1981: 91-112).
The two basic concepts used in Petri nets are events (transitions) and conditions
(places) (Peterson, 1981: 32). The state of the system controls the occurrence of the
events, and the system is described by its set of conditions (Peterson, 1981: 31). A given
condition, which will either be evaluated as "true" or "false", represents a logical
description of the state of the system (Peterson, 1981: 31).
The preconditions of an event are those conditions that must hold true in order for
the event to occur (Peterson, 1981: 31). Additionally, an event can result in new
conditions (postconditions) becoming true and / or in some preconditions becoming false
(Peterson, 1981:31-32).
In modeling terms, the preconditions represent the inputs of a transition (event)
and the postconditions represent the outputs (Peterson, 1981: 32). Tokens are used to
represent the conditions in the system. A token is located at every place (condition) that
holds true. When a transition (event) occurs, the tokens are removed and new ones are
placed for the postconditions (Peterson, 1981: 32-33). Multiple events that are enabled
can occur simultaneously if they are independent (Peterson, 1981: 35).
Time need not be explicitly modeled, as the Petri net structure contains all of the
information needed to define the possible sequences of events (Peterson, 1981: 36).
When multiple transitions are enabled, the choice of which one fires first is made
randomly (Peterson, 1981: 36). The events are assumed to be instantaneous, and events
cannot occur simultaneously (Peterson, 1981: 37).
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Events that are not instantaneous in the system of interest can be modeled using
two events, one for the start time and another for the end time, and a condition for the
event occurrence (Peterson, 1981: 37-38). If the net is executed multiple times, the
duration and sequence of events will differ (Pagnoni, 1990: 120).
Events that lay on the same path through the network are causally dependent
(Pagnoni, 1990: 119). This dependence can be a function of time, resources, or other
precedence constraints (Pagnoni, 1990: 119). Equivalently, those events that do not lie
on a common path are seen as causally independent (Pagnoni, 1990: 119).
A Petri net's structure, C, is represented by four elements: a set of places (P), a set
of transitions (T), an input function (I), and an output function (O) (Peterson, 1981: 7).
The set of places and transitions are finite and disjoint (they do not overlap) (Peterson,
1981: 8). Additionally, the input function maps from the set of transitions to the set of
places, and the output function does the reverse (Peterson, 1981: 8).
The final element of a Petri net is the set of tokens, discussed previously, that are
used to mark the execution of the net (Peterson, 1981: 8). The number of tokens and
their positions may change during execution, as they represent the occurrence of
transitions (Peterson, 1981: 8). The number of possible tokens in a given place on the net
is infinite; therefore there are infinite ways that the tokens may form a "marking" of the
net (Peterson, 1981: 17). A marking is an assignment of tokens to places in the net based
upon the conditions of the system (Peterson, 1981: 16). The set of all markings is then
countably infinite (Peterson, 1981: 17).
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2.8.6. Random Utility Models (RUM)
Another approach to modeling hackers is from the perspective of Thurstonian
Models, a subset of Random Utility Models, also known as Stochastic Utility Models.
Stochastic utility models seek to account for situations where preferences are
probabilistic or random, hence the use of the term stochastic (Barbera, Hammond, and
Siedl, 1998: 275). They are suitable when different choices are to be made in similar
situations, and therefore could help explain why people may make different choices for
the "same" decision at different times, or why individual members of a group have
different preferences for alternatives when presented with the same decision.
Thurstonian models explore how to extrapolate from data how the group, as a whole,
thinks. It is therefore a descriptive class of models.
Thurstonian models utilize three basic assumptions: continuous preference
between pairs of stimuli, the stimulus that is preferred by the subject at the time of
solicitation has a higher value, and populations have preferences that are normally
distributed (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000: 3). This basic preference model can be used to fit
rankings or, by use of a threshold relationship between unobserved preferences and
observed responses, a extended model could be used to fit rating data (Maydeu-Olivares,
2000: 3). Interestingly, it is not assumed that the stimuli are judged independently.
However, these models are not used in many applications since they often require a many
dimensional multivariate normal integral be calculated to obtain the ranking, paired
comparison, or rating preference probabilities (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000: 3). This results
from the large number of comparisons that must be made for every stimulus.
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Some attempts have been made to estimate and test Thurstonian models with only
limited information. The model uses just the first and second order marginal probabilities
from contingency tables (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000: 3). This approach has been used
several times in psychological experiments, and is now being extended to rating, ranking,
binary, and graded paired comparison data (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000: 4).
A three-step procedure is used to estimate and test the model, along with a
goodness-of-fit test developed by Maydeu-Olivares (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:4). The
procedure uses grouped data to restrict the thresholds and underlying correlations in the
normal random variates. This procedure works well for polytomous data (data with many
categories). Ungrouped data are used when additional data on the subject or stimuli are
to be modeled along with the preference data (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:4).
Paired Comparison Thurstonian model
When complete paired comparison experiments are conducted, a random sample
of N individuals from a population are asked to compare all pairs obtained from a set of n
stimuli. This results in n = n(n-l)/2 pairs of comparisons, where the subject is asked to
select a preferred option in each pair. The outcome in each case is represented as a
random variable yj} where y = 1 if the first option is preferred, and 0 otherwise. This
results in a Bernoulli random variable, with the overall joint distribution for all n y is that
of a multivariate Bernoulli distribution (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:5).
Modeling seeks to explain the observed preference patterns of paired comparison
from an n-dimensional vector of unobserved continuous preferences t and a ndimensional vector of random errors e associated with each paired comparison. The
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preferences are assumed to be approximately normal (|at, St), and errors are assumed
approximately normal (0, 0 Q), where Q is a diagonal matrix. The model becomes

y* = A * t + s
Equation 2-3 Thurstonian Paired Comparison Model

A is a n x n matrix of contrasts where columns are individual stimuli, and rows
are the paired comparisons (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:6).

The variables y can be obtained

from the unobserved y*, and the usual standardization of y* results in a standard normal
z* with mean zero. The covariance matrix for z* has diagonals of 1, Q. is assumed to be
I, and au = 1 for all i in n (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:7). Finally, jit = 0 is chosen
arbitrarily due to location indeterminacy in the elements of Et (Maydeu-Olivares,
2000:7).
Ranking Thurstonian Model
In the case of a ranking experiment, the subjects rank all of the stimuli according
to a specified preference criteria function. This would result in n! possible permutations
of the rankings, giving a multinomial sampling distribution. This can be transformed to a
n -dimensional multivariate Bernoulli by defining y as a dichotomous variable of ordered
pairs of stimuli. A given y\ is assigned a value of 1 if y is ranked above y, and 0
otherwise. The multivariate Bernoulli distribution's contingency table must be filled with
an additional 2n*n zeros since only n! ranking patterns are possible (Maydeu-Olivares,
2000:6).
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The parameters of the ranking model are based on the ordered pairs of
comparison data. The population's unobserved continuous preferences have mean p.; and
variance or«, and the correlations between preferences for any two given stimuli are pjj.
The final parameter, coy, is the variance of the random errors eu- associated with each
paired comparison (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:8). The random errors in e allow modeling
of intransitive patterns in the paired comparisons, which Maydeu-Olivares deems crucial.
Intransitive patterns of preferences allow subject's preferences to change during the
experiment as a stimulus is presented next to several different stimuli. As a result, the
random errors are assumed to be uncorrelated with both the continuous preferences t and
each other. The covariance matrix is then diagonal (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:8).
Rating Thurstonian Models
In a complete rating experiment, each stimulus is presented alone, and a
preference is assigned according to a binary rating scale. The outcomes can then be
represented by y as above, and the resultant joint distribution is again multivariate
Bernoulli (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:5).
With the unobserved continuous preferences t defined as for paired comparisons,
a threshold a for the preference is assumed to exist. Therefore, the binary variables y are
assumed to be y,j = 1 only if tjj> a, and 0 otherwise (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000:9). The
probability patterns are unchanged for the transformation to y*. The result is
y*i =a

a=l
Equation 2-4 Thurstonian Rating Model
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for all i and (j,n is assigned a value of zero (Maydeu-Olivares, 2000: 9).
Application to Survey Data
Thurstonian models have also been used to model purchases of consumer goods.
Some of the models attempt to gain insight into aspects of consumer choice otherwise
masked by use of only aggregated choice data (Islam, Louviere, and Bartels, 2000: 2).
One approach by Islam, Louviere, and Battels uses depth of repeat given trial, or
purchase incidence given trial, as count data for the model. Individual repeat choices are
modeled as Poisson a process, with purchase rates in the population as a whole having a
gamma distribution. This results in a negative binomial (NBD) model (Islam et. al, 2000:
2). The resulting Markov chain style model has stationary purchase rates and the usual
memoryless property for purchase times.
A second approach models the inter-purchase times. The goal is to better
understand and model the dynamics of purchase behavior (Islam et. al, 2000: 2). Interpurchase times are assumed to be exponential random variables, leading to a Pareto
distribution (Islam et. al, 2000: 2). This model can be extended by the use of flexible
parametric baseline hazard models, non-parametric proportional hazard rate models, and
modeling heterogeneity using multivariate normal distributions (Islam et. al, 2000: 2).
Both of these approaches use discrete trials, which is adequate when a single unit
of the consumer good is purchased in each trial period. If multiples are purchased,
another approach is to model purchase amounts conditional on choice behavior (Islam et.
al, 2000: 2-3). The result is a Beta-Binomial model framework.
Comparisons between the modeling approach can be made through the use of the
following two questions (Islam et. al, 2000: 3-4):
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1) Do differences exist between consumers who do not try a product and those
who try but do not repeat, those who try once and repeat once, etc?
2) Can a consumer choice model be developed to purchase volumes conditional
on amount of repeat purchases?

To explore these questions, Islam, Louviere, and Bartels hypothesize that there
are systematic differences in the personal characteristics of consumers who never try a
product, those who try but never purchase the product again, and those who repeat
purchases a given number of times (Islam et. al, 2000: 3). If the purchase behaviors are
given the role of states, then personal characteristics such as age and number of
household members, and the period of life they are in, would represent stages (Islam et.
al, 2000: 3). The question can then be explored using a random utility model in which
the latent (unknown) preferences of the households would predispose them to one of the
states. The assumption is made that the random aspects of the utility are IID
(independently and identically distributed) extreme value type I random variates, which
results in a discrete discriminant model (unconditional logistic regression) (Islam et. al,
2000: 3-4). Additionally, the authors develop a method of modeling purchase volumes
given number of repeat purchases (Islam et. al, 2000:4).
The behavior choices of the consumers are treated as a series of inter-related
choices (Islam et. al, 2000: 4). This approach allows the model to develop in the context
of a random utility model. Consumers choose outcomes that they most prefer, or that
maximizes their utility, subject to any constraints (Islam et. al, 2000: 4). The consumer's
true utility cannot be measured, resulting in a latent utility model (Islam et. al, 2000: 4).
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uin=vin + *
Equation 2-5 Consumer Preference Model

Ujn is the utility (true or latent) of choice i for consumer n. Vjn is the systematic
model component that is observable or experimentally estimable, and Sjn reflects the fact
that not all factors influencing consumer «'s choice can be directly known (Islam et. al,
2000: 4). In this framework, it is easy to understand the inherent stochastic nature of the
situation, since one cannot exactly predict a consumer's choice, but one can estimate the
probability that a consumer will make each of the available choices
(Islam et. al, 2000: 4).
2.9. Total Quality Management (TQM) and Fishbone Diagrams
The model that was finally selected was the Ishikawa "fishbone" diagram.
Details of this method are presented in Section 3.1. The strengths of this method include
its clear and elegant visual nature. Unlike models such as VFT, the result is not a
"number" for a given alternative being considered.
Placing a numerical value on an individual's profile can be misleading. What
does the number mean? What does it mean that one group's average member scores a
value of x, while another group's scores a value of yl Is there a true significance in the
difference between the two numbers, and what is the true precision of the number
reported? In the case of a profile for an individual that has not been extensively
interviewed, a numerical value produced by a model may mislead decision makers as to
the capabilities and granularity of the tool being used.
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What is desired from the model being developed is a description of the person.
This is provided by the Ishikawa diagram. Both VFT and Ishikawa diagrams make use of
group expertise in building the model. This is vital with profiling, since input from
various types of experts is required. Ishikawa diagrams also allow for factors that are
interrelated. Human nature is hard to separate into a few, mutually exclusive, areas.
Models such as VFT require that the categories used by both mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive.
Table 2-6 highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the models explored in this
section.
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Table 2-6 Summary of Models Explored
Model

Strengths

Weaknesses

Value Focused
Thinking
(VFT)

• Group process
• Additive model
• Numerical result
• Level of detail
• Sensitivity Analysis

• Group process
• Weights depend upon level of
decision maker
•Score every aspect
•Measures mutually exclusive,
collectively exhaustive

Item Response
Theory (IRT) /
Latent Trait
Theory

• Psychology model
•Numerical result
•Indicative of underlying
preferences

Token Theory

• Level of detail
• Flexible

Petri Nets

• Level of detail
• Flexible

• Single factor analyzed
• Experimental nature
• Validity for small data sets, and
level of abstraction
• Requires direct contact with
hackers
• Cause & Effect relationships
• "Project" style path
• Order of choices
• Requires direct contact with
hackers
• Cause & Effect relationships
• "Project" style path
• Order of choices
• Weights depend upon level of
decision maker
• Score every aspect
• Measures mutually exclusive,
collectively exhaustive
• Requires direct contact with
hackers
• Group Process
• No single numerical result

Random Utility • Similar to VFT
Model (RUM) • Preferences under uncertainty
• Additive model
• Numerical result
• Level of detail
• Sensitivity Analysis
Ishikawa
Diagram

• Group Process
• Qualitative & Quantitative data
• Visual nature
• Analysis through Pareto charts,
control charts, etc.
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2.10.

Summary

The topics and documents discussed provide a basis to begin analyzing malicious
hackers. Chapter Two was developed to consolidate information on the major areas that
have bearing on building a malicious hacker profile. References on hackers and criminal
profiling and US military doctrine were summarized separately (rather than integrated) so
that the authors' ideas could be presented as a cohesive whole. The following chapter
will use the knowledge gained from the sections of Chapter Two to develop a model
framework applicable to analyzing foreign 10 programs that utilize malicious hackers.
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3. Malicious Hacker Framework

3.1. Introduction and Methodology
A profile of any individual is complex. Many aspects such as personality,
motivation, education, and group membership affect what makes a person who they are.
This makes it difficult to develop a clear, concise model that is easy to present,
understand, and execute.
The model found to best represent a scripted profile of structured hackers, given
the current level of available open source data, is the Ishikawa "fishbone" diagram
(cause-and-effect diagram). A fishbone diagram visually presents the main profile areas,
and allows for additional levels of detail to be developed as required. It is also one of the
most widely used quality control tools (Costin, 1994: 177). One key advantage of this
approach is the ability to examine each profile area in turn, keeping only the details from
a "basic malicious hacker" model that applies to the specific group or individual being
investigated. Results from each of these areas are then combined to form the overall
profile. A description of the fishbone diagram process is presented below, followed by
the development of the basic model.
3.1.1. Fishbone (Cause-and-Effect) Diagrams
Fishbone diagrams were developed as a method for identifying and clarifying the
underlying causes of a problem. As a quality improvement tool, they are often used for
solving problems within industrial processes. Their use can complement control charts in
deciding what changes to make when a process has gone out of control (Mitra, 1993: 6).
Fishbone diagrams are sometimes called "Ishikawa diagrams" in honor of the quality
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expert, Kaoru Ishikawa, who championed their adoption for problem solving in 1943
(Mitra, 1993: 6; Ozeki and Asaka, 1990:149). They resemble "fishbones" in that
suspected causes or factors relating to a problem surround a core "spine", which connects
to an effects side representing the problem at hand (Mitra, 1993: 6). Figure 3-1 presents
an example fishbone diagram. The "causes" are believed to influence the "effect", and
the goal of the process is to find out in what way the influences exist and to resolve them.
The common areas of causes that are explored are materials, machinery and equipment,
operating methods, manpower (operators), policies and procedures, measurements, and
environmental factors (Winchell, 1991: 89).
Two types of cause-and effect diagrams exist - "how" and "why" diagrams. The
"how" chart focuses on how a problem can be solved (countermeasures) rather than
explaining the causes of the problem. "How" diagrams run the risk of focusing on
symptoms of the underlying problem(s) rather than the root of the problem. "Why"
diagrams instead focus on why the problem arose (underlying causes). As a result, any
solutions developed should deal directly with the root cause of the problem rather than
just the symptoms (Ozeki and Asaka, 1990: 36-37).
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Measurements

Policies &
Procedures

Figure 3-1 Example Fishbone Diagram

Ozeki and Asaka point out that fishbone diagrams serve many purposes (Ozeki
and Asaka, 1990: 157). They can help guide discussion about a problem by providing a
process on which to focus. The diagrams may provide insights that might otherwise have
been missed, and may aid understanding and process observation. Key interrelationships
among aspects of the problem may become more evident (Mitra, 1993: 142). Unlike
Value Focused Thinking, the Ishikawa diagram's factors need not be mutually exclusive.
With its focus on the "big picture", broader environmental areas are addressed that might
otherwise be ignored as not "controllable" (Costin, 1994: 182).
Additionally, these diagrams can be used to gather frequency data for problem
causes during day-to-day operations. In the case of a malicious hacker profile, this might
consist of frequency counts for characteristics as data becomes available to "feed" that
aspect of a specific group or individual's profile. A Pareto chart would provide a useful
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tool to track those details of an aspect occurring most frequently (Mitra, 1993: 191).
Pareto charts can be used to identify areas that are causing the most problems, so that
resources used to remedy those problems will provide the most improvement while
utilizing limited resources in the most efficient method possible (Mitra, 1993: 140). The
chart consists of the data categories along the horizontal axis and the percent of
cumulative occurrence on the vertical axis. Data categories are presented in decreasing
percentage of occurrence (Mitra, 1993: 140). Figure 3-2 provides an example Pareto
chart. The left vertical axis provides the percentage of occurrence for each of the four
problem types, and the right vertical axis provides the cumulative percentage. As an 10
example, incidents that support an 10 organization's use of a specific hacking process or
tool would provide a count, helping to focus Information Assurance efforts on
appropriate defensive measures. Changes in tool usage or hacking approaches could be
tracked over time to maintain an updated assessment of adversary intents and potential
actions.
The combination of cause-and-effect diagram and Pareto analysis ensures effort is
extended only on those factors that provide the "most bang for the buck", rather than
tangential issues (Mitra, 1993: 584). The Pareto chart often upholds the 80-20 rule 80% of a problem is caused by 20% of the factors involved (Winchell, 1991: 86).
Inventory control theory also provides the ABC policy (90% of the cost belongs to 10%
of the parts) is a similar concept (Nahmias, 1993: 272-273).
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Figure 3-2 Sample Pareto Chart

Finally, Ishikawa diagrams can be used with a stable process to identify areas for
further improvements (Mitra, 1993: 142). The malicious hacker framework developed
can be used to identify areas for expanded profiles in the future. More useful model
details could replace those that cannot be substantiated, and additional levels of detail can
be grown as required. Additionally, the malicious hacker model developed would
provide a basis for profiling other groups of hackers, such as script kiddies or those
hackers who are not members of structured groups.
The process of creating a fishbone diagram is easy to learn and implement
(Costin, 1994: 177). Developing a cause-and-effects diagram involves six steps,
summarized in Table 3-1. An individual can implement the process; however, it is best
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used when the input of a team is available (Costin, 1994: 177). The team involved should
be broad-based, but of a small enough size that the brainstorming process remains
productive (Costin, 1994: 183). In Step 2 and 4, care should be taken not to unduly
eliminate potential factors early in the process (Mitra, 1993: 143). Without further
analysis, one of the root causes of the problem may be ignored. Lower level causes can
be repeated under higher-level categories if direct, multiple relationships exist (Costin,
1994: 179).
Three methods exist for adding levels of detail to the fishbone's spine (Step 3):
big branch expansion; brainstorming; affinity diagrams. Big branch expansion begins by
identifying a few key causal areas. As mentioned earlier, in production situations, these
often consist of materials, machinery and equipment, operating methods, manpower
(operators), and environmental factors (Ozeki and Asaka, 1990: 150). A main branch is
drawn from the causal area (placed within a box frame) to the spine. Additional branches
pointing to the main factor provide increasing levels of detail (Ozeki and Asaka, 1990:
151).
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Table 3-1 Ishikawa "Fishbone" Diagram Process
Details

Step
1: Clarify characteristics

2: Draw spine and effects characteristics

3: Clarify factors affecting the characteristics

4: Check for omitted factors
5: Identify factors that strongly affect the
characteristics
6: Adding related information

Choose a title for the problem.
Ensure everyone understands the problem.
Determine characteristics to examine.
Describe the effect characteristics to be explored in
specific terms.
Draw the "spine" or "trunk" for the diagram as an
arrow pointing to the effect characteristics.
Identify and define the factors that could cause the
effect characteristics.
Methods: big branch expansion; brainstorming;
affinity diagrams.
Ensure no factor has been left out.
The diagram may need updating over time.
This step helps identify the most critical factors;
those that provide the most explanation of the
characteristics observed.
Add clarifying information, as well as date of
creation and names of participants.
Source (Ozeki and Asaka, 1990: 150-157).

Brainstorming, also called small branch expansion, begins with a group
brainstorming exercise to identify all factors that might affect the problem at hand. These
factors are then grouped into small functional categories. Smaller categories provide the
lowest level of detail that is then grown into higher levels, ultimately connecting to the
fishbone's spine (Ozeki and Asaka, 1990: 152). The third method, the affinity diagram,
is also referred to as small branch expansion (Ozeki and Asaka, 1990: 153-154). The
only difference is that the affinity diagram process is used as an alternate form of
brainstorming. Instead of a group brainstorming session, each participant brainstorms
separately. Pieces of paper are divided among the group. Participants record a single
potential cause on each piece of paper. All of the cards are then placed on a wall or table,
and the group as a whole decides on a category framework as in the brainstorming
process.
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The greatest benefit of the cause-and-effect diagram comes from turning the
analysis into action. The aspects of the problem should be quantified where possible
(Costin, 1994: 182). Pareto charts, mentioned earlier, are one possibility. Care must be
taken, however, in selection of parameters to measure. Their relationship to the factor of
interest must be clearly established, and the parameter must be well defined.
3.1.2. Basic Hacker Framework Approach
Profiles of hackers can be made at various levels of detail, as shown in Figure 3-3.
The goal of this effort is a profile of malicious hackers that belong to a state-sponsored,
or other structured, group. This represents Step One of the Ishikawa diagram process.
The title for the problem is "Malicious Hacker Profile".
An Ishikawa diagram framework will now be developed that addresses the key
factors seen to influence hacker behavior for the group being studied (Step Two). Those
factors are Motivations and Personality; Approach to hacking; individual Skill and
aspects of Teamwork; hacker Tools and Training; the Intent of actions, their Timing and
Use; Cultural Impacts; and, Leadership, Doctrine and Policy. A parallel can be seen
with the traditional factor categories of operating manpower (operators), methods,
materials, machinery and equipment, measurements, environmental factors, and policies
and procedures. Figure 3-4 presents the basic framework.
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Following each factor is a diagram representing the details for that factor.
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3.2. Motivations and Personality
What makes someone hack? What makes them hack at the behest of their
country, their terrorist organization, or the transnational criminal organization to which
they belong? Are common personality characterists shared among hackers? While
profiling in general seeks to find unique aspects of the individual or group profiled, in
some instances a common personality characteristic may provide the best chance for
influencing a hacker once he has been identified.
3.2.1. Hacker Motivation in General
Many authors on hackers discuss a range of motivations for hacking. These
motivations can apply together in groups or individually for each hacker. Some
motivations may change over time. Taylor discussed boredom with school as a
motivation for hacking (Taylor, 1999; 52). When a hacker moves on to college, this
motivation might diminish. While the authors in Chapter 2 discussed many motivations,
this model will only utilize those most likely to correspond to the motivations of the
target groups. Several of the other motivations discussed in Chapter 2 would have a
direct bearing on terrorist groups and criminals. Those motivations that are felt to have
the most bearing on nation state hackers are summarized in the following table.
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Table 3-2 Malicious Hacker Motivations
Motivation

Definition

Sources

Curiosity

The desire to learn and explore.

Challenge

The desire to achieve, as well as the thrill of
an illicit pursuit

Recognition

Hacking can provide social benefits such as a
close circle of friends, and peer recognition.
This can also relate to aspects of patriotism,
nation prestige, and unit or Service pride.
A sense of accomplishment. Pride in self.

(Chantler, 1996: 108;
Denning, 1999: 45;
Taylor, 1999:46)
(Chantler, 1996: 108,
126; Denning, 1999:
45)
(Denning, 1999: 45;
Taylor, 1999: 58 - 60;
Vranesevich, 2000)

Personal
Satisfaction
Feelings of
Power
Governmental

The desire to have control over a system, or
to feel "better" than the system
administrators.
Acts directed by one government against
another (IW and espionage) in support of
national objectives.

(Chantler, 1996: 108;
Denning, 1999: 45)
(Denning, 1999: 46;
Taylor, 1999: 56;
Vranesevich, 2000)
(Vranesevich, 2000)

3.2.2. Personality
Several common personality characteristics emerge as being common to hackers.
Again, this may make them less useful in profiling hackers, but may provide important
leverage points to influence them. First, by the nature of the task, elite hackers tend to be
very detail oriented. This can be seen in the process they use to gather information on a
target (McClure, et. al 1999: xxvi; Chantler, 1996: 109). According to Chantler, elite
hackers may occasionally "short-circuit" this process in the hopes that success is possible
without all of the information originally deemed necessary, less skilled hackers tend to be
less thorough (Chantler, 1996: 109). Taylor likens this to just "rattling the doors" in the
hopes of success, rather than planning for success (Taylor, 1999: 102).
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A second characteristic of many hackers is their persistence. They spend a large
amount of time and effort in order to exploit a target system. Information about the
system, the information it holds, its vulnerabilities, and even what other systems it is
connected to, is built over time. Only low-level hackers, or ones who wish to appear as
such, just bash at a system in the hopes of success. Denning comments on one highly
successful hacker Phantom Dialer, whose exploits were not attributable so much to
"brilliance or skill..., but to an incredible persistence" (Denning, 1999: 46). This is what
makes DoS and DDoS attacks interesting. While they are often seen as the last ditch
effort of a frustrated script kiddie, many authors see them as the weapon of choice for
terrorists and nation states seeking to deny access to a system (AFDD 1,1997: 24;
Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41; McClure, et. al, 1999: 340-341).
A third personality aspect is self-esteem. Chantler explored self-esteem as part of
his survey of hackers. Interestingly, the level of self-esteem corresponded to skill level.
Elite hackers were judged to have high self-esteem. Those of moderate skill were seen as
having average or moderate self-esteem. These two groups are those that Chantler also
believes to have "positive" motivations for hacking (Chantler, 1996: 126). Those with
low self-esteem were also seen as having "negative" motivations (profit, vengeance,
desire to cause damage) for hacking, and possessed of little skill.
Next, one can consider aspects of creativity. Elite hackers are seen as very
creative (Chantler, 1996: 23). This, along with persistence, can be seen as a key to
success. An elite hacker does not see obstacles in the same way that a system designer or
administrator does; the hacker assumes there is a way around every obstacle and is very
creative in seeking solutions.
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A final aspect of personality that can be explored is the degree to which someone
is a self-starter or a follower. This again can affect how the hacker is influenced. A
follower may cease action when the leader is removed in some manner, whereas a selfstarter will continue as long as they desire to do so. Additionally, influencing the leader
succeeds in influencing all of his or her followers. Members within a group may be selfstarters or leaders. In most cases, the leaders will be self-starters, as they "set the pace"
for the group and develop new tools and techniques. Chantler sees the elite group of
hackers as being the self-starter types; those with moderate skills are seen as followers
(Chantler, 1996: 126). Followers reuse past exploits as they develop their own skills.
3.2.3. Mercenaries
Military members are seen as primarily motivated by patriotism, especially in allvolunteer forces such as that of the United States. Monetary payment is a secondary
concern. Mercenaries, or hired experts, are primarily motivated by money, and may only
feel a secondary tie to the country that has hired them (Machiavelli, 1962: 72). Close ties
are to the mercenary group to which they belong, highlighting the need for a strong sense
of trust in their own leadership.
With less of a tie to the success of the country for which they are fighting,
mercenaries are generally seen as focused on personal survival ("live to fight another
day"). If the danger of an operation gets too high, as discussed in Section 2.6, they may
demand more money or leave the engagement. While hackers may be seen as placed at
less risk of physical danger, this may not always be the case. Vranesevich discusses one
method of preventing hacks - letting the hacker know you know their "true" identity
(Vranesevich, 2000). This means that their anonymity has been compromised, and
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makes it easier for law enforcement to pursue them. While this may not be as effective
against a military member, it may threaten a mercenary's future employment.
Other cases where a mercenary might feel threatened are: situations where the
mercenary is co-located with military forces, or where the IW cell is co-located and can
then be attacked. When mercenaries (or government groups) utilize the flexibility of
communications and computing technology to transcend issues of location, it is
significantly harder to hold their personal safety at risk.
3.2.4. Issues of Criminality
Hackers "know" what they are doing is "wrong" (a cultural element), but in the
case of government hackers, their actions are sanctioned by the organization. This is
similar to the case of assassins. As discussed in Section 2.2, international law is
expanding to accommodate the growth of IW.
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Figure 3-5 Motivations and Personality
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3.3. Approach to Hacking
There are two basic approaches to hacking - unstructured and structured. Script
kiddies and others of lower skill level are primarily the hackers utilizing unstructured
approaches. Taylor refers to this approach as "rattling the doors" (Taylor, 1999: 102).
McClure, et. al, talks of script kiddies that "throw everything they have" at a system
rather than use a more formal process such as vulnerability mapping (McClure, et. al,
1999: 34). A more skilled hacker might utilize what appears to be an unstructured attack
in order to blend in with script kiddies and avoid detection.
Structured attacks utilize a formal methodology, and might be referred to as
"doctrinal" in nature (Lemon, 2000). Nation states' with developed 10 organizations
could be more likely to act under a structured methodology, especially once expertise in
the field of IO has been trained or bought. In this light, the term "structured" can take on
two meanings - an organized method of problem solving, and a method of conducting
operations in accordance with formal military doctrine. The first meaning will be
addressed in this factor, and the latter is considered in the Leadership, Doctrine and
Policy factor. McClure et. al lists five steps in a basic attack (problem solving)
methodology: target acquisition and information gathering; initial access; privilege
escalation; covering of tracks; and planting of back doors (McClure, 1999:xxvi). These
steps are discussed in Section 2.3.2. Detection of this process would require that events
of the various attacks be noticed, associated in to a group, and analyzed as a common
incident.
Chantler provides a methodology that he feels represents information processing
by hackers with moderate to expert skill levels. This view is based upon his experience
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as head of computer security for the Australian Army, as well as many years of
interviews with hackers and the ethnographic study performed for his doctoral
dissertation. His work is reviewed in Section 2.3.3. Chantler compares the hackers'
information processing to that of a military intelligence process (Chantler, 1996: 109).
The process has three steps: direction, collection and collation, and dissemination. In the
direction stage a target system or problem to solve is selected. Information needed to
complete the task(s) is determined. The second step has two phases. First, the necessary
information is collected, and possibly stored. Other members of a group may be asked to
provide assistance. Next, the information is collated and analyzed. The third stage
consists of either dissemination of information if the hack is successful, or beginning the
cycle again if the hack is not successful (Chantler, 1996: 109). An interesting situation
sometimes occurs in which a hacker breaks the cycle to test for success early (Chantler,
1996: 167). The goal is to complete the hack more quickly.
Discussions with Red Teams, or other members of United States 10 organizations
may provide valuable insight into structured approaches to hacking. These groups might,
however, be loath to openly disclose their methods or tools. Interestingly, NSA director
Lt. General Michael Hayden has openly stated that the NSA remains behind much of the
world in "keeping up" with information technology developments (Verton, 2001).
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3.4. Individual Skill and Aspects of Teamwork
While hackers in 10 organizations may most likely work as part of a team, their
individual skill level remains an issue. Much of the open literature on hackers refers to
hacker skill levels in various general categories. Psychological models such as Item
Response Theory (reference Section 2.8.3) could provide a capability-based
differentiation among skill levels of hackers. This would, however, require an adequately
sized sample of hackers at all possible skills levels that were willing to have their skills
tested, and that actually performed on the test to their best ability. Therefore, models of
hacker skill levels will continue to revolve around self-reports and surveys, interviews
with experts, and expert judgment for the near future.
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In the case of both individual skill and teamwork, the various events involved
must be tied together into common incidents. There is also the issue of tying events by
the same individual or group together over time, even while their skill levels, team
membership, motives, and methods are changing. This is a similar set of problems to
those identified by Godwin for serial killers, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
3.4.1. Individual Skill Levels and Talent
Chantler describes three skill or knowledge levels in his hacker profile. These
consist of low, medium, and high levels. When developing a profile of members of a
nation's 10 organization, both individual skill and that of the "average" group member
can be considered.
Those on the low category consist of hackers who display little evidence of
intellectual capability (Chantler, 1996: 126). This group is termed "Losers" or "Lamers"
by other hackers, and could be used to describe script kiddies. They may be using tools
and techniques without understanding how or why they work (Taylor, 1999: 88). In
Chantler's hacker survey, 193 respondents described the skill level or profile of hackers
as expert / specialist, malicious, and nebulous. Both low and medium levels of hackers,
as characterized by Chantler, belong to the nebulous category (Chantler, 1996: 113).
Hackers with low skill levels may have just begun hacking, or are just disregarded by
higher-level hackers. Their ability may be hindered by lack of education (Chantler, 1996:
126).
Both McClure and Lesser believe that Denial of Service (DoS) attacks will be
used more extensively in the future, particularly by those hackers without the skill to
manage more sophisticated attacks (Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41; McClure, et. al, 1999: 340-
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341). This might apply to nations who are "growing" their military skills in 10, without
hiring outside expertise. It is not meant to imply that these nations do not have citizens
with high levels of computing skills, just that few of them may be members of the
military currently. This concept would apply more to developing nations.
Hackers with medium skill levels possess a sound basis in hacking. They are still
expanding their skill set, often using past exploits or mentors to improve. Information
processing skills and their approach to hacking are still expanding (Chantler, 1996: 126).
Chantler, and those he surveyed, believe the majority of hackers belong in this category
(Chantler, 1999,113).
Expert hackers have an extremely high skill level (Chantler, 1999,113). Their
approach to hacking tends to follow a structured problem solving methods, and they
possess a wide range of knowledge in computing (Chantler, 1996: 126). This group is
often referred to as the "elite". Chantler's survey respondents estimated that only 20% of
hackers reach this level (Chantler, 1996: 113). It is interesting to note that all of the
respondents placed themselves on this category. They felt expert status consists of
knowledge, renown (prestige), and service to the hacker community at large (mentoring,
sharing knowledge) (Chantler, 1996: 113). These expert hackers may also use lower
level hackers as a force multiplier or as "drones". The expert would provide the tools,
techniques, and targets for the underlings to attack. PSYOPS or perception management
may convince hackers to attack targets, even though they are not members of the group
(and may not even support the group) initiating the attack.
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3.4.2. Aspects of Teamwork
Taylor discussed how many hackers, who are not members of formal
organizational structures, choose to work in informal teams (Taylor, 1999: 60). These
teams pool resources and expertise to target larger, more complex systems or to speed
their efforts. Most members have a given specialty area or system; teams form to meet
the needs of a specific hack. The fluid nature of cyberspace, with no locational
restrictions on group membership, readily supports these teaming arrangements. The US
Air Force has similar flexibility inherent in its "reachback" approach to many formerly
deployed mission areas. Expertise is "tied in" from wherever it resides, and the group
may never need to meet "in person".
The fluid nature of teamwork in hacking groups may make these groups, as a
whole, harder to profile, especially in the case of modern day terrorist organizations
(reference Sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6). However, when one considers the specific group of
interest, the situation may not be as foreboding. These groups would consist of, in whole
or part, members of the military, their civilian counterparts, and hired contractor support.
As such, they might be physically collocated by higher-level command, or could be seen
as tied together by that country's equivalent to the United States MIL However, one
cannot assume that this will always be the case.
Additionally, as teams work and train together, common tools and techniques may
begin to provide a "hallmark" for specific groups. Mentors or specific training
philosophies may also contribute to identifiable aspects of attacks. This would be similar
skills and methods learned in terrorist training camps.
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Mercenaries, or equivalent "hired" talent, present an interesting dilemma.
Mercenaries as such are not allowed by the laws of war, and may choose not to follow
these laws or other international agreements (African Business, 1997). If hired as a team,
their actions may only tangentially correspond to the way an "in-house", traditional
military team would operate. Information as to the presence and identity of such a group
would be necessary to properly model such a nation's hackers.
This detail of the Skill and Teamwork factor is interrelated with Tools and
Training, as well as Leadership, Doctrine, and Policy.
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Figure 3-7 Skill and Teamwork
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3.5. Hacker Tools and Training
The intent of this factor is not to list every type of tool a hacker might use. Such a
list would be of limited practical value as these tools and techniques are constantly
changing. McClure, Scambray, and Kurtz detail many of the more common tool and
technique types in their book and on the related website http://www.hackingexposed.com
(McClure, et. al, 1999). Both the book and website provide a broad list of references
and Internet websites. A similar reference is Maximum Security: A Hacker's Guide to
Protecting Your Internet Site and Network by Anonymous (a hacker). Some types of
tools, such as social engineering, will be addressed, since their presence can be more
easily detected, and can provide information on the group or individual behind the
incident. This factor is interrelated with Individual Skill and Teamwork, and Leadership,
Doctrine and Policy.
3.5.1. Toolsets
One of the first things to remember when addressing the tools hackers might use
is that the US can no longer assume it will have the edge in the technology race. Many
countries can purchase the necessary equipment and hacking skills required to hack at an
elite level. This is one key reason why 10 is seen as an asymmetric approach to war. In
fact, the bureaucracy inherent in military acquisition processes could be seen as a limiting
factor.
There are two basic types of tools that can be used to hack - those that are
"published" (generally available) and those that have been created by a group or
individual for their own use. Hackers with only limited expertise are confined to the
published tools. More elite hackers might use either set depending upon the
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circumstance. In some cases they might wish to blend in with more traditional hackers
(script kiddies, random individuals interested in military systems). This would most
likely be the case for long-term intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) efforts.
These tools, since known, might however increase the chances of the activity being
detected. Even if it is detected, if it does not appear suspicious, it may not be greatly
explored due to current limitations on tracking incidents to overseas servers.
Tools that have been created for specific situations are generally much harder to
detect. These are the attacks that are rarely, if ever, noticed. These tools require the
highest levels of computing skill, and generally must be tailored to the specific target
system. The intent behind the tools might be to plant trojan horses, fishbowls, or
backdoors into a system in such a way that they can be used in the future for easily
launching a concerted IW attack.
Social engineering has been said to be one of the most effective hacking tools.
All of Chantler's survey respondents prided themselves in their ability to obtain vital
information, to include user names and passwords, from unsuspecting users (Chantler,
1996: 115). Social engineering, which can be seen as efforts at PSYOPS and perception
management, refers to using social interactions such as phone calls to obtain information
on a target system (Chantler, 1996: 134). Use of telephone calls and email allow a hacker
to gain information from a distance. Typically, hackers pose as service personnel, such
as computer support technicians. Activities might also involve posing as a security guard
or cleaner in order to search for hidden passwords or to "shoulder surf users typing in
their information. This requires that the hacker visit the victim in person. The ability to
lie well, act well, and good communication skills are the only requirements (Denning,
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1999: 111). Another form of social engineering would be planting a member of the 10
cell as an insider. This could occur at those target locations that make use of contractor
support, either on a normal basis or for more limited projects. This would pose the most
risk, and require the most effort on the part of the hackers.
The last two specific tools to be addressed are the use of rogue code and DoS or
DDoS attacks. There are many forms of rogue code, such as viruses, trojan horses,
mimic programs, and worms.
Viruses are pieces of code that attach themselves to other programs. Whenever
the program runs, the virus runs as well (Denning, 1999: 269). These bits of code can be
spread to any system that comes in contact with an infected system either through
network connections, e-mail, or via diskette. According to Denning's research, several
nations have begun to explore viruses as a method of offensive IW. A 1995 report from
the US Defense Intelligence Agency, cited by Denning, stated that Cuban had a program
in place to develop viruses with the goal of infecting US civilian computers (Denning,
1999: 275). The report also stated that, prior to the 1991 coup attempt in Russia, the
KGB had been developing viruses for use in times of war or crisis. Russian nationalists
have suggested that viruses could prove a useful foreign policy tool (Hoffman, 2000).
Vladimir Zhirinovsky was quoted in a Washington Post article as having said, "Let us put
viruses into their secret programs like we did recently, and they will not be able to do
anything." (Hoffman, 2000).
Hackers once looked down upon virus writers, but are now learning from their
techniques and even combining forces. Many of the motivations given for virus writers
are the same for hackers (Denning, 1999: 274-275). An example is the use of viruses to
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launch a DDoS infection, or to install rootkits or back doors (Rouland, 2000). Chris
Rouland, the Director of X-Force (a computer security firm) also predicts that virus
attacks will become more coordinated and specifically timed, and that they will target
defense systems (Rouland, 2000).
A trojan horse program is one that pretends to perform a useful function, but also
performs code in the background without the user's knowledge (McClure, et. al, 1999:
132). Its basic purpose is to gain access to an information system or resource (Denning,
1999: 259). Often the background code is malicious in nature. It may also involve
alteration of computer programs to perform unauthorized functions (McClure, 1996:
128).
Mimic programs lead victims into believing that they have a valid hardware
problem. They may also be written to mislead a user into giving away their user name
and password (Chantler, 1996: 128). The code presents what appears to be a normal
'log-on' screen; however, it is set up to pass the account information to both the normal
log-on program as well as a hidden directory that the hacker has access to. In this way,
the hacker gains the same privileges on the system as the user whose account he has
stolen (Chantler, 1996: 128).
Worms are similar to viruses, in that they replicate. However, worms operate
independently, and do not require a host program. The host system is not destroyed, but
its resources are taken over to support the growth and spread of the worm. This form of
malicious code is designed to secretly move through a network, often erasing evidence of
its presence, collecting information such as user accounts or documents of interest to the
hacker (Chantler, 1996: 129). Worms may also manipulate or destroy data, and may
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replicate to the point that its network host collapses (Chantler, 1996: 129). Many of the
latest generation of worms are propagated via e-mail (Smith, 2000).
Denials of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have
been discussed previously in Sections 2.3, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3. DoS attacks maybe
motivated by frustration when efforts to break into a system have failed, for the sense of
power it can bring, or a grudge against an organization (McClure, et. al 1999: 340-341).
While they are often seen as the last ditch effort of a frustrated script kiddie, many
authors see them as the weapon of choice for terrorists and nation states seeking to deny
access to a system (AFDD 1,1997: 24; Lesser, et. al, 1999: 41; McClure, et. al, 1999:
340-341). McClure also feels that DOS attacks will increase due to tools that allow easy
launching of DOS attacks, and the opinion that Windows NT/95/98 is a favorite, and
readily available target. The goal of a DoS or DDoS attack is to prevent use of a system
by bandwidth consumption or resource starvation (McClure, et. al, 1999: 344). DoS
attacks may be used to force a system reboot so that changes planted by the hacker can
take effect, hopefully without the system administrators noticing the changes (McClure,
et. al, 1999: 340-341). "Many governments have or are in the process of ramping up
offensive electronic warfare capabilities that use DoD attacks rather than conventional
missiles" (McClure, et. al, 1999: 354)
3.5.2. Training
This area includes both individual and team training, and the use of military
exercises. Any individual may also engage in self-training in addition to more formal
instruction. Due to the attraction hackers have for technology, most will pursue training
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and improved skills on their own. In this case, any change in the group's style of hacking
may be harder to detect.
Individual training is formal coursework or exercises performed at the individual
level. Skills learned are not used primarily within the hacking cell to further teamwork,
but to improve the skills of the team's members. Since many groups utilize specialized
skills of their members, this may involve furthering the expertise of the overall team
through training of individual members. This would be similar to specialized skills
(communications, first aid) inherent in an infantry platoon.
Team training would be similar in concept to traditional basic or specialized skill
training in the military. As such, it may be "behind the times" if it requires the same
formal course planning, building, and approval process of other military training courses.
Courses by contractor groups, either to military or to military contractors, may be more
responsive to changes in technology. 10 cells may also decide to take advantage of
courses provided by academic organizations, institutes related to computer security, or
commercial organizations. While these courses are not meant to train hackers, they often
teach hacking techniques and tools so computer security professionals can better guard
against them. These courses may provide valuable training for groups building expertise
in 10, and may also help develop techniques for "hiding in the noise" of more traditional
hackers. It would also provide valuable insight into security vulnerabilities of specific
systems.
Group training could also consist of military exercises. These activities are of a
larger scale, and tend to involve many types of troops and weapon systems. As 10
emerges as a new form of war, it is beginning to take part in these exercises. Currently,
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10 portions of these exercises are limited, and 10 is used as a supporting capability, not
as the primary weapon system. This may change in the future, as more countries develop
10 doctrine, policy, and plans. These exercises, due to their larger size, may be easier to
detect and observe. However, an all-IO exercise may not be as easy to observe, unless
high visibility items are targeted. Detection would require that the country's systems of
interest can and are being observed, and that successful targeting of systems can be
detected.
These team-based training efforts are of interest, since they shape the behavior of
those involved. This is why the US puts such emphasis on the concept "train as you
intend to fight". If all of any adversary's 10 forces have been trained in the same manner
with the same doctrine and policy, then they may act in a similar manner when their skills
are called upon during conflict. They may share a common set of tools for aspects of the
hacking process such as information gathering and vulnerability mapping. While
different members may have different specialized skills, their common approach to
hacking may make their efforts more predictable.
Hired hacking cells (mercenaries) may not provide this same level of
predictability. Mercenaries primarily care about a person's skill level - can they get the
job done. They accept trained personnel from many countries (African Business, 1997).
Team training would most likely be provided by the mercenary group, and therefore may
be less observable. They could, however, develop specific characteristics over time if the
same members work together on several operations.
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3.6. Intent, Timing and Use of IO
Every action by a military IO group is meant to serve a specific mission or set of
missions. Therefore, some aspects of the intent behind an IO incident may be visible
with sufficient analysis. Data such as the time of the event, both the data and time of day,
and external triggers to the event also provide additional information for the group's
profile. Finally, how specific IO tools and techniques are used can provide insight into
the intent of the group, as well as the specifics of the group itself.
3.6.1. Intent (Mission)
A single IO or IW attack can serve one or a myriad of missions. US doctrine will
be used as a source for concepts of IO mission planning and the intent behind IO
operations. This does not assume that other nations will follow US doctrine, but that the
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doctrine has stood the test of time in traditional conflicts, and is a source for adapting
views on 10.
One intent that may provide the bulk of 10 incidents is Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlespace (IPB). US Joint doctrine holds IPB vital to the success of 10 and IW (JP
3-13, 1998:1-18). These efforts in support of 10 would require long-term development,
possibly longer than traditional operations (JP 3-13,1998: V-2). IPB efforts would
include efforts to locate, identify, and map potential adversary systems and information
infrastructures. Sun Tzu wrote, "Both sides stalk each other over several years to contend
for victory in a single day." (Huang, 1993: 111).
The growing reliance of US troops on information and information systems
provides an asymmetric advantage to an enemy, less reliant upon technology, who can
identify US weaknesses. Another aspect of IPB would be efforts to identify a potential
adversary in terms of "intent, vulnerability, capability, and opportunity to adversely
influence the elements of the friendly information environment critical to achieving
objectives" (JP 3-13, 1998:1-16). Finally, IPB would provide a potential adversary with
an understanding of US decision making processes and leadership (JP 3-13,1998:11-12 11-13).
10 can also be used to shape the battlespace and prepare for future operations
prior to initiating a conflict (JP 3-13,1998:1-4). The idea is to create conditions
favorable to achieving ones goals before the conflict escalates into violence (JP 3-13,
1998:1-9). One goal may be to gain Information Superiority over an adversary at the
start of a conflict. Once Information Superiority is gained, an adversary would have the
freedom to fully exploit their information systems while denying the US access to its own
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information systems (AFDD 1, 1997: 31). Tools to support the shaping of the battlespace
might include placing back doors, planting trojan horses, and developing and/or releasing
viruses designed to affect the target systems. A final tool could be the development of
DoS or DDoS tool, along with the capture of drone computers to launch the attacks.
A third intent might be deterrence. In this case, 10 may not be conducted so
much as capabilities are "advertised". Again, JP 3-13 postulates that 10 may have its
greatest impact as a deterrent, or during the initial stages of a conflict (JP 3-13, 1998:13). Deterrence is based upon posturing, maintaining, and exercising forces with
sufficient capability to hold at risk a broad range of targets, as well as having the intent to
use those forces if efforts at deterrence fail (AFDD 2-1.5, 1998: vi). 10 and rW can have
a psychological effect far greater than actual physical effects. Threats to cripple or
destroy and enemy's key infrastructure may serve a country's objectives more than an
actual attack. However, without actual use, there may be a question as to the
effectiveness of IO.
The attack of one system cannot, necessarily, be construed as the intent to attack
that specific system. Instead, the true intent may be to "hop" from that system to one it is
connected to, or to use the conquered system to attack another target. One example is the
use of a large number of computers as "drones" when carrying out a DDoS attack. This
is part of what makes tracing an attack to its true source so difficult. These attacks could
be seen in the light of "primary" and "secondary" targets. Similarly, the intent may be to
achieve a "cascading effect". Each successfully hacked system may be linked to a wealth
of other systems that are now more vulnerable due to "peer-to-peer" relationships
between the systems. Viruses and worms present a clear case of cascading effects, as
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they are rapidly spread throughout a network. Finally, the intent could be one of creating
a synergistic effect, such as operations combining 10 with more traditional operations (JP
3-13,1998: II-3). A synergistic effect may also occur when 10 and IW achieve strategic,
operational, and tactical level objectives simultaneously.
10 and IW have the unique capability to achieve multiple levels of objectives at
the same time. At the strategic level, 10 seeks to impact political, military, economic,
and informational elements of the enemy's power (JP 3-13, 1998:1-2). Operational level
10 supports operations at the campaign level, focusing on adversary forces or combatant
commanders (JP 3-13, 1998:1-2,1-10). Finally, tactical level 10 involves specific actions
to affect an adversary's information and information systems that are directly related to
the conduct of military operations (JP 3-13, 1998:1-3). Together with air and space
power, 10 has added strength and flexibility in that it does not require the achievement of
tactical objectives before operational and strategic level objectives are pursued (AFDD 1,
1997: 13). Table 2-5 Air Force Information Operation Goals provides examples of goals
at each of the levels.
3.6.2. Timing of Actions
Some actions may be in response to an external trigger. They could then be
predicted as a response to an act of aggression, the imposing of sanctions, or other world
events. Whenever the US is active in the international world, there is the possibility of
adverse reactions from those nations whose goals and objectives are in conflict with ours.
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo could be used as an
illustration of Chinese hacker reactions to external triggers (Thomas: 12). In addition,
Israeli and Palestinian nationals have been waging a hackers' war against each other's
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government computer systems and websites in the last several months following
problems in the Middle East peace process (Ackerman, 2000; Associated Press, 2000;
Gentile, 2000).
Other actions could constitute a "first strike" in a new conflict. JP 3-13 states that
the strength of IO and IW may be its use in the early stages of an operation or as a
deterrent (JP 3-13, 1998:1-3). If the attack is small, meant to prepare the battlespace of
finalize IPB, it may go unnoticed. Larger actions, meant to cripple systems or deny
access to vital information will be harder to camouflage. However, aspects of stealth
may be involved - the conflict has begun, but the adversary does not wish this fact to be
known.
3.6.3. UseoflO
One of the first uses of IO supports JJPB as well as preparation of the battlespace
and actions that can be construed as more traditional attacks (CNA, launching of viruses).
This use involves tailoring attacks so that they hide in the normal "noise" seen on a
network. The goal is to avoid detection, both during the operation or later when system
administrators may notice evidence of actions. If the operation is noticed, the attacker
wishes to appear as a script kiddie or another "run-of-the-mill" hacker, rather than as an
agent of a foreign nation. Examples of when this would occur are during ping sweeps to
gather intelligence on systems, or when an adversary is mapping system vulnerabilities.
Additionally, some low-level attacks may be a way of testing new capabilities
prior to actual conflict. Again, this may occur most often with rogue code (viruses and
trojan horses). In general, those testing these capabilities would try to ensure the
operation went unnoticed. This may involve using civilian or non-military government
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targets. Overall, most adversaries will not wish to "tip their hand" by providing
information on 10 capabilities until the situation requires that they do so. This relates to
the concept of surprise, one of the principles of war (AFDD 1, 1997: 20). While some
capabilities are made known for their inherent deterrent value, others are hidden so that
they can be used to best effect.
10 and IW support other principles of war as well. These operations provide
unique ways of concentrating mass on enemy targets, with little exposure of troops to the
hazards of war. Forces need not be co-located; instead, they can wait to combine forces
at the target (AFDD 1,1997: 16). The interconnected nature of computer and
communications networks also allows a wide range of maneuverability, forcing an enemy
to react since he does not know from what direction an attack will come. The flexibility,
versatility, and speed of 10 allow the simultaneous application of mass and maneuver
(AFDD 1, 1997: 17).
10 can also act as a force multiplier when supporting more traditional operations
(JP 3-13,1998: VI-2). It may also be the supported operation when 10 provided the main
effort against the adversary, but other capabilities are required (JP 3-13,1998: VI-2).
Finally, during operations such as IPB, IO may serve as a stand-alone operation. This is
not to imply that efforts such as open source collection of information does not support
IPB, but rather that such collection may not solely impact the success of the IO-based
collection of information.
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Finally, IO and IW can be utilized for its inherent capabilities (PSYOP, Military
Deception, and CNA ) as defined in
Table 2-2 Key Military Capabilities. PSYOP, and the related concept of
perception management, involves actions to influence emotions, motives, reasoning, and
behavior of the enemy; the enemy's will to fight (JP 3-13, 1999: II-3 - II-6). This may
involve enemy efforts to influence US leadership, but also the American public. Military
Deception efforts seek to plant inaccurate information or impressions in the mind of the
enemy (JP 3-13, 1999: II-3 - II-6). Again, the minds of the American public could prove
a valuable target. Other targets would include releasing information that would mislead
US decision makers in the assessment of the enemy's capabilities or intent. The third
capability, CNA, specifically involves denying access to, corruption (or deception),
destruction, or compromise of vital information. It may also involve similar actions
against the computer systems on which the information resides (JP 3-13,1998: GL-5).
Examples of these threat areas are provided in Table 2-4 Information Warfare Threats.
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3.7. Cultural Impacts
Technology provides a wealth of options for 10 efforts. Each country and group
utilizing the strengths of 10 does so in its own way. Cultural aspects of the country and
its people, as well as their shared history, influence the political, social, and military
actions of the leadership and general populace. The concept of culture holds that some
aspects of a group's character will be the same. For example, in recent months, Israeli
and Palestinian nationals have been waging a hackers' war against each other's
government computer systems and websites (Ackerman, 2000; Associated Press,
2000;Gentile, 2000). While carried out by the general populace, at least in part, this
example provides insight into cultural affects on the type, timing, and use of hacking.
The incidents are traced to long-standing arguments of land rights, access to religious
sites, and feelings of nationalism.
3.7.1. Nationalism and Patriotism
Feelings of nationalism, ethnicity, and patriotism can provide motivation for
military hackers, much as they provide motivation for the all-volunteer United States
military. These motivations may inspire hackers to join the military even though higher
salaries, better equipment, and better benefits may be available outside the military.
Another area of culture to explore is the "personality" of a nation. For example,
the US might be seen by some as a "technology junkie", or as a nation that cannot delay
its gratification (keeping up with the Joneses). Therefore, adversaries may see targets in

3-36

the US Nil, Gil, and Mil that have no equivalent in their own country. The "Y2K" scare
in the US may give an adversary an idea of using denial or destruction of access to
technology as a PSYOP target against the general public, as well as denying the military
access to many military systems that depend upon technology. On the issue of delaying
gratification, adversaries may feel that the US is very direct in its actions. Someone who
cannot delay gratification may miss better opportunities in the future in order to obtain
near-term gains. Conversely, someone who is willing to delay gratification may take
actions that appear harmful or less than desirable in the near-term so that a better future is
shaped.
3.7.2. Paradigms and Perspectives
Cultural paradigms and perspective color a nation's views of itself, as well as the
picture that other nations have of it. JP 3-13 warns of the need to consider cultural
perspectives in analyzing a potential adversary or their actions (JP 3-13, 1998; II-12-II14). This area also affects how one would evaluate the adversary's leadership, doctrine,
policy, and potential actions.
3.7.3. Religion
Religion is another key cultural issue. This extends to both the religion itself, as
well as to specific religious sects in some cases. Culturally diverse nations such as the
United States and the United Kingdom may not have as religious an aspect to their 10
organizations as those nations which have a primary, and active, religious nature to their
cultural identity. Religious zealots could provide a ready force multiplier if a nation state
can convince them, either openly or through PSYOPS, to serve as "proxy" cyberwarriors.
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3.7.4. Cyberculture
Hackers may also be seen as members of an additional culture, that of the
computer world. This could represent a sub-culture or microclimate to be explored. One
respondent to Chantler's survey described cyberspace as "an information world created
by technology, in which the mind has the freedom to decide what role its owner should
play" (Chantler, 1996: 141). As discussed by Taylor, this culture is very fluid (Taylor,
1999: 30). It evolves at the speed of technology, has an ever changing and hard to
quantify membership, and is not bound by borders, language, or location. In some cases,
the ties of "cyberculture" and the more traditional culture to which a hacker belongs may
come in conflict. This issue must be considered in a profile. It may not be clear whether
a hacker has stronger cultural ties to the other members of his 10 group, the hacker
community at large, or his / her country of nationality. The strength with which a hacker
is motivated by peer recognition may provide insight into the specifics of cultural ties.
Mercenaries may provide an interesting challenge to profiling efforts, as the country for
which they are working may not hold strong cultural ties.
Renfro, in his study "Modeling Individual Behavior", identifies three key
concepts in exploring cultural influences. These are Moral Understanding (religion, and
relativist / universalistic), Legal System (value of human life), and Political System
(Renfro, 2000: 12).
3.7.5. Morality
The influence of religion has already been discussed. The concept of relativistic
versus universalistic reasoning deals with issues of right and wrong. Someone who is
relativistic looks at right and wrong purely in the context of the current situation perhaps
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influenced by inclusions of bystanders viewpoints. In contrast, a person with a
universalist outlook believes in universal concepts of right and wrong (Curphy, Hughes,
and Ginnett; 171). An example is a true conscientious objector - a person who believes it
is never "right" to kill another.
3.7.6. Legality
The influence of the legal system can also be seen in relation to hacking.
Governments at all levels are passing laws against hacking. Taylor discussed three issues
that relate to the success of legislation against hackers, which were summarized in
Section 2.2 along with other legality issues. At a more serious level, a hacker's views on
issues of legality may impact target selection. Some 10 targets, such as communications
lines, may potentially result in loss of life, for example due to denial of access to
emergency 911 call systems. A hacker with little regard for human life may not worry
about the potentially cascading effects of his / her attack. This issue is also addressed in
the factors of Intent and Leadership, Doctrine, and Policy.
Renfro's third area of cultural influences, Political System, deals with decision
makers and those that might influence them. As such, it is addressed in the factor of
Leadership, Doctrine, and Policy.
3.7.7. Psychological Theory
Where specific information is available on a hacker's culture, both in the
traditional sense as well as that of "cyberculture", psychology may provide additional
levels of detail for the profile. Section 2.4.3 presents the theories of Rotter, Bandura, and
Lewin, all of which specifically consider the role of the environment in shaping an
individual's motivations and actions. Use of these theories in a specific profile would
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require significant expertise in the field of psychology. One potentially useful tool
requiring such expertise is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which successfully
describes British economic growth over a 350-year period (Arkes, 1982: 277). Created
as a method of assessing the need for achievement, a TAT test consists of an individual
creating a story around an ambiguous picture (Arkes, 1982: 252).
In the case of societal trends in achievement, writings about the same general
topics were compared across many years. Some experts question the validity of the TAT
to measure motivation (Arkes, 1982: 286), based upon studies where need for
achievement does not predict well a given measure of performance. Atkinson, one of the
developers of achievement theory, defends the theory with Yerkes/Dodson's law (Arkes,
1982: 287). This states that people with a low need for achievement do better on hard
tasks, while people with a high need for achievement perform better on an easy task.
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3.8. Leadership, Doctrine, and Policy
The organization to which a hacker belongs may have an effect upon approaches,
actions, and tool use during an actual hack. Each nation has its own leadership,
leadership style, doctrine, and policy. The United States DoD and AF will provide a
basis for this aspect of the malicious hacker framework. JP 3-13, AFDD 1, AFDD 2-1.5,
and AFDD 2-5, discussed in Chapter 2, will serve as key references.
3.8.1. Leadership
The quality of leadership varies from individual to individual. However, the
degree of responsibility and autonomy given to a specific level of leadership and / or
branch of military service for a specific nation can be estimated. This aspect explores the
structure of the 10 cell and its chain of command.
One of the first areas to be explored is the adversary's decision making processes.
Are they slow moving, and/or dependent on information technology for collection,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence products? If so, then key influence points,
possibly in terms of PSYOPS, Military Deception, or CNA, would be those systems that
support the decision makers.
Additionally, is authority for operations centralized or decentralized? A long,
formal approval process for 10 or IW may limit the effectiveness of the operations. Just
as airpower's strengths and flexibility were limited in the US until the Air Force was
established as a separate service, if 10 cells are controlled by commanders with limited
knowledge of their capabilities their operations will primarily continue as supporting
efforts. In this case, traditional "hard kills" of systems may be preferred to the less
substantiated power of CAN or other 10 approaches. The flexibility of 10 to react at
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great speed, limited only by human keystrokes and communications bandwidth, may also
be restricted if specific actions must be approved by higher command.
Berger presents the case for decentralized, networked organizations (Berger,
1998: x). Decentralization has the added benefits of encouraging information sharing
across lines of authority and passing authority for operations to as low a level as possible
(Berger, 1998: 25). Organic (networked) organization structures are more robust in
environments experiencing large amounts of change or uncertainty, require little formal
coordination, and encourage innovation (Berger, 1998: 33-35). All of these
characteristics would benefit a nation involved in conflict. Thus, a decentralized
approach to the 10 command chains would provide the least impediment to IO's
strengths.
A more centralized command structure would be easier to influence and to target.
A traditional hierarchical approach to control and organization of 10 capabilities, tied
with strict adherence to current doctrine, can breed predictability (Berger, 1998: 98).
Knowledge of the enemy's command structure and doctrine is vital, then, to
understanding how that country will approach and implement 10. On the other hand, if a
nation's doctrine allows autonomous action when communications are lost, striking the
C4 system might actually speed a foe's response time.
To better understand the enemy, one must also explore issues of command and
control. This not only involves IPB aspects of locating and identifying potential systems
and infrastructure, but also exploring how leadership, advisors, and units are connected to
each other both formally and informally. Determination of who is involved in command
and control processes will help isolate viable influence points as well as most suitable
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targets for specific operations when the US decides to act or respond to enemy actions.
Again, if the enemy has developed a networked 10 structure, then the most effective lines
of command and control may be hard to detect, or their lines may be blurred. However,
the goal of profiling the leadership aspect of and enemy's 10 organization is to better
understand thought processes, approaches to operations, and lines of command and
control.
Finally, the issue of leadership should also be addressed with respect to the use of
hired 10 expertise (the concept of mercenaries). Mercenary groups must rely heavily on
trust in both the individual member and, most especially, the leadership. Mercenary
leaders depend upon charisma, strength, and skill. While they may not be the most
skilled at a given task, the group as a whole perceives them as having been proven "the
best" overall (Lavadour, 2001: 60). While the same may not hold true for the formal
leadership of a military contractor, within the functional 10 cell they provide, this may
still hold true. If this is the case, the most effective influence point is to cast doubt upon
the leader's ability or trustworthiness.
3.8.2. Doctrine & Policy
Basic doctrine is adapting to the unique capabilities of 10. Doctrine provides
overall guidance on the use of military capabilities to meet national objectives. Policy
can be defined as doctrine put into practice. The specifics of a situation influence how
doctrine is implemented to meet specific objectives in a given situation. Those
developing doctrine may find themselves behind the curve of rapid changes in the field of
10. When observing an enemy's doctrine, one must question whether operations plans
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have moved beyond current published doctrine. Many of the concepts explored in this
factor have been discussed previously.
First, a potential adversary's doctrine should be explored for statements regarding
how the country sees that 10 will be tempered by the laws of war, as well as international
law and conventions. These concepts were explored in Section 2.2. Specifically, are
some actions (rogue code, attacks on financial markets) weighed in light of their possibly
indeterminate or cascading effects? Many of the specifics of more damaging 10
capabilities might not be mentioned, so that capabilities remain hidden until they are most
needed.
Next, how are 10 mentioned with respect to deterrence? This concept was
previously developed as part of Intent, Timing, and Use. Again, US doctrine postulates
that 10 may have its greatest impact as a deterrent, or during the initial stages of a
conflict (JP 3-13, 1998:1-3). Deterrence is based upon posturing, maintaining, and
exercising forces with sufficient capability to hold at risk a broad range of targets, as well
as having the intent to use those forces if efforts at deterrence fail (AFDD 2-1.5,1998:
vi). Other nations have already begun to develop ideas about 10 with respect to
deterrence. Chinese author Shen Weiguang in a February 2, 1999 article in Jiefangjun
Bao is quoted by Farris as having written, "Only when we possess the capability to win,
and make preparations to win, can we possibly realize the aim of checking the warfare"
(Farris, 2000: 38 - 39).
Next, how does the potential adversary's doctrine address the use of 10 versus
conventional weapons systems? Is 10 primarily addressed as a supporting operation, or
does it appear to be seriously treated as a stand-alone or supported operation? This could
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provide insight into how and at what level (strategic, operational, or tactical) 10 will be
conducted. For example, it may provide an idea of whether US systems and
infrastructure will be targeted by CNA versus electronic attack or physical destruction.
This could highlight whether information or information systems in the US mainland will
be targeted over systems deployed to the area of operations. 10 can impinge upon
building and sustaining coalitions, as well as highlight the vulnerability of the US
homeland in ways not previously seen with traditional operations (Molander et. al, 1996:
30).
Finally, how does the adversary's doctrine discuss 10 target selection and target
sets? Figure 2-2 Examples of Potential 10 Targets (JP 3-13,1998:1-17) presents
examples of targets that the US is considering for 10. Are potential synergistic effects
explored through the combination of 10 with physical attack / destruction or electronic
attack (JP 3-13, 1998: II-3)? Is the possibility of bypassing, isolating, or neutralizing a
target so that it retains its intelligence value discussed (JP 3-13, 1998:11-14)? Are
measures of success identified for 10 (JP 3-13,1998: II-l)? All of these concepts will
help place the potential adversary's intent, capabilities, and approaches to use of force in
context.
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3.9. Malicious Hacker Framework
Now that the key aspects that can affect a hacker and the actual hack have been
identified, a framework, or scripted profile, has been established to organize the
knowledge about a particular nation's approach to 10 and to facilitate analysis. Each of
the seven factors and their diagram is now assembled into an organized whole in Figure
3-12 Malicious Hacker Profile. As mentioned previously, a strength of the Ishikawa
diagram is that the factors need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, areas of overlap
provide insight into interrelationship among the factors.
When utilized, available data and expertise on a nation of interest is assembled.
Each factor can then be considered in turn. Some aspect of each factor area will be
relevant to a group being profiled. It is not believed that all details will be appropriate (or
available) in every case. The profile is tailored so that each applicable detail is explored
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as far as possible or desired, with unnecessary areas being deleted from the diagram.
Areas that require more exploration or collection of information can also be highlighted.
The framework, then, serves as a method of consolidating information on a group
of interest. It highlights information and intelligence requirements, and may serve to
identify sources. Additionally, characteristics of the group are identified along with
potential targets, weaknesses, and influence points. This may drive additional
requirements for the intelligence community collecting information on the group.
The level of confidence in a given detail can be specified. For example, the belief
that a country's hackers are motivated primarily by salary could be weighed against all
other motives assumed to be relevant, similar to the way that swing weights are used in
VFT. The goal is not to develop a numerical value for motivation, but rather to better
understand at an overall level how the hacker is motivated and how he or she could
potentially be influenced. For those motivated by salary, efforts might be undertaken to
hinder payments of salaries, or bribes might be offered. Additionally, providing levels of
confidence in each aspect of the model can provide input to the overall model's ability to
describe the group of interest. If provided as part of the diagram, it will highlight the fact
that the diagram represents a profile, and not necessarily the "facts" of the group of
interest.
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3.10.

Summary

This section has utilized the review of references in Chapter Two, as well as key
model structures, to develop a framework to analyze malicious hackers. Much of the
framework is useful in studying the broader classes of hackers, from insiders, to script
kiddies, to elite hackers, or even terrorist groups.
Ishikawa diagrams have a unique set of strengths for this type of efforts. The
hierarchical nature of the diagram allows for appropriate levels of detail, substantiated by
available data. These diagrams are not limited by the availability of quantitative data for
each factor and level of detail. Where available, quantitative data can focus efforts on
defense measures specific to the area of the data. For example, use of a specific tool or
events occurring at a similar time, substantiated by Pareto charts or other numerical tools,
can focus defensive 10 measures against events using that specific tool or allow greater
scrutiny of events during the times of interest.
Chapter Four will use the model developed to study a specific country's 10
doctrine, and how state sponsored hackers in that country could be modeled. The case
study serves as both a proof of concept and validation of the proposed malicious hacker
model.
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4. Case Study: Chinese Approach to 10 and Hacking

4.1. Introduction
To be operationally sound, the framework developed in Chapter Three must
provide a useful analysis of some group or class of malicious hackers. Since the focus of
this thesis was on state sponsored hacking, a foreign country with known 10 programs
and doctrine was needed to serve as a test case. Due to availability of documents and
some level of cultural assessment, China has been selected as an appropriate case study.
4.2. Chinese Doctrine for IO
Several sources provide an overall view of Chinese 10 doctrine and theory. The
Chinese were one of the earliest nations (following Russia) to pursue the concept of 10
and IW. By the mid-nineties the Chinese government had discussed the possibility of
attacking foreign financial markets (Borland, 1998). Military exercises began to
incorporate concepts of computer-based warfare in 1997 (Borland, 1998).
China's long history of actively collecting information on the US and US defense
secrets is well known (Gertz, 2000). Sources of information, as early as the late nineteen
seventies, include students studying abroad, business people, scientists, and travelers.
These individuals were not paid for their efforts, as those collecting the information
expect those friendly to China to provide any information freely (Gertz, 2000). Another
large source of information is through open source documentation that can be pieced
together into "better" intelligence. According to a spying manual recently published by
two Chinese intelligence experts, 80% of Chinese spying efforts focus on open source
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material, with the remaining 20% obtained through illicit means such as the use of agents
or electronic surveillance (Gertz, 2000).
4.2.1. Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory
and Practice by Thomas
Mr. Thomas, a member of the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office,
discusses the recent articles and studies published by Chinese scholars on IW in this
document. He presents three key results of his analysis (Thomas: 1). First, he believes
the Chinese feel a compelling urge to develop rW theory in a manner that is uniquely
Chinese. This theory would take into account China's history, military philosophy,
culture, and economic situation. Second, Mr. Thomas states that Chinese IW theory is
"strongly influenced by Chinese military art" (Thomas: 1). Two examples of this concept
are the extension of the People's War concept to IW and the development of a separate
"net force" - a separate military branch to address issues of rW. Finally, the Chinese are
developing r\V theory based on terminology consistent with Chinese military science,
which is more in line with Russian (communist) concepts than those of the West.
However, Chinese scholars are studying US doctrine and RAND studies to further their
own theories and doctrine.
While China is developing this new set of IW theory, it appears that moving
theory into practice is proving more difficult (Thomas: 1). China is still developing the
necessary infrastructure, both military and civilian, to support their IW theory. This is
seen as China's biggest weakness (Thomas: 17). However, Thomas cites a 3 August
2000 Washington Times article that states hackers suspected of working for the Chinese
government successfully attacked a Los Alamos computer system and gained access to
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sensitive, but unclassified, information (Thomas: 2). However, China holds a longstanding strength in the formulation of strategic concepts coupled with a focus on long
term thought processes (Thomas: 17).
Other targets that appear to be of interest to the Chinese include "information
sources, channels, and destinations, and C4I and electronic warfare assets" (Thomas: 2).
Primary attack objectives are believed to be information systems linking political,
economic, and military installations, as well as US society in general (Thomas: 2).
China believes that it is not of superpower status with respect to its nuclear arms,
but that IW, representative of a change in the conduct of warfare, might provide the
necessary power to threaten other nations (Thomas: 2). IW attempts to win conflicts in
terms of "promptness, correctness, and sustainability", and can attack targets from long
distances (Thomas: 2). The area of communications (methods and media) is one of
concern for the Chinese due to the strategic nature of their capabilities. Communications
can have a deterrent effect and are capable of manipulating the general public, making
them a key target during conflicts (Thomas: 8). Adding emphasis to this concept,
Thomas states that "Chinese military scientists have studied the ability of IW to affect
values, emotions, and beliefs of target audiences, traditional psychological warfare
theory, but with IW applications" (Thomas: 18).
The Chinese no longer count military strength in terms of armored divisions,
wings of airplanes, or battle groups; concepts such as computing power, communications
bandwidth, and system reliability are being addressed as well. Xie Guang, the ViceMinister of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense,
describes (according to Thomas) the three areas of IW as first C4ISR (command, control,
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Communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), then
electronic warfare, and finally computer attack and defense methods (Thomas: 7). IW is
seen as a way for China to catch up to the West in terms of military strategy and
international status (Thomas: 16).
Thomas believes the most far-reaching development in Chinese IW theory is the
extension of IW to the theory of a People's War (Thomas: 2). This means that civilians
as well as military forces will be involved in IW operations - "the chance of the people
taking the initiative and randomly participating in the war increased" (Thomas: 2). The
result is a "take home battle" where civilians use laptop computers from home to hack
foreign computer systems. Chinese analyst Wang Xiaodong is quoted as having stated,
"... an IW victory will very likely be determined by which side can mobilize the most
computer experts and part-time fans" (Thomas: 3). "The goal of Chinese doctrine is to
unify the concept of People's War with the concept of victory through information."
(Thomas: 3) Thomas sees a large, untapped potential in Chinese information engineering
and computer specialists (Thomas: 3).
China's reserve forces are adopting this concept of an rw People's War. The
People's Liberation Army (PLA) is creating mini IW regiments in some districts
(Thomas: 3). A reserve training base for rw has been established, and there are several
reports of IW activity by reserve units (Thomas: 3-4). Aspects of this approach could be
seen following the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo 8 May 1999. Thomas
discusses a Chinese Liberation Army Daily article detailing a "network battle" between
US and Chinese hackers. This article claims that in addition to defacing the home page
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of the US Embassy in Beijing, Chinese hackers shut down several US political and
military website and many civilian web sites (Thomas: 12).
The methods used included DDoS attacks by thousands of Internet users, e-mails
loaded with rogue code, and attacks using "hacker tools" buried in programs. The targets
of these attacks reflects a common concept held by both Chinese and American analysts technology is increasing the size of the battlefield even as it is shrinking the size of the
world (in virtual terms) (Thomas: 12). Precision targeting of key network nodes (termed
acupuncture war by the Chinese) illustrates the ability of 10 to attack locations at will,
without the requirement for mass troop movements (Thomas: 12).
Several organizations and institutes have been created in the last few years
charged with IW training for the PLA. The lead organization, the Communications
Command Academy, has published two books - one on Command and Control IW and
the other on Technology in IW (Thomas: 8). The first book addresses concepts for
building an "information corps" and the principles on which to base Chinese approaches
to IW. The second develops trends for basic IW technologies. Thomas states that the
academy is "well respected for its IW curriculum that analyzes strategic, operational, and
tactical IW requirements" (Thomas: 9). All of the universities, colleges, and institutes
reflect the changes in warfare that the PLA sees with respect to rw. The Chinese view
IW as a force multiplier and as a strategic resource (Thomas: 9). However, Thomas
believes the current level of IW expertise and "culture" of current commanders is
relatively low (Thomas: 9).
As a result, training programs are being tailored to the age and position of
Chinese troops. High level, older, and somewhat less technically adept commanders
4-5

receive short duration training (supplemented by other means) geared to eliminating
information illiteracy, changing concepts and paradigms, and the application of new IW
ideas to future war (Thomas: 10). The Chinese feel that high-technology war demands "a
high level of knowledge by commanders and operators, strong psychological qualities,
command ability, and operational skill" (Thomas: 10).
Those members aged 30-40 are seen as "transitional-style talent" - the leaders of
tomorrow. The focus of their training is on "enhancing their ability to command in IW
environments" (Thomas: 10). Training goals include laying a firm foundation in
information theory, and gaining a grasp of the requirements, unique aspects, and laws of
IW.
Finally, younger members of the PLA receive long duration IW training. It is
assumed that they already possess an understanding and appreciation of the modern
information-based world. The focus of training at this level is on command and
technology. In addition to ideological and theoretical concepts of IW, these students
receive advanced instruction in IW methods and develop skill through actual application
(Thomas: 10). All training levels addressed basic theory, IW rules and regulations,
strategy and tactics specific to IW, information weapons, simulation-based IW training,
CNA, and network defense (Thomas: 10). Thomas points out that while articles appear
to present China as having superior IW training programs, some reports provide a less
favorable picture (Thomas: 10-11). One source states that IW training is not systematic,
that it lacks order as well as assessment standards, and its management lacks regulation
(Thomas: 11).
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The use of military exercises by the Chinese to explore, develop, and
institutionalize IW theory and practice has grown since the first IW exercise in 1997
(Thomas: 13). Later exercises extended participation over several regions across China.
Exercise objectives have included emphasis on electronic confrontation, discussions on
and design of IW training, and campaign-level IW confrontation of forces (Thomas: 1516).
The establishment of a separate Chinese "net force", which some Chinese
scholar's treat as "very likely", is also considered (Thomas: 5). One possible reason for
this event is that the Chinese view violations of their cyberspace as important, if not more
so due to their secretive nature, than violations of national sovereignty (Thomas: 5). This
net force would both defend Chinese systems and information and attack adversary
targets (Thomas: 5).
China has a long history of military strategy. One set being re-explored in terms
of IW is the "36 stratagems" originally collected over 300 years ago by an unknown
scholar (Thomas: 4). One of the overriding issues was the use of deception as a military
art supporting the achievement of military objectives, now possibly revitalized as a tactic.
Thomas presents five of these "36 stratagems" and provides modern IW interpretations
(Thomas: 4).
First, "fool the emperor to cross the sea" - this means hiding the true intent of
actions in order to mislead the enemy. Rogue code hidden in e-mail messages or Internet
traffic is a modern example. Next, "besiege Wei to rescue Zhao" - attacking something
the enemy holds dear if a direct attack is not possible. This would be represented by
CNA use instead of conventional operations, and highlights the Chinese intentions to use
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IW, potentially against the Nil (i.e. the US economy) rather than the Mil or GIL Third,
"kill with a borrowed sword" - attack using another's strength is a direct attack is not
possible. This would be the case when proxies, cut outs, or another country are used to
release or spread rogue code. Fourth, "await the exhausted enemy at your ease" - similar
to the US principle of war of offensive, this relates to "choosing the time and place of
battle". Thomas' IW example is the use of the People's War theory to launch multiple
attacks, consuming US computer security resources, and only then launching the true
offensive. Finally, the fifth stratagem is "loot a burning house" - use internal conflict to
neutralize an adversary's ability to deal with external threats, allowing information to be
stolen during the ensuing chaos. Thomas suggests that planting hackers inside Western
nations, under the guise of legitimate business people or students, would be a suitable IW
application (Thomas: 4). He does not state, however, whether his example is based upon
published Chinese views or his own supposition.
4.2.2. Chinese Views on Information Warfare by Farris
Kate Farris provides a thorough open source discussion of Chinese views on
Information Warfare, and the caution that must be applied in drawing conclusions from
Chinese writings on the topic. China began a military buildup in the 1980s, and evolving
concepts of IW provided a strong focal point (Farris, 2000: 76). Additionally, the
Chinese leadership was adapting to a changing international scene.
The global environment had changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the
swift pace of Desert Shield / Desert Storm. Additionally, China was dismayed by the
growth of democracy in Taiwan, as they believe that China and Taiwan are one nation
(Farris, 2000: 76). Some experts also believe China may try to exert more influence in
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the Asian continent as a result of their newfound wealth and power (Farris, 2000: 77).
This may lead to situations where US and Chinese national objectives are in conflict.
Therefore, the US should consider how evolving concepts of IW may influence the
initiation, duration, and conclusion of such conflicts.
While a discussion of topics by Chinese leadership does not imply intent to act
upon one, several, or any of the topics, IW appears to have become a key concept for the
Chinese in recent years. However, any result will necessarily have a Chinese orientation
that need not directly correspond with American views on IW. Differences in views on
IW are a result of different force structures, different military histories, and different
experiences (Farris, 2000: 70). This holds true for any two nations being compared, but
is still a critical mindset to remember. Farris notes that China sees IW, particularly
perception management, as being integral to both military and civilian life, whereas the
US treats it as an almost exclusively military issue (Farris, 2000: 70). The US should
recognize, in light of the highly interconnected National Information Infrastructure (Nil),
that "in the information warfare era, the relationship between civilian forces and the war
itself will be much closer than ever before" (Farris, 2000: 69).
Farris does not believe it is correct to say that the Chinese are incorporating IW
into their doctrine. Rather, IW "precedes, overarches, and encompasses all facets of
military doctrine and strategy" (Farris, 2000: 3). Much as the US views IO to be
ongoing, the Chinese believe IW and perception management begins before a conflict
and continues after conflict ends. While the US acknowledges technology transfer
between the civilian and military sectors occurs, for security reasons the Chinese focus
solely on transfer from the civilian sector into the military (Farris, 2000: 4). Chinese
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institutions are being created to incorporate IW operationally from the national level to
the system level (Farris, 2000: 4).
According to a 27 April 1999 article in Biejing Keji Ribao, the PLA has created a
cross-disciplinary doctoral level program in IW at the Communication Command
Academy. Sub-disciplines include "information warfare psychology" and "information
warfare transmission". The academy has also sent specialists to lecture at military
headquarters, units, and service academies (Farris, 2000: 55 - 56).
The Information Engineering University, part of the PLA, was created to prepare
professionals for future high-technology conflicts involving IW according to a 17
November 1999 article in the Beijing Xinhua (Farris, 2000: 56).
The "National Defense Science, Technology and Information Center" was created
to train technical personnel in IW, to establish an IW simulation center, and to study IW
theories and technologies. A 15 September 1999 article in Chung-Yang Jih-Pao stated
one of the center's goals is to attract both young and middle-aged experts from home and
abroad (Farris, 2000: 57 - 58).
A simulation center was discussed in the September / December 1996 Zhongguo
Guofang Keji Xinxi. The center, complete with advanced technical equipment would
employ high-technology methods to "create a simulated IW environment" and carry out
"training in simulated countermeasures". Expert personnel would be employed to study
science and technology problems, demonstrate new equipment, conduct theoretical
research, and teach other staff members. Information technology specialists would also
be employed to test, demonstrate, and simulate countermeasures (Farris, 2000: 57 - 59).
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In an interview for Taiwan Central News, published 31 May 1999, Taiwan's
Mainland Affairs Council Vice Chairman Lin Chong predicted that IW would become
the top item on China's military development agenda (Farris, 2000: 4). China's tradition
of posturing itself as a weaker nation that would be taking on a more powerful enemy
leads in many cases to a view of IW as an asymmetrical tool (Farris, 2000: 76).
The Chinese leadership has studied Desert Storm and the more recent conflict in
Kosovo. They are upgrading the technological underpinnings of their forces, while also
exploring the potential changes such technology may bring to the military structure
(Farris, 2000: 7). However, they lack practical experience in IW using high technology
(Farris, 2000: 7). Deficiencies identified by the Chinese in their current capabilities
include the need to flatten and automate command structures, conduct systems
architecture research, link IW to increased combat effectiveness, train personnel in IW,
and building a military intranet and extranet according to a 15 September 1997 article in
Zhongguo Dianzi Bao (Farris, 2000: 8).
To overcome these deficiencies, various Chinese leaders purpose both symmetric
and asymmetric responses. Those pursuing symmetric approaches believe China should
invest in technology in as many aspects as possible. Detractors point to the fall of the
Soviet Union, which sought to meet the US in this manner (Farris, 2000: 8). To an
extent, these two views represent two different approaches to IW - indiscriminate attacks
versus precision attack (Farris, 2000: 17). The inherent problem with indiscriminant
attacks is the imprecise nature of expected outcomes (Farris, 2000: 45). Precision
attacks, seen as the hallmark of a symmetric approach to IW, allow a better assessment of
outcomes but require more detailed knowledge of the adversary's systems (Farris, 2000:
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45). This requires that links be established between IW attacks and traditional combat
actions.
According to the 11 November 1999 Jiefangjun Bao, at least one proponent of a
symmetric approach feels IW must be integrated into other combat actions, and that a
conflict cannot be won solely using IW (Farris, 2000: 46). However, China recognizes
that it still lags the US in the technology necessary to carry out precision (symmetric) IW
attacks (Farris, 2000: 17). Farris believes it is clear that China will pursue both
symmetric and asymmetric approaches to IW (Farris, 2000: 49). She bases this belief on
the upgrade of China's C4ISR infrastructure, as well as their traditional reliance on
asymmetric tactics and the teachings of Sun Tzu (Farris, 2000: 49).
Farris states that some of the proponents of a symmetric approach to IW may be
"merely discussing US concepts without applying them to China", rather than have true
support for the concepts (Farris, 2000: 9). This further complicates an analysis of a
Chinese approach to r\V, as one must somehow discriminate between Chinese reviews of
US (and other foreign) concepts of IW and how those concepts might or might not be
applied to the PLA. To approach this problem, Farris explores the differences and
similarities between the US and China using the Six Pillars of IW from JP 3-13.
The Chinese are focusing their IW efforts in areas of traditional strength, as well
as on areas of known deficiencies (Farris, 2000: 14). While the US is becoming more
reliant on interconnected networks and high-technology tools, the Chinese still rely in
part on redundant landline communications or the use of couriers (Farris, 2000: 15). This
difference in level of technology dependence in operations could provide the Chinese a
level of defense against computer network attack by the US.
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Joint Publication 3-13, discussed previously, lists six aspects of IW as PSYOPS,
Denial and Deception, Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Attack (CNA), Physical
Destruction, and Operational Security (Computer Network Defense [CND]). Farris
discusses Chinese views on IW on each of these concepts in turn.
PSYOPS
One of PSYOPS' key components is perception management, which has already
been recognized as a traditional concept for the Chinese. Propaganda is a PSYOPS tool
that seeks to disseminate information to a target audience (Farris, 2000: 18). Examples
can be seen in the news media surrounding any conflict. For China, statements by and
documents from leaders in regards to Taiwan and China's "one nation" policy are
instances of propaganda. Like 10, PSYOPS begins before a conflict and continues
afterward. It serves to affect the minds of the general public and the world at large, to
affect the decision making process of the leadership, and may also provide insight into a
future enemy's intent (Farris, 2000: 19 - 20). Like IW, PSYOPS can blur the line
between the homeland and the theater of operations (Farris, 2000: 20).
Denial and Deception
Key concepts in Denial and Deception are deceiving the enemy as to one's true
capabilities and concealment of forces (Farris, 2000: 22). Farris presents the case of the
Chinese government's failure to release President Clinton's apology over the bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo for four days as an example of the combination of
PSYOPs with Denial and Deception (Farris, 2000: 23). Farris casts this in the light of
perception management, common in both military and civilian affairs in the Chinese
culture.
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Electronic Warfare (EW)
Chinese views on electronic warfare were greatly influenced by the Gulf War
(Farris, 2000: 24). Integration of EW efforts across peacetime and wartime efforts is
sought. Long-term surveillance during peacetime would lay a firm foundation for efforts
in times of conflict (Farris, 2000: 25). Farris also mentions a single reference alluding to
specific EW units (Farris, 2000: 25-26).
CNA
Farris addresses both traditional concepts of CNA as well as Computer Network
Monitoring (CNM). CNM, a possible precursor to CNA, involves the Chinese intent to
monitor and control Internet traffic for potentially traitorous comments (Farris, 2000: 2829). This can be seen as an additional form of perception management. Chinese
concepts of CNA extend under the broader scope of Information Attack to include covert
efforts in support of IPB and overt actions such as polling US public opinion (Farris,
2000: 32). According to Farris, "China openly admits that many of the visiting scientists,
students, and other Chinese nationals living in the West collect unclassified data" (Farris,
2000: 36).
Physical Destruction
Chinese authors do discuss this more traditional form of warfare. One approach
that is discussed focuses elimination of key nodes and links in both the military and
civilian information infrastructures (Farris, 2000: 26).
Operational Security (CND)
Farris found little discussion of Computer Network Defense (CND). She states
that this dearth of information may be the result of China recognizing a weakness in this
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area (Farns, 2000: 37). One military exercise focused on combating computer viruses is
mentioned.
4.2.3. "The Revolution in Military Affairs" from Chinese Views of Future
Warfare edited by Michael Pillsbury
Michael Pillsbury served as editor on this work, which is published under the
auspices of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. This collection of articles by
several Chinese military and civilian scholars explores China's Revolution in Military
Affairs following the rapid growth of military technology in the Information Age.
Authors of specific concepts will be identified. In many cases, US doctrine provides a
basis for discussion of changing Chinese doctrine and strategy. Only those aspects of the
document relating to 10 and IW will be addressed. It is interesting that Mr. Pillsbury
notes in his Preface that, according to several Chinese military officers, the top Chinese
military strategists never publish openly (Pillsbury, 2001).
Chang Mengxiong addresses "Weapons of the 21st Century". IW is seen as
"warfare to win people's minds and boost morale by employing ... (media products)...
focused on the use and prevention of use of information" (Pillsbury, 2001). The author
believes that in the modern age, combat capability is determined by a military unit's
information capability. Information superiority will be even more important than, and
will be required prior to, traditional land, sea, and air superiority (Pillsbury, 2001).
Chang Mengxiong believes that IW is the most complex form of modern warfare, and it
will decide the winner of future conflicts (Pillsbury, 2001).
He also addresses the concept of deterrence with respect to IW. While he does
not believe that it currently exists, he states that it may appear in the future (Pillsbury,
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2001). Even if adversaries are matched in traditional military strength, whichever nation
has the advantage in IW capabilities stands the best chance of deterring or winning the
conflict (Pillsbury, 2001).
Issues of organizational structure are also addressed. The Chinese have studied
the lessons of Desert Storm, and some believe that highly-centralized command
structures are unsuited to modern, high-technology warfare (Pillsbury, 2001). The
sophistication of modern information systems creates conditions suitable to centralized
command at high levels and enables independent combat commands at lower levels.
Networked and dispersed command, control, communications, and intelligence systems
provide robust, reliable capabilities that are resistant to destruction (Pillsbury, 2001).
This will ensure lower level commanders access to the information they need to make
decisions about their forces while still adhering to the overall plans of higher
headquarters (Pillsbury, 2001). The number of staff levels will decrease, and military
organizations will mix high levels of centralization and decentralization supported by the
military information infrastructure (Pillsbury, 2001).
Additional concepts addressed by this scholar include the issues of use of
simulations and the need for highly skilled personnel. Simulations and exercises,
involving a mixture of real and virtual targets and connecting units from multiple
locations, will be used by the Chinese to prepare for future conflicts (Pillsbury, 2001).
Chang Mengxiong states that the human factor will become more prominent in the age of
high-technology warfare. The number of military units will decrease, even as their
capabilities increase (Pillsbury, 2001). Warfare will become more mental than physical,
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and the education and technical skills of the officer corps will exceed that of the civilian
sector with respect to information technology (Pillsbury, 2001).
Major General Wang Pufeng is the next author in this work to specifically address
10. His article is titled "The Challenge of Information Warfare". The general also
believes that the rapid growth of information technology has lead to a revolution in
military affairs. (Pillsbury, 2001). He states that, in the near future, "information warfare
will control the form and future of war", and will provide the primary driving force of
modernization in China's military (Pillsbury, 2001). Efforts will focus on strengthening
"information technology, information weapons systems, and information networking".
The General believes that IW theory will exist as a new theory of war, and must
be used in conjunction with Marxist and Maoist warfare theory (Pillsbury, 2001).
China's current weakness with respect to Western IW capabilities leads the general to
emphasize asymmetric approaches to IW - using inferior equipment to achieve victory
over a better-equipped adversary (Pillsbury, 2001). Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (IPB) and efforts to shape the battlefield, along with China's defensive
capabilities, will determine the progress and outcome of any future wars (Pillsbury,
2001). Just as in US doctrine, the general believes that seizing and maintaining the
information offensive (information superiority) may precede, or be combined with a
traditional strategic offensive. Efforts in support of this goal would include active
offensive information attack and information suppression (Pillsbury, 2001).
It is interesting that the General states the US used computer viruses to destroy
Iraqi air defense computer systems during the Gulf War.
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An asymmetric approach to IW upholds the traditional military theory of Mao
Zedong, and can be said to directly support existing Chinese paradigms of warfare.
Major General Wang Pufeng believes that China's military has a strong tradition of
flexible fighting methods and nonlinear warfare concepts that form the basis of IW's
strength, but currently lacks practical battle experience (Pillsbury, 2001). For the nearterm future, China will have to overcome its weaknesses in fielded information systems
by focusing on the organization and training of specialized IW troops and the
development of IW weapons to raid enemy operations platforms and bases, and to
damage or foil enemy offensive operations (Pillsbury, 2001). Changes in doctrine,
strategy, and tactics to accommodate the information revolution are seen as a vital task
(Pillsbury, 2001).
Finally, the general also stresses the need to cultivate expertise in rw Operating
technical personnel, those sitting before computers and instruments, are seen to be as
important as more traditional combat personnel (Pillsbury, 2001). Training and study are
seen as the methods to obtain the necessary talent.
Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei address more of the specifics of IW in
an article entitled "Information Warfare". They see IW as efforts aimed at seizing the
battlefield initiative. The five major elements in their definition of IW include: military
deception, operational secrecy (OPSEC), psychological warfare, electronic warfare, and
physical destruction (Pillsbury, 2001). These are the same concepts addressed in US IO
doctrine. Computer virus warfare is included in a broader definition if IW.
IW is also seen to impact general concepts of warfare. The colonels feel rivalry
over information superiority will be intense, and that IW will expand the general concepts
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of warfare. For example, as with other Chinese scholars, the colonels feel primary targets
in future wars will be the elimination or control of enemy information systems (Pillsbury,
2001). They believe future wars will be harder to win due to the extended target set, as
both the traditional military "material bases" and the information systems must be
addressed.
Additionally, the pace of battle will shorten as attacks are launched over
communications networks. Combat objectives will evolve from total surrender to limited
political objectives (Pillsbury, 2001). The concept of force concentrations will also
evolve from ideas of quantity to those of quality. "Force concentrations will occur faster,
more precisely, and more often during operations." (Pillsbury, 2001)
Finally, organizational structures will change. Officer corps will consist of more
technical specialists, and less of staff and command billets (Pillsbury, 2001). The
colonels support the establishment of a separate IW branch of service. The units
themselves will be smaller, better integrated, and multifunctional (Pillsbury, 2001).
4.3. Chinese Specific Malicious Hacker Framework
"Therefore we say: By perceiving the enemy and perceiving ourselves, victory
thereby has no unforeseen risk." (Huang, 1993: 93)
Sun Tzu stressed the importance of understanding one's enemies and potential
enemies in his writings over a thousand years ago. The Art of War is still studied by
modern militaries. The ability to expand this understanding to the evolving forms of IO
and IW is one of the goals of this work.
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The information provided by the open source documents reviewed above will
now be used to tailor the basic malicious hacker framework presented in Chapter Three to
the specifics of Chinese 10 and IW organizations and hackers. Due to the limited nature
of this information, the model developed will be more representative of an "average"
Chinese "cyber warrior" than a specific individual.
Each of the factors in the basic framework will be addressed in turn. The results
of this analysis will then be integrated into a complete profile. The references utilized in
this Chapter were first presented individually to enhance an overall appreciation of
Chinese views on IW. Details from the various works will be briefly summarized under
the relevant model details.
4.3.1. Motivations and Personality
Little information from the references relating to Chinese IW can be construed as
addressing Motivations and Personality. What could be found is summarized below.
Chinese Hacker Motivation in General
The only motivation from Table 3-2 Malicious Hacker Motivations that is upheld
directly by the references on Chinese IW is that of governmental. A case can be made,
based upon the actions of Chinese hackers following the US bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Kosovo, to support feeling of national pride as a part of recognition (Thomas:
12). Overall, one cannot assume that China's hackers are any more or less motivated by
the remaining motivations discussed in Section 3-10.
Personality
Similar to other aspects of Motivations and Personality, no direct sources for
assessment of this factor was found in the open source references on Chinese IW.
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Mercenaries
No support was found in the open source references to support the use of
mercenaries or other hired IW support by the Chinese. Rather, the documentation
suggests serious efforts on the part of the Chinese government and military to grow
expertise in information technology throughout both the military and civilian sectors
(Farris: 2000: 8, 56-58; Thomas: 3-4).
Issues of Criminality
Although some mention was made in the references with respect to laws and
regulations regarding the use of IW, specific issues of criminality did not arise (Thomas:
10). However, use of Chinese nationals living within the US to launch a cyber attack
against US networks would put the US government at a disadvantage. Currently, US law
would treat the issue as a criminal matter, making it hard to pursue any ties the hacker
might hold to the Chinese government.
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4.3.2. Approaches to Hacking
The two approaches to hacking are structured and unstructured. The references
reviewed suggest that Chinese hackers will employ both. First, a case can be made for
structured approaches through the development of IW doctrine and strategy (Thomas: 1,
2, 17; various, 2001). This would involve planned activities such as IPB, shaping the
battlespace, and CNA.
Unstructured attacks would most likely involve the concept of the People's War civilian hackers "taking the initiative and randomly participating in the war" (Thomas: 2).
This is not meant to imply that many of the civilians are not highly skilled hackers, but
that the use of DoS, DDoS, and rogue code in attacks upon US information systems
following the accidental US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo would indicate
the presence of unstructured attacks by Chinese civilians (Thomas: 12). Additionally, the
idea of a "take home battle", a Chinese concept cited by Thomas suggests widespread
participation by Chinese nationals with a wealth of skill level (Thomas: 2).
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4.3.3. Individual Skill and Teamwork
The references examined do provide a level of detail with respect to skill levels
and the make-up and location of IW teams.
Individual Skill Levels and Talent
The use of civilians as part of a People's War contributes to the skill assessment
of an average Chinese hacker. Combined with the opinion of those Chinese scholars that
formal training in IW has yet to live up to its potential, hackers will be found at all skill
levels (Thomas: 1-3, 10-11). Existence of these schools would lead one to believe that
Chinese hacker skill will grow over the next several years, limited only by the pace of
information infrastructure development, a recognized weakness of the Chinese military
and civilian sectors (Thomas: 17).
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Aspects of Teamwork
Specifics of teamwork and how IW units would function were not provided in the
open source references that were reviewed. However, the existence of such units, as well
as simulations and military exercises supports the idea that IW units will function as
teams (Farris, 2000: 56-58; Thomas: 1; Pillsbury, 2001). The existence and training of
reserve PLA units would also support this statement (Thomas: 3-4). Use of a People's
War concept, and the third stratagem would support the military's use of proxy "cyber
warriors" and mixed team membership (Thomas: 2-3, 4). In the context of military
exercises, the use of both co-located and dispersed IW units was mentioned (Thomas: 13,
15-16). Finally, the article by Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei refers to future
units being smaller, better integrated, and multifunctional (Pillsbury, 2001).
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4.3.4. Hacker Tools and Training
All details of the basic framework are supported by the references on Chinese
views of IW.
Tool Sets
The use of both published (readily-available) code and that developed for specific
targets or operations is reflected in the People's War concept and specific mention of
virus use and development (Thomas: 2-3).
DoS, DDoS, rogue code, and social engineering are all evident in the references
(Farris, 2000: 36; Thomas: 4, 10, 12; Pillsbury, 2001). The most common form of rogue
code mentioned is the computer virus, followed by trojan horses. Social engineering is
mainly discussed in terms of intelligence collection efforts by Chinese nationals
(students, scientist, and business people) in foreign countries (Farris, 2000: 36; Gertz,
2000).
Training
Training of IW troops was addressed in several places (Farris, 2000: 25-26;
Thomas: 10-11). China has created several formal training programs for all levels of
Chinese military and civilian leadership (Farris, 2000: 55-59; Thomas: 3-4, 9-11;
Pillsbury, 2001). Training, in the forms of self-training, individual, and group level
programs appears to be ongoing. Military exercises, begun in 1997, have continued to
expand in terms of doctrine, content, and breadth (Thomas: 13.-16; Pillsbury, 2001).
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4.3.5. Intent (Mission), Timing and Use
This factor in its entirety is supported by the Chinese IW references.
Intent (Mission)
Frequent mention of intent or missions of Chinese IW is made in all of the
references. EPB efforts (Farris, 2000: 3-4, Gertz, 2000) and Shaping the Battlespace
(Farris, 2000: 3-4) are highlighted on several occasions. Additionally, IPB is mentioned
as it is supported by social engineering methods (Farris, 2000: 36). Chang Mengxiong
specifically discussed deterrence through IW (Pillsbury, 2001). Cascading effects,
synergy, and system hopping are illustrated by the Chinese scholars' focus on the
asymmetric aspects of IW (Farris, 2000: 8, 17, 4; Pillsbury, 2001). Primary targets are
listed as adversary information systems linking political, economic, and military
installations, as well as the adversary's society in general (Thomas: 2). Additionally,
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Chang Mengxiong states that IW is focused on the people's minds - both leaders and the
general public (Pillsbury, 2001).
Timing ofActions
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Kosovo illustrates Chinese
hacker reactions to external triggers (Thomas: 12). The use of IW as a "first strike"
capability, or to set the pace of conflict is also discussed in the references (Farris, 2000:
3-4; various, 2001).
Use ofIO
The Chinese have begun to adapt existing concepts of IW to their own culture and
history (Thomas: 1). Military objectives at all levels are discussed in terms of IW
actions, as well as the fact that IW allows targets at the strategic level to be attacked even
before operational and tactical objectives have been achieved (Thomas: 17, Pillsbury,
2001). Operations involving IW are seen as being stand-alone, supported, or supporting
depending upon the needs of the situation (Farris, 2000: 26, 32; Thomas: 4; Pillsbury,
2001). Two Chinese scholars felt that in the future combat objectives would become
more limited and political in nature. There was even some discussion of creation of a
separate IW branch of military service (Pillsbury, 2001).
The inherent capabilities of IW in terms of concepts such as CNA, PSYOPs, and
perception management, were frequently discussed. Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and
Li Fei discussed major elements of IW in much the same terms as US doctrine (OPSEC,
military deception, PSYOPs, EW, and physical destruction) (Pillsbury, 2001). This is in
part due to the fact that Chinese doctrine and capabilities, along with those of other
nations, are rapidly evolving. The capability of IW to have a psychological effect on the
4-27

values, emotions, and beliefs of adversary audiences was considered by some Chinese
scholars (Thomas: 18). Perception management in China is more of a way of life, both in
the military and civilian sectors than is the case in the US (Farris: 2000: 70).
The idea of testing capabilities prior to their use in battle may be evident in the
alleged penetration of Los Alamos computer systems containing sensitive but
unclassified information by hackers working for the Chinese government (Thomas: 2).
IW's ability to act as a force multiplier is also addressed - again as part of the People's
War or "take home battle" (Thomas: 3).
China's "36 stratagems", which are the equivalent of the US's principles of war,
are still seen as valid in the new world of IW. Deception is considered one of its key
concepts (Thomas: 4). Other strategies addressed include offensive, surprise, mass,
maneuver, and objective (AFDD 1, 1997: 12-21; Thomas: 4; Pillsbury, 2001). The
Chinese also consider the use of insider threats so that the resultant chaos facilitates
intelligence collection from external sources (Thomas: 4). The first of these stratagems
presented by Taylor directly addresses IW efforts that would seek to hide in the noise of
normal network traffic (Thomas: 4). Finally, asymmetric attacks, a common idea in
Chinese discussions of IW, cold also be seen as a modern interpretation of the principles
of war (Farris, 2000: 8,17, 45; Pillsbury, 2001).
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4.3.6. Cultural Impacts
First, as noted previously, the Chinese tend to think with a longer view than their
Western counterparts (Thomas: 17). Immediate gain is weighed against potential gain
over the next several generations. This might be seen as the perfect mindset to adopt a
"low and slow" attack approach for collecting intelligence on US systems. In this case,
the risk of not noticing the attacks in the normal network traffic, or inadvertently
mistaking the efforts for those of script kiddies, may be greater.
This could also represent an aspect of national personality for the Chinese, as
would the Chinese focus on their own history, military philosophy, and military art
separate from influence by other's concepts (Thomas: 1). This does not mean that the
Chinese ignore potential benefits to be found in the ideas of other nations, but that the
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emphasis always seems to return to adaptation of foreign ideas to the Chinese viewpoint
(Chinese characteristics) (Thomas: 1; Farris, 2000: 70).
An additional form of national personality may be the Chinese viewpoint that it
will often be the weaker power being attacked by stronger nations (Thomas: 2; Farris,
2000: 76). This viewpoint has influenced how China focuses its IW efforts.
While the researcher does not have enough knowledge of Chinese culture to truly
tailor this factor to the Chinese, those issues addressed in the references will be discussed.
Nationalism and Patriotism
The Chinese appear to a well-developed sense of national identity and patriotism.
The large size of the PLA, and the history of waging "People's War" on invading
enemies would support this view (Thomas: 2-3).
This concept also appears with respect to how China views violations of its
sovereign cyberspace. Thomas believes that violations of cyberspace are considered
more important than traditional violations of national sovereignty due to the secretive
nature of the Chinese civilian and military information infrastructures (Thomas: 5).
Paradigms and Perspectives
The Chinese have exhibited great care in developing views and doctrine with
respect to IW that uniquely reflect the Chinese culture (Thomas: 1). Perception
management plays a large role in both civilian and military life (Farris, 2000: 70). This
extends to computer network monitoring of Chinese Internet traffic to detect and control
traitorous comments (Farris: 2000: 28-29). According to Farris, the US views perception
management primarily from a military standpoint (Farris, 2000: 70).
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A final aspect of paradigms that US analysts should consider is the caution, put
forth by Farris, that Chinese articles and studies may be "merely discussing US concepts
without applying them to China" (Farris, 2000: 9). Since publications by Chinese
military members, leaders, and scholars serve as one of the primary data sources for
understanding Chinese culture, politics, and military objectives and capabilities, one
would do well to heed Farris' warning.
Religion
Religion does not appear to have played a large role in the political or military
structure of China as of the date of the references used to build this case study. More
recently, the Chinese government has been responding to a perceived threat from the
Falun Gong religious sect. In this case, the Chinese government is not acting in line with
an existing national religious culture, which is the original intent of this aspect of the
framework. However, their response is toward a religious movement, and therefore
should be considered.
The Chinese government vowed to eliminate the practice of Falun Gong, labeled
an "evil cult", in 1999 (Dorgan, 2000). More recently, the Chinese government has
pronounced the sect to be a reactionary political group aimed at change of China's
socialist system (Dorgan, 2000). Both sides are using the Internet in an attempt to garner
support among the Chinese people and the world at large (Dorgan, 2000).
One could also explore how Maoism and Marxism, as belief systems, might
provide a similar impact on the Chinese culture as other beliefs systems more directly
perceived as being "religious".
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Cyberculture
The use of computer network monitoring by government officials may serve to
limit the development of cyberculture in China (Farris, 2000: 28-29). However, one may
choose to interpret the large scale efforts of Chinese hackers in attacking US civilian,
military, and government websites following the accidental bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Kosovo (Thomas: 12). Recent modernization plans for China include efforts
to expand both the military and civilian information infrastructures, which may facilitate
further development of Chinese hacker culture, and provide Chinese hackers with
increased access to other hackers world-wide (Farris, 2000: 8; Thomas: 17)
Morality
There is an insufficient level of detail in the open source references to address
issues of morality with respect to Chinese hackers.
Legality
Aspects of legality were only addressed in terms of instruction in rules and
regulations pertaining to IW (Thomas: 10). None of the references provided input on
how the Chinese view human life, although US concerns over past human rights
violations may cast this detail in an unfavorable light with respect to the Chinese.
Psychological Theory
There is insufficient level of detail in the open source reference documents to
address specific aspects of psychological theory as it applies to Chinese hackers. Expert
judgment is needed to choose among and utilize the available psychological theories with
respect to a specific set of information and situations. Additionally, aspects of culture
will need to be considered.
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4.3.7. Leadership, Doctrine, and Policy
The Chinese have spent some effort on developing concepts of leadership,
doctrine and policy since the emergence of IW. Examples include the extension of the
concept of the People's War to IW and the concept of a separate "net force" on par with
land, air, and sea forces (Thomas: 1).
Leadership
The existing high-level military leadership is in a similar position to that of the
US. New skills must be developed, and the concepts of IW as a fully functioning method
of warfare must be internalized. Several levels of IW training have already been
established, but Thomas currently considers the IW expertise and "culture" of Chinese
leaders to be relatively low (Thomas: 9-11). Several sources noted that Chinese
leadership has spent significant time in studying both the Gulf War (often considered the
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first "modern technology" war) and air operations over Kosovo (Farris, 2000: 7; Thomas:
12). However, Chinese leadership are held as having little practical experience in IW
using high technology (Farris, 2000: 7). As such, their "comfort level" with IW and
understanding of IW strengths and weaknesses may limit their use of these new
capabilities. Leaders may prefer to depend upon more conventional weapons systems
and operational plans rather than risk that the results of an rW operation were less than
expected. The situation would be similar that of airpower before air doctrine was
developed and the Air Force established.
Finally, Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei suggest that future Chinese
military officer corps will consist more of highly skilled, technical specialists and less of
the traditional staff and command billets. They predict that the overall number of units,
as well as unit size, will decrease. The units themselves will become more
multifunctional and better integrated (Pillsbury, 2001).
Organizational Structure
Potentially one of the greatest aspects of organizational structure on the Chinese
approach to IW is the suggestion of a separate "net force" specifically address IW
(Thomas: 1; Pillsbury, 2001).
Current Chinese writings also suggest a focus on overcoming the weaknesses of
large, non-automated command structures (Farris, 2000:8). Chiang Mengxiong, a
Chinese rW scholar, specifically addressed organizational structure when writing on
weapons of the 21st century. He supports moving to more networked structures, allowing
centralized command at high levels, reduction in middle levels of command, and enabling
independent command at the lower levels (Pillsbury, 2001). Military and civilian
4-34

information infrastructures must be further developed in order to support this goal
(Thomas: 17). China's goal is to allow greater flexibility for lower level commanders in
adjusting to changes in local conditions, while providing them with sufficient information
to ensure that the overall plans of higher headquarters are supported (Pillsbury, 2001).
This would represent a mixed organizational structure - neither strictly hierarchical nor
strictly networked. It is interesting that Berger suggests a similar structure for the US
military (Berger, 1998:
Doctrine and Policy
In China's case, Major General Wang Pufeng believes that IW will emerge as a
new theory of war, but he also states that Marxist and Maoist theory must be considered
as well (Pillsbury, 2001). In this light, Chinese doctrine will more closely resemble
Russian approaches to IW than those of the Western nations (Thomas: 1). Major General
Wang Pufeng also states that changes to existing doctrine, strategy, and tactics are vital to
the success of IW and the information revolution (Pillsbury, 2001). Additionally, the
Chinese tendency to take a long-view with respect to strategic concepts and thought
processes must be considered (Thomas: 17). Rather than meeting an adversary at the
nation's border, traditional doctrine of the People's War involves absorbing enemy forces
into the interior of the country, where Chinese strengths in numbers and geographic
knowledge can be brought to bear. Doctrine for IW has been developed with this same
thought in mind (Thomas: 1). Chinese secrecy with regards to national information
infrastructures, and how violations of cyberspace are viewed, contribute to this concept
(Thomas: 5).
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Additionally, Chinese doctrine for an information warfare based People's War
still includes the concept of the "people", not just active duty military, participating in
conflicts - the idea of a "take home battle" (Thomas: 3). Traditionally, China has
postured itself and its doctrine as a weaker nation beset by stronger enemies (Farris,
2000: 76).
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4.4. Chinese Framework for Malicious Hacking
The knowledge gained exploring each of the key aspects of malicious hacking
with respect to the Chinese is now consolidated into the proposed framework. This
allows for insight into strengths and approaches to 10 and IW that can improve threat
warnings and assessments, as well as contribute to more rapid and / or automated attack
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responses to perceived efforts at collecting against or targeting US information and
information systems.
One of the key insights from this analysis is the cultural difference in approaches
to IW. The tools and techniques remain the same, but the level at which 10 and IW is
incorporated into both the civilian and military aspects of society differ. The People's
War concept, with the possibility of "take home battle" against the US via laptops
sending rogue code and DoS or DDoS attacks over communications systems worldwide
is sobering. Recent events in the Middle East support the concept of everyday citizens
participating in IW (Associated Press, 2000; Gentile, 2000).
Efforts to profile state sanctioned hackers would capture aspects of this form of
warfare through detailing the nation's culture, intent, doctrine, and individual skill levels.
Figure 4-8 Chinese Malicious Hacker Profile provides the overall framework
tailored to open source, published summaries of Chinese doctrine and views of IW.
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4.5. Conclusions
The case study provides a sound example of how the malicious hacker profile
developed in Chapter Three can be applied to foreign 10 and IW programs. A limitation
of the case study is the author's lack of background in Chinese culture and military
history, as well as the restriction to open source information. However, the open source
references utilized to tailor the basic framework to Chinese 10 units are sufficient to
illustrate the framework's applicability.
Of particular interest is the Chinese concept of the People's War. This provides a
large body of both high and low levels of expertise that can be called upon in times of
conflict to launch attacks simultaneously and over sustained periods of time. The large
Chinese population, if motivated to participate even in part in a DoS, DDoS, or virus
launching attack, could have a strong impact on the outcome of a future conflict. More
efforts should be spent in evaluating the impact of this concept on US computer defenses
at all levels of information infrastructure.
The high levels of patriotism and military involvement in the Chinese culture also
strongly color their approach to 10. Cases such as the accidental US bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Kosovo highlight potential external triggers of Chinese (and other
nation's) hacking. The Chinese long-term view of strategy and success, and admission of
intelligence collection efforts, would also lead one to explore low-level IPB efforts.
In conclusion, the fishbone diagram provides a sound and visually elegant method
of consolidating intelligence products and information on foreign 10 organizations and
analyzing their strengths, weaknesses, and influence points. To prove effective over
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time, this framework must be updated as Chinese (or other nation's) 10 and IW theory,
practice, and expertise evolve.
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5. Findings and Conclusions

5.1. Overview
This thesis has presented a comprehensive overview of malicious hackers and the
world in which they operate. A framework has been presented that organizes key aspects
about hackers into a model that can be analyzed.
The results of the effort include a framework for analyzing individual hackers, or
average members of 10 cells, from the category of nation state actors. Additionally, this
framework can be used as a basis for analysis of malicious hackers belonging to
transnational terrorist or criminal organizations.
A case study was developed and presented to illustrate the uses of the framework
that is proposed. China was chosen as the nation of interest for the case study due to its
early interest in 10 and IW concepts and programs, and due to open source
documentation on Chinese views on 10, doctrine, and military efforts in the development
of 10 capabilities.
5.2. Objectives of Study
Throughout this effort, the underlying desire was to move forward the current
state of profiling with respect to malicious hackers. With a recognized need for improved
Threat Warning and Assessment in the realm of Information Operations, a framework
was presented that allows those combating malicious hackers to better understand and
respond to their adversaries.
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5.3. Limitations
One key limitation of this effort was the availability of data, and the restriction to
open source information. Without data from past, substantiated attacks, whether from
individuals acting outside the framework of an organized structure or from those acting
on behalf of recognized, structured threats, this effort relied upon past analysis of hackers
and published doctrine for US 10 efforts.
An additional limitation was access to expertise in the fields of computer security,
threat warning and analysis, and profiling. This contributed in the effort remaining at the
unclassified level, with "data" for the framework developed being open source. This is
not to say that the results are not valid. Rather, it acknowledges the fact that expertise
and intelligence sources exist that can improve the level of detail in any profiles that are
developed as a result of this effort. For this reason, results of the framework developed
should be considered indicative of an "average" member of an 10 group for the nation
being evaluated, and not predictive of any specific member.
Finally, it must be remembered that a specific profile is only as useful as it is upto-date. Technology, unit capabilities, skill levels, tools, and doctrine are changing
rapidly in the information age. To be effective, a nation's hacker profile must change as
well.
5.4. Recommendations for Further Study
Computer technology is advancing at a pace that makes it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to understand and synthesize. As discussed in Chapter Three, hackers
have the advantage of time and specialization when it comes to knowing the "ins and
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outs" of any given aspect of computer technology. While a hacker can specialize in
specific operating systems and hardware platforms, a computer systems administrator
must, due to organizational needs, become a "jack of all trades" with rudimentary to
moderate knowledge of a wealth of computer systems. This makes the system
administrator's role often one of reaction to past or ongoing attacks. The number of
hacker tools available on the Internet grows every day, allowing anyone with a computer
and a modem the chance to become a hacker. Knowing the enemy - motivations, true
intent, and even their identity - will rarely be the same in cyberspace as in the physical
world of previous wars. For these reasons, and many others, the work begun by this
thesis and all of its predecessors, is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.
Several areas with the potential for large rewards were identified during the
course of this thesis. A first effort would involve statistical analysis of substantiated
incidents, as discussed in Chapter Two. Additional details with regard to hacker types,
skills, tools, approaches, and aspects of teamwork might be identified by such an effort.
The results of such analysis would provide several benefits. Aspects of the model
developed in this effort could be validated by real world attacks from nations of interest,
and additional aspects of the model that can be substantiated by the data might be
developed. Data analysis would also assist in automated response to attacks, once
characteristics of the attacks can be tied to types of hackers or the intent behind their
actions.
Second, the framework presented in this thesis could be expanded for additional
types of threats. The differences that exist between foreign actors and national actors,
insiders, script kiddies, and political dissidents of all varieties could be explored.
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Additionally, using the Value of Information hierarchy from Hamill's thesis and various
efforts in risk-based approaches to system protection, a new perspective in analyzing
computer assurance could be developed that would allow for clear trade-offs between
capability of the computer system, analyzed threats and vulnerabilities, and the value of
the information being protected (Hamill, 2000). Finally, a value model of malicious
hackers could be built, using members of various Red Teams as the decision makers. In
this case, a VFT approach would provide hierarchy of what is important to hackers in
breaking into a system. An effort could be made to separate those aspects of the values
and objectives into those common to all hackers, cultural elements important to a specific
group of hackers, and those values of the individual hackers themselves as opposed to the
groups in which they operate. Renfro's past work in profiling individuals would prove a
valuable starting point (Renfro, 2000).
Future work would extend this model to more types of hackers, and further detail
the hacker profile model. There is a recognized need to update the models developed as
the group's profiles react to world changes. An additional area of particular interest to
many in the DoD would be profiling of potential "insider" attackers, as well as ways to
see a small, sustained attack that is hiding in the "white noise" of normal system traffic or
"script kiddy" type probes, hi addition, future research could focus on automated ways to
tie multiple distributed attacks together and to the underlying attacker. A predictive
model of hacker behavior could also be developed once the descriptive model has proved
operationally sound.
A more near term research extension would be tying the types of attacks a
particular type of hacker is more prone to use. Hackers reacting to different motivations
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would be pursuing different goals - such as information mining, denial of service,
corruption or deletion of data. Based upon the profiles developed for different hackers
and the signatures of attacks, anticipation of attacks and directed responses can be
developed.
5.5. Conclusions
In summary, a framework has been developed that draws upon the strengths of
past efforts in hacker profiling, but that specifically focuses on structured attacks from
hackers employed by foreign governments. The basic framework needs to be tailored to
each nation of interest, with specific expertise in that nation's culture, doctrine, and
military structure utilized in the analysis.
More work remains in this area, as doctrine, capabilities, and structure of 10
groups will change with the technology. Further efforts in profiling potential adversaries
will only improve the ability of US forces to respond to 10 and IW threats regardless of
their point of origin.

5-5

Bibliography
Ackerman, Gwen, "'Analyzer' enlisted to defend Israeli sites against Web violence,"
The Jerusalem Post, November 16 2000.
African Business. "Soldier of Fortune - the mercenary as corporate executive,"
December 1997.
Aldrich, Richard W. "Cyberterrorism and Computer Crimes: Issues Surrounding the
Establishment of an International Regime," INSS Occasional Paper 32, Information
Operations Series: ix - 92 (April 2000).
Anonymous. Maximum Security: A Hacker's Guide to Protecting Your Internet Site and
Network (2nd Edition). Indianapolis IN: SAMS Publishing, 1998.
Arkes, Hal R. and John P. Garske. Psychological Theories of Motivation (2nd Edition^
Monterey CA: Brooks / Cole Publishing Company, 1982.
Associated Press. "Crackers Attack Pro-Israeli Site," WiredNews. November 3 2000.
Barbera, Salvador, Peter J. Hammond, and Christian Siedl, editors. Handbook of Utility
Theory. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1998.
Berger, Alexander. Organizational Innovation and Redesign in the Information Age: The
Drug War, Netwar, and Other Low-End Conflict. Department of National Security
Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, March 1998.
Boldrick, Michael R. "Information Warfare: The Next Major Challenge in Military
Strategies and Operational Planning," Soldier-Scholar: 11-19 (Fall 1996).
Borland, John. "Governments Beat Terrorists to Net Weapons," TechWeb News, article
released 22 September 1998.
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19980922S0018. 25 July 2000.
Chantler, Nicholas. Risk: The Profile of the Computer Hacker. Ph.D. dissertation,
Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia, March 1996.
Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC). CERT/CC
Statistics: 1988 - 2000. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute,
http://www.cert.org/stats/cert stat.html. 9 February 2001.
Computer Security Institute. "CSI/FBI1999 Computer Crime and Security Survey".
CSI report, http://www.gocsi.com/losses.htm. 24 August 2000.

BIB-1

Cooley, William W. and Paul R. Lohnes. Multivariate Data Analysis. New York NY:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971.
Costin, Harry. Readings in Total Quality Management. Fort Worth TX: Harcourt Brace
and Company, 1994.
Curphy, Gordon J., Richard L. Hughes, and Robert C. Ginnett. Leadership. Homewood:
Irwin, 1993.
Denning, Dorothy E. Information Warfare and Security. Reading MA: Addison Wesley
Longman, Inc., 1999.
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations. Washington: Pentagon, 9 Oct 1998.
Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel. An Assessment of International
Legal Issues in Information Operations. Washington: Pentagon, May 1999.
Department of the Air Force. Air Force Basic Doctrine. AFDD 1. Washington: HQ
USAF, September 1997.
Department of the Air Force. Nuclear Operations. AFDD 2-1.5. Washington: HQ
USAF, 15 July 1998.
Department of the Air Force. Information Operations. AFDD 2-5. Washington: HQ
USAF, 5 August 1998.
Dorgan, Michael. "China casts banned sect as political subversion," San Jose Mercury
News, article released 21 October 2000. http://www.CENSUR.com.
27 February 2001.
Edwards, Harry. "Hacker Exposes Computer Security Benefits," AirForceNews. article
released 14 July 2000. http//www.af.mil/news/Jul2000/n20000713_001064.html.
18 July 2000.
Falmagne, J.-Cl. "Stochastic Token Theory," Journal of Mathematical Psychology 41:
129-143(1997).
Farris, Kate. "Chinese Views on Information Warfare." Unpublished report, 2 April
2000.
"Fight-Back! Against Hackers." Unpublished report, http://www.antionline.com/fightback/. 25Jul2000.

BIB-2

Fogleman, Ronald R., USAF Chief of Staff. "Fundamentals of Information Warfare An Airman's View." Address to the National Security Industry Association National Defense University Foundation Conference on The Global Information
Explosion. Washington DC. 16 May 1995.
Gentile, Carmen J. "Israeli Hackers Vow to Defend," WiredNews. November 15 2000.
Gertz, Bill. "Chinese Espionage Handbook Details Ease of Swiping Secrets," The
Washington Times. 26 December 2000.
Godwin, Grover M. Hunting Serial Predators: a Multivariate Classification Approach to
Profiling Violent Behavior. Boca Raton FL: CRC Press Inc., 2000.
Grier, Peter. "Information Warfare," AIR FORCE Magazine: 34-37 (March 1995).
Hair, Joseph F., Rolph E. Anderson, Ronald L. Tatham, and William C. Black.
Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings. (3rd edition) New York NY: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1992.
Hamill, J. Todd. Modeling Information Assurance: A Value Focused Thinking
Approach. MS Thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS/00M-15. School of Engineering and
Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH,
March 2000.
Hoffman, David. "Russian Touts Computer Virus as Weapon," Washington Post. 9
May 2000.
Huang, J. H., translator. Sun Tzu The Art of War: The New Translation. New York NY:
Quill William Morrow, 1993.
Hulin, Charles L., Fritz Drasgow, and Charles K. Parsons. Item Response Theory:
Application to Psychological Measurement. Homewood IL: Dow-Jones Irwin, 1983.
Islam, Towhidul, Jordan Louviere, and Robert Bartels. "An Empirical Analysis of
Household Level New Product Trial and Repeat Data." Paper presented to
RU2000, Duke University, August 2000.
Jackson, Janet L., and Debra A. Bekerian. Offender Profiling: Theory, Research, and
Practice. New York NY: Wiley Press, 1997.
Kerchner, Philip M. Jr. Value-Focused Thinking Approach to Psychological Operations.
MS Thesis, AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-07. School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of
Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, March 1999.

BIB-3

Kiras, James. "Information Warfare and the Face of Conflict in the Twenty-First
Century," Soldier-Scholar: 40-42 (Fall 1996).
Lavadour, Justin W. Pitfalls of the A-76 Process. MS Thesis, AFIT/GLM/ENS/01M.
School of Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson
AFB OH, March 2001.
Lemon, Dave. AIA contractor. "Threat to Computer Systems & Networks." Briefing to
ALA Cyber Summit attendees, Air Intelligence Center, Kelly AFB TX. 15 August
2000.
Lesser, Ian O., Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini.
Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996 (RAND MR-989-AF).
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR989/MRM989.pdf. 28 August 2000.
McClure, Stuart, Joel Scambray and George Kurtz. Hacking Exposed: Network Security
Secrets and Solutions. Berkeley CA: Osborne / McGraw-Hill, 1999.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1962.
Mardia, K.V., J. T. Kent, and J. M. Bibby. Multivariate Analysis. San Diego CA:
Academic Press Limited, 1994.
Maximum Security: A Hacker's Guide to Protecting Your Internet Site and Network (2nd
edition). Indianapolis IN: SAMS Publishing, 1998.
Maydeu-Olivares, Albert. "Limited Information Estimation and Testing of Thurstonian
Models for Preference Data." Paper presented to RU2000, Duke University,
August 2000.
Meiler, Paul. "Council of Europe to discuss cyber crime treaty," InfoWorld.com. 22
November 2000.
Meyer, Gordon R. The Social Organization of the Computer Underground. MA Thesis.
Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb IL, August 1989.
Minihan, Kenneth A. "Intelligence and Information Systems Security: Partners in
Defensive Information Warfare," Defense Intelligence Journal 5-1: 13-23 (1996).
Mitra, Amitava. Fundamentals of Quality Control and Improvement. New York NY:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.
Molander, Roger C, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson. Strategic Information
Warfare: A New Face of War. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996 (RAND MR-661-OSD).

BIB-4

Nahmias, Steven. Production and Operations Analysis (2nd edition). Homewood IL:
Irwin, 1993.
Ozeki, Kazuo, and Tetsuichi Asaka. Handbook of Quality Tools: The Japanese
Approach. Cambridge MA: Productivity Press, Inc, 1990.
Pagnoni, Anastasia. Project Engineering: Computer-Oriented Planning and Operational
Decision Making. New York NY: Springer-Verlag, 1990.
Peterson, James L. Petri Net Theory and the Modeling of Systems. Englewood Cliffs
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981.
Pew, Richard W. and Anne S. Mavor, editors. Modeling Human and Organizational
Behavior. Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1998.
Renfro, Rob. "Modeling Individual Behavior". Unpublished report for the School of
Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH,
2000.
Rouland, Chris. Director X-Force. Briefing to CIA INFOSEC Malicious Code Seminar,
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC. 29 November 2000.
Scott, William B. "Information Warfare Policies Called Critical to National Security,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology: 60-64 (28 October 1996).
Smith, Richard. CTO, Privacy Foundation. Briefing to CIA INFOSEC Malicious Code
Seminar, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC. 29 November 2000.
Stevens, Haibert F. "Information Dominance: The New High Ground," Defense
Intelligence Journal, 5-1: 43-52 (1996).
Taylor, Paul A. Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime. New York NY: Routledge,
1999.
Thomas, Timothy L. Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory
and Practice. Fort Leavenworth KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, www.fas.org.
Turvey, Brent E. Criminal Profiling: an Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis.
San Diego CA: Academic Press, 1999.
Pillsbury, Michael, editor. Chinese Views of Future Warfare, revised edition.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/chinview/chinapt4.html 4 January 2001.
Verton, Dan. "NSA warns it can't keep up with rapid changes in IT," Infoworld.com
article, http://www.infoworld.com. 21 February 2001.

BIB-5

Vistica, Gregory. "Inside the Secret Cyberwar: Facing Unseen Enemies, the Feds Try to
Stay A Step Ahead," Newsweek article, http ://newsweek.com/nwsrv/printed/us/st/al6330-2000febl3.htm. 18Februrary, 2000.
Vranesevich, John. "How to Be a Hacker Profiler." Unpublished special report.
http://www.antionline.com/SpecialReports/hacker-profiler/category.html. 24 July
2000.
Weiss, David J., editor. New Horizons in Testing: Latent Trait Test Theory and
Computerized Adaptive Testing. New York NY: Academic Press, 1983.
Winchell, William. Continuous Quality Improvement: A Manufacturing Professional's
Guide. Dearborn MI: Society of American Engineers, 1991.

BIB-6

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
2. REPORT TYPE
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
4.

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

June 2000 - March 2001

Master's Thesis

20/03/2001

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

MALICIOUS HACKERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
AND CASE STUDY

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

AUTHOR(S)

KLEEN, LAURA J., CAPTAIN, USAF
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENS)
2950 P Street, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-7765
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

DARPA/ISO/IASET
Attn: Mr. Steve Carroll
3701 North Fairfax Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22203-1714
scarroll@darpa.mil, 703-696-2235

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

AFIT/GOR/ENS/01M-09
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an increase in the number and severity of Information Operations (IO) attacks upon DoD resources by
individuals and groups seeking thrills, monetary gain, publicity, and myriad other goals. This effort develops a first cut model of
individual hacker mentality that can be utilized to improve risk and threat assessments, mitigate Information Assurance (IA)
vulnerabilities. Further, it is a first step toward automated characterization of Information Warfare (IW) attacks based upon hacker
types.
All hackers are not the same; therefore one must understand who they are to best deal with their actions and the intent behind them.
Many hackers are not malicious. However, others are intent upon gathering information for gain, corrupting data, denying access, or
to see what harm they can cause. This effort specifically focused on malicious hackers working for nation states. Results include
advances in the way that hackers are classified and profiled, with a better understanding of their values, skills, and approaches to
hacking. Responses can then be tailored to specifics of a given class of hackers. The model developed is illustrated by a case study.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Information Operations, Information Surveillance, Motivation +, Statistical Analysis
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
REPORT

b. ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

U

U

U

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

UU

18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES

221

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Dr. Richard F. Deckro
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(937) 255-6565, ext 4325/Richard.Deckro@afit.edu
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

